Do Inclusive Societies Need Closed Borders?

The Association Between Immigration and Citizenship Regimes

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I declare that this work consists of 91872 words.

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Many political theorists assume that the openness of immigration and the inclusiveness of citizenship trade off. Yet, there is no consistent empirical evidence for this negative relationship. This dissertation advances three papers to investigate the association between immigration regimes and citizenship regimes. The first paper introduces a new citizenship policy dataset and charts policy trends. I observe a liberalizing trajectory that has stagnated as well as long-term convergence in citizenship regimes across 23 democracies 1980-2019. In addition, I advance index methodology by introducing the idea of confirmatory dimensionality testing within a three-level approach to concept formation. The second paper maps immigration and citizenship regimes in a novel and empirically validated two-dimensional typological space across those cases until 2010. Overall, boundary regimes have become more open-inclusive and less closed-exclusive over time. The liberalizing and converging tendencies are especially pronounced in immigration regimes due to liberal constraints. Based on these descriptive analyses, the third paper develops and tests the boundary politics framework across 23 democracies 1980-2010. It shows that, as theorized, in cases in which immigration-related issues are not politicized, immigration and citizenship regimes do not correlate. When immigration is politicized, immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness correlate positively as they become part of the same cultural dimension of party politics, yet they only do so after the Cold War. The evidence shows further that the strong liberal constraints that immigration regimes are exposed to cannot be fully suppressed even when nativists are strong, while citizenship regimes respond to nativist party power and become more exclusive even when immigration is not politicized. These empirical findings corroborate but also qualify the boundary politics framework. They also provoke some surprising implications for various ideal-typical positions in normative theory. The allegedly unrealistic liberal-cosmopolitan vision of open-inclusive boundary regimes emerges as the least troubled stance.

Florence together with Sev, from whom you always get a lot of bang for your Buckingham. Laura, Claudia, and Roman also enjoyed Florence with me. Elias, Murat, Carlos, Reto, and Atalja made sure I would never get bored or hungry in Lucerne. Jasmin has made Lucerne even more special. Kristin made Göttingen more meaningful. And Daniela, Kristina, Ilaria, and Evelyne did the same in Florence and beyond. Sally has continued to be my loving American mom. Jerry never forgot about me. Mürg kept in touch. Fabienne and her family welcomed me into their home. Guendalina and her wonderful family stayed close to my heart despite the distance. Andrea and Alex did as well, and generously hosted me in Colorado. Niklas and Inga always cheered for me. Krishna and Beena came to enjoy sunny Lucerne with me. And last but not least, Simone never gave up, neither on herself nor on me. Her triumph and friendship mean the world to me.

I would not be the person I am without my mother and my father, who have loved and supported me so generously and unconditionally all my life. My amazing sister and my wonderful brother-in-law have also shown relentless support and gifted me with so much joy. Their children Julia Elina and Dario Noah are our greatest treasures. This dissertation is dedicated to this awesome group of humans I get to call my family. I love you.

For my family

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SYNOPSIS

Do inclusive societies need closed borders? This problem has bothered political theorists for decades. Three prevalent positions can be characterized in a stylized way as follows. The *liberal-communitarian position* would affirm that citizenship must be inclusive to sustain democracy, and immigration must be restricted to provide the filter that is necessary to sustain the cohesion of national democratic communities in this democratic context. Conversely, the *neo-liberal-utilitarian position* argues that immigrant rights should be restricted to safeguard the openness of borders, which are assumed to increase welfare on a global scale. By contrast, the *liberal-cosmopolitan position* maintains that open borders and inclusive citizenship are not only desirable but also compatible. Focusing on varying aspects, and using different data, various studies reach inconsistent conclusions regarding the empirical relationship between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness, or related aspects thereof. Against this background, this dissertation reframes the underlying empirical puzzle and asks: *How are Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) *and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) *associated, and what explains variations in this association across space and time?*

This dissertation starts with two introductory chapters that provide, respectively, a comprehensive literature review and then outline the research question, key concepts and theoretical foundation of the thesis. Subsequently, I present three papers that provide the first necessary steps to solve this puzzle. The first paper is entitled *Stagnated Liberalization, Long-Term Convergence, and Index Methodology: Three Lessons from the CITRIX Citizenship Policy Dataset*. It argues that we lack robust and rigorous data to analyze inclusiveness of regulations for immigrants' access to citizenship across a large number of cases across space and time. To fill this gap, the paper introduces the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX). This new index measures the level of inclusiveness across 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019, zooming in on four essential policy components: conditions for the acquisition of citizenship regarding (1) territorial birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation of previous citizenship(s); and (4) integration. The paper is structured along three lessons we can learn from CITRIX. First, I propose a synthetic index methodology. The main idea of this methodology is to use statistical dimensionality tests such as principal component analysis to validate deductively specified additive concept structures. Using this methodology, I describe the construction of CITRIX and validate it in terms of content, dimensionality, and convergence with alternative indicators.

There are two additional empirical lessons to be gleaned from this paper. First, there have been two cycles of liberalization and subsequent restrictive turns mostly in integration conditions. The first restrictive turn has occurred during the 1990s and the second during the 2000s. Whereas

the former is a novel finding, the latter was more pronounced and broadly noted in the literature. 2003 marks the peak of liberalization. Afterwards, aggregate citizenship policy inclusiveness has stagnated. This is the result of simultaneous restrictions in integration conditions and liberalizations in other conditions. Second, there has been long-term convergence constituted by a first phase of convergence from 1980 to 2000, one diverging phase from 2000 to 2010, and another phase of convergence until 2019. I conclude that liberalization is more limited, and convergence more pronounced, than often assumed.

At the core of the conceptual framework of my dissertation is the underlying two-dimensional policy space established by the openness of immigration regimes and the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes. The second paper – entitled *The Architecture of National Boundary Regimes: Mapping Immigration and Citizenship Policies in 23 Democracies 1980–2010* – introduces the typology by conceptualizing *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI), theorizing their dimensionality, and then statistically mapping the dimensions and their various combinations and trends across time. I extend an existing account to argue that immigration policies are mainly exposed to fast-paced market and medium-paced liberal-constitutional forces, while citizenship policies are primarily driven by slow-moving conceptions of democracy and national identity. These structural logics should, on the one hand, create internal coherence in these two policy areas. On the other hand, the varying forces of the structural logics create different dynamics and trajectories in immigration and citizenship regimes. I argue that external liberal constraints imposed by global markets and international institutions create opening tendencies in immigration policies. These forces are also likely to induce cross-country convergence. Citizenship policies are exposed to liberal-democratic constraints, but these are weaker and more malleable by domestic political forces. This makes them more likely not to converge significantly across time; they are more path-dependent. The resulting *national boundary regime typology* features four logical combinations that can be linked to the normative debate on the topic: closed-inclusive regimes with a liberal-communitarian flavor, open-inclusive regimes with a liberal-cosmopolitan quality, a neo-liberal kind of open-exclusive regimes, and illiberal closed-exclusive regimes.

Using CITRIX and existing panel data on immigration policies across 23 democracies from 1980 to 2010, a categorical principal component analysis (CATPCA) confirms that IRO and CRI are internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. Immigration policies therefore appear more coherent than is often assumed. Furthermore, the number of open-inclusive regimes has increased, while especially the number of closed-exclusive boundary regimes has decreased. Behind this trend are aggregate liberalizing tendencies in IRO and CRI. As expected, liberalization

in immigration occurs earlier and is stronger and convergent; in citizenship, it occurs more slowly, less clearly, and is non-convergent. This is also why a substantial number of boundary regime observations still show an open-exclusive combination in 2010. Regarding citizenship, I also provide systematic quantitative evidence for a much-cited restrictive turn during the 2000s. In addition, I reveal that there was already a restrictive turn in citizenship during the 1990s. Using the two dimensions as separate variables, I find an increasingly positive correlation between IRO and CRI across historical periods. Together with the observation that relatively open-inclusive regimes are empirically possible, this defies the widespread assumption that openness in immigration and inclusiveness in citizenship trade off and suggests instead that the different structural logics may converge over time.

Using the empirical and conceptual yardsticks established by the first two papers, the third paper introduces and tests the novel *boundary politics framework* to explain the association between *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). It is entitled *Open Borders versus Inclusive Citizenship? Distinct and Common Logics in Immigration and Membership Politics.* The new theory of boundary politics claims that the correlation between IRO and CRI depends on the politicization of immigration-related issues in terms of salience and nativist party support, and that the specific combination of IRO and CRI in politicized contexts is determined further by long-term nativist party power. When immigration is not politicized, immigration and citizenship politics follow distinct logics and are not associated. When immigration is politicized, the logics underlying the politics of immigration and citizenship converge and become part of a common cultural dimension of party politics. Based on competing visions of national identity, this conflict pits nativists seeking closure against cosmopolitans seeking openness in both territorial and membership boundary-making in the context of globalization. This should translate into a positive correlation between IRO and CRI. Long-term nativist party power further determines to what extent, in politicized contexts, boundary regimes are closed-exclusive.

I test these three propositions using quantitative analyses across 23 democracies 1980-2010, added by some illustrative qualitative evidence from specific cases. The results corroborate but also qualify the boundary politics framework. In politicized settings, significant positive correlations between IRO and CRI only emerge after the end of the Cold War. Boundary regimes in politicized contexts also become more exclusive and more closed with increasing long-term nativist power only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is in line with broader assumptions in the literature, which shows how the dynamics of international migration and party politics have undergone crucial transformations after the world ceased to be bipolar. The evidence also shows

that the strong liberal constraints that immigration regimes are exposed to cannot be fully suppressed even when nativists are strong, while citizenship regimes respond to nativist party power even when immigration is not politicized. In terms of absolute values in the underlying policy space, nativist party power in politicized settings is associated with *exclusive citizenship but semi-open borders*. This shows that the distinct structural logics in immigration policymaking cannot be overcome even when immigration is politicized and nativists are strong. Instead, even in politicized settings, cosmopolitan boundary politics and more open-inclusive regimes are more frequent, as nativists have grown strong only in a few countries. Importantly, overall, the non-correlation between IRO and CRI emerging from distinct logics is most prevalent empirically, because politicization is low in most cases, especially during the last decade of the Cold War.

I conclude that the classical assumption that closed borders are a necessary condition for inclusive citizenship does not apply to real-world immigration and membership politics from 1980 to 2010 across 23 liberal democracies. The dominant trade-off assumption – both in terms of negative correlations between *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) and the low likelihood of open-inclusive boundary regimes – cannot be corroborated. The most common feature of democratic boundary regimes is that the two constituent dimensions are structurally and politically distinct and statistically independent. IRO and CRI only correlate positively in settings that politicize immigration. The liberal constraints in boundary regime-making appear to be upheld mainly by non-nativist parties, but they also limit the degree to which nativists themselves can suppress liberalization in immigration policymaking. Boundary regimes thus have a cosmopolitan bias that can be hard to overcome even in politicized contexts.

I end the dissertation with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the various ideal-typical positions in normative theory without endorsing any particular stance myself. One point applies to all normative positions: in most cases, immigration regimes and citizenship regimes follow distinct logics because immigration is not politicized. This allows theorists to operate without a strong general empirical constraint. I then present reasons why communitarians should, surprisingly, embrace cosmopolitan boundary politics and reject nativist boundary politics. This is due to their commitment to inclusive citizenship and the strong liberal constraint in immigration policymaking, which, when suppressed, is more likely to be combined with exclusive citizenship. Neo-liberal utilitarians have reasons to support nativists because they make exclusive but semi-open boundary regimes more likely, but the strongly divergent motivations driving utilitarians aiming for more open borders and nativists aiming for exclusive nationhood should be troubling. The allegedly unrealistic liberal-cosmopolitan vision of open-inclusive boundary regimes emerges

as stance that is least complicated by my analysis. More generally, I conclude that if political theorists want to consider empirical realities, their theorizing is not constrained by a trade-off or an impossibility of relatively open-inclusive regimes, but instead complicated by underlying liberalizing tendencies especially in immigration policymaking, as well as by the context-dependent emergence of boundary politics.

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The openness-inclusiveness puzzle

Introduction and literature review

1.1 THE PROBLEM

Do inclusive societies need closed borders? This problem has bothered political theorists and immigration scholars for decades and is reflected in contrasting positions. In *Spheres of Justice*, Walzer (1983: ch. 2) conceptualizes border control as an essential aspect of national self-determination and, as a consequence, suggests that democracies are morally free to restrict immigration at their discretion. At the same time, he argues that already admitted immigrants must be set on a path to citizenship, provided that their integration is tied to certain requirements so as not to undermine the cultural cohesion of a particular national "community of character" (ibid. 62). Even more, Walzer's position explicitly links border control and inclusive citizenship. Only by exclusivity at the border can a universalistic political community flourish within (Bosniak 2006: 119). If border control were abolished, so the argument ultimately implies, citizenship closure would become necessary.

Others have observed that there is a political trade-off between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of immigrant rights and their access to citizenship but draw the opposite normative conclusion. Rather than closing borders and opening a path to inclusive membership, Ruhs (2013) in *The Price of Rights* argues that temporary labor immigration programs may justify restricting immigrant rights to reduce labor costs as well as to sustain a policy of relatively open borders for more temporary migrant workers. This is assumed to be economically beneficial for migrants as well as both their countries of origin and destination. From this perspective, liberal-egalitarian domestic concerns about equal citizenship in immigrant-receiving countries are secondary – what counts is the maximization of economic welfare on a global level.

Finally, summarizing his work on *The Ethics of Immigration*, Carens (2013) challenges the conventional view that democratic states may control territorial admission in the first place. The "open borders argument" can be invoked on two separate grounds (ibid. ch. 11). On the one hand, open borders can be justified as a remedy for the unequal distribution of opportunity across nation-states, which is perpetuated by more affluent states through the combination of birthright citizenship with immigration restrictions. On the other hand, open borders can be justified by the intrinsic value of the freedom of movement. On this view, we are not completely free unless we can move freely not only within states' borders, but also across international borders and justify both inclusive citizenship and open borders.

While these three normative positions reflect essentially contested starting points about states, borders and citizenship, they rely on contradictory empirical assumptions about the political

dynamic of control over immigration and membership. Whereas Walzer and Ruhs assume – with varying thematic foci and degrees of explicitness – that there is a trade-off between openness in immigration and inclusiveness of immigrant rights and citizenship, Carens maintains that openness and inclusiveness are "compatible" (Carens 2013: ch. 13). This potential empirical dilemma is the key focus of this dissertation: Can relatively open borders be combined with relatively inclusive citizenship, or is there a trade-off between the two? More generally, how are immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness associated across space and time?

As I will show in this introduction, this empirical puzzle is still underexplored. Various relevant studies exist, but findings have been mixed. This paper-based dissertation will attempt to solve the puzzle more conclusively by presenting and using novel data by theorizing and testing the dimensionality and trends in immigration and citizenship policies in the first two papers (Chapters 3 and 4), and by developing and testing a context-sensitive explanatory framework that accounts for variations in the association between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness in the third paper (Chapter 5).

This introductory chapter is structured into two main sections. In section 1.2, I delve more deeply into the normative debate and its complexities to tease out the empirical assumptions underlying the central policy dilemma addressed in this thesis. Subsequently, in section 1.3, I review the relevant empirical literature to assess the state of art in this field. Against this background, in Chapter 2, I outline the dissertation by formulating the research question, defining the key conceptual tools, introducing the main claims – most importantly the *boundary politics framework* – and by defining the empirical focus and research design.

1.2 NORMATIVE THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Before discussing the empirical literature on policy trade-offs, I first identify in what way and to what extent ideal-typical normative positions rely on certain empirical assumptions about the relationship between immigration policies and citizenship policies. My approach here is to use a limited selection of important contributions that approximate these ideal-typical positions. My characterizations of the positions are stylized and thus do not fully correspond to the many approximations of them that are defended in the normative debate. I do not claim or aim to cover all existing positions ever outlined in the literature, but rather use and discuss those that I think are

most pertinent to this normative controversy.[1]

1.2.1   THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN POSITION

I begin by unpacking and qualifying the implicit empirical claim made by Walzer (1983: ch. 2). Walzer argues that the inclusiveness of citizenship is essential to democratic legitimacy and that, because of this normative imperative, democratic states are morally free to restrict immigration according to the will of the national political community. His starting point is that citizenship policies are constitutive for a state. By stipulating the rules for acquisition and loss of citizenship, they define the boundaries of national political communities. The second assumption is that democracies cannot completely block access to citizenship for permanent immigrants, as this would violate the fundamental constitutional principle of equality and, hence, undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system. Indeed, according to the view of democracy defended by Walzer, the complete exclusiveness of citizenship would amount to tyranny (Walzer 1983: 52-61). It follows that letting immigrants settle as non-temporary residents almost always must lead to their eligibility for citizenship in the long run. This is still a normative claim, but for the argument to function, it is assumed to apply empirically. The argument also applies specifically to territorial admission that is not explicitly temporary, and it is concerned with naturalization rather than immigrant rights. This will be important to understand how this normative position relate to others. Thus understood, for Walzer, in democratic states, *admitting long-term immigrants means admitting future members.*

Given these logical connections of immigration and citizenship policies in institutional and demographic terms, it follows that the socio-cultural make-up of the national community can change if immigration openness or, even more, if also citizenship inclusiveness is increased. Bader (1995b: 219) has labeled this idea the "second law of cultural thermodynamics."[2] The reference to thermodynamics suggests that immigration inevitably leads to a perpetual increase in cultural

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[1]   I summarize some important references that are not mentioned in the text here. For overviews in the vast field of the "ethics of migration" see for instance Bader (2005), Seglow (2005), Wilcox (2009), Carens (2014), Song (2018), and Hosein (2019). Comprehensive edited volumes are Gibney (1988), Bader (1997a), Wellman and Cole (2011), and Fine and Ypi (2016). Some important monographs are Miller (1999, 2007), Benhabib (2004), Gibney (2004), Boswell (2005a), Bosniak (2006), Pevnick (2011), Higgins (2013), Bertram (2018), Song (2019), Blake (2020), Owen (2020), Sager (2020), and Kukathas (2021). Examples of notable articles are Hudson (1984), Bader (1995a, 1997b, 2012), Carens (2003), Johnson (2003), Bosniak (2007), Abizadeh (2008), Bauböck (2009, 2011a, 2001b, 2016a, 2016b, 2020), Pevnick (2009), Brock (2011), Kukathas (2012, 2016), Zolberg (2012), Holtug (2017), Oberman (2017), and Bertram (2019). For an early comprehensive treatment focused on the implications of migration for citizenship see Bauböck (1994). There is a large adjacent field in citizenship studies on the "boundary problem" regarding the electoral and political inclusion in democracies (see e.g. Bauböck et al. 2018).

[2]   I want to thank Esma Baycan for drawing my attention to Bader's characterization.

entropy or disorder. The underlying idea is that to preserve the character of a national community, immigration and citizenship must be regulated in a way that is in line with the self-conception of this community. If this community identifies as a democracy, the crucial checkpoint for immigrants to pass must be located at the territorial gate. This is because, as we have seen, for Walzer as well as for most other democratic theorists, inclusive citizenship is itself not up for debate; it is a necessary condition for democracy (see also Dahl 1989: ch. 9; Blatter et al. 2017). If in this context of immigration cannot be restricted in the way a national community of character envisions, the socio-cultural cohesion of said community would be disrupted.

It is essential to note that Walzer neither makes a normative nor an implicit empirical claim that immigration must be restricted in any case. Instead, he states that, if we assume that long-term immigrants should become citizens in democratic contexts, the primary way to ensure a selection of future members that is in line with the will and the integrity of a national political community is by regulating immigration accordingly. If the national community in question is not only democratic but also conceives of itself as a community culturally open to immigration or even as an immigration nation – as, for instance, is the case for the US (see Zolberg 2006; Walzer 1990a) – then combining relatively open immigration regimes with inclusive citizenship regimes poses no problem. This puts self-determination and national identity rather than territorial closure at the heart of Walzer's argument.

The ethics of immigration have become a booming field in political theory in the decades following Walzer's treatise, especially after the turn of the millennium. One prominent name in the field is David Miller (e.g. 1999, 2008a, 2016a, 2016b). Expanding Walzer's work, Miller is also concerned with the need for democracy to be inclusive but adds stronger emphasis on the sustainability of the welfare state and on the need for cultural cohesion and self-preservation. More specifically, the main idea of Miller's "liberal nationalism" is that "national identities can serve as a source of unity in culturally diverse liberal societies, thereby lending support to democracy and social justice" (Gustavsson and Miller 2020). This leads him to adopt a more explicit stance on territorial closure as well as carefully calibrated citizenship as the mechanisms to build coherent and cohesive national identities. However, while supporting instruments such as language tests, Miller (2016a: 161) is also opposed to more comprehensive cultural assimilation. The latter would tilt the underlying normative conviction towards illiberal nativism.

I characterize Walzer's stance and Miller's further adaptions and elaborations as instances of an underlying *liberal-communitarian* normative ideal type. Given the long-standing debate between liberals and communitarians, this characterization might seem like an oxymoron. Following Bader

(1995a: 217), I choose this label especially for Walzer's communitarianism, which is liberal because of its strong focus on inclusive citizenship and its focus on potential border control rather than full closure. Walzer (1990b) himself also emphasizes that the communitarian critique is internal to liberalism. The same can be said of Miller, whose position can be called *liberal* because of its insistence on inclusive citizenship, as well as *communitarian* because of its focus on self-determination and cultural cohesion (Miller 2016a: 161). National communities can determine if specific conditions need to apply to distributing citizenship to safeguard cohesion, and they should have the power to regulate territorial admission in their image. In its stylized version, the normative preference of this position therefore corresponds to the ideal type of closed-inclusive boundary regimes (see section 2.6 for the typology). Because – on this view – completely open borders would necessitate exclusive citizenship, which is normatively indefensible for a democracy, this position rests on the empirical assumption that the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship trade off and resolves the tension in favor of inclusive citizenship.

1.2.2 THE NEO-LIBERAL-UTILITARIAN POSITION

The *neo-liberal-utilitarian position* explicitly starts from the premise that there is a trade-off between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of immigrant rights and the access to citizenship. Chang (2003: 770) has referred to the underlying problem as the *immigration paradox*:

> "A commitment to treat the immigrant as an equal can backfire against the alien seeking to immigrate, because the immigrant's access to this equal status does not arise unless we admit the immigrant. If the act of admission triggers obligations of justice, then we can avoid these obligations by choosing to [restrict entry]. … Thus, the source of the immigration paradox is the contingent nature of the obligation to treat the alien as an equal."

The literature drawing on this idea is mainly concerned with temporary migrant workers. The dilemma between the openness of borders and domestic liberal egalitarianism is especially virulent for this group (Carens 2008; Stilz 2010; Bauböck 2011; Lenard 2012; Lenard and Straehle 2012; Ottonelli and Torresi 2012; Dauvergne and Marsden 2014, 2018; Fudge 2014; Barry und Ferracioli 2018). Yet advocates of temporary labor migration see temporariness as part of the solution. The idea is to escape the immigration paradox not only by limiting rights but also by curtailing long-term immigration so that receiving states can "drop the assumption that immigrants are citizens in the making" (Miller 2008a: 375). The underlying principle here is maximization of welfare and the corresponding reduction of economic inequality on a global scale. The tolerance

for intra-state inequality makes the position *neo-liberal*, and its focus on the maximization of welfare makes it *utilitarian*.

Ruhs (2013) provides the most elaborate approximation and empirical contextualization of this position, but others have put forward similar normative conclusions (e.g. Chang 2002, 2003; Ruhs and Chang 2004; Bell and Piper 2005). The starting point is the *numbers versus rights hypothesis* introduced by Ruhs and Martin (2008), who theorize an inverse relationship between the actual levels of labor immigration and immigrant workers' rights, since "employer demand for labor is negatively sloped with respect to labor costs, and […] more rights for migrants typically means higher costs" (ibid. 251). Against this background, Ruhs (2013) starts by conceptualizing the idea of "labor immigration programs," which refers to a set of policies that regulate the admission and the rights of migrant workers (ibid. 53). He assumes that in crafting such programs policymakers *simultaneously* determine the numbers, the selection (in terms of skills and nationality), and the rights of labor immigrants. In this process, four interrelated goals are involved: "economic efficiency (e.g., maximizing the benefits of immigration for economic growth), distribution (e.g., making sure immigration does not harm the lowest-paid workers in the economy), national identity and social cohesion (concepts that are contested and hard to define in practice), and national security and public order" (ibid. 5). As these goals can conflict, Ruhs argues that openness (in terms of numbers and selection) and rights must be balanced according to states' national interests. He posits that "if certain rights for some migrants create net costs for the receiving country (e.g., full access to the welfare state for low-skilled migrant workers), policy openness to admitting such migrants can be expected to critically depend on the extent to which some of their rights can be restricted" (ibid. 6). Hence, he expects that "there can be a trade-off […] between openness and some of the rights of some migrant workers admitted to high-income countries – that is, greater openness to migrant workers will be associated with relatively fewer rights for migrants and vice versa" (ibid.). Regarding citizenship policies specifically, Ruhs (ibid. 173) argues that any "guarantee" of future citizenship "would significantly lower receiving countries' incentives to admit some migrant workers – especially low-and medium-skilled workers – in the first place" (see also Bell and Piper 2005: 209; Chang 2003: 770).

I shall discuss the evidence for these claims in section 1.3.3 when I review the empirical literature. What matters here is that Ruhs (2013) concludes normatively that in the specific case of temporary labor immigration programs the openness of borders should be prioritized, while immigrant rights should be curbed. For Ruhs, rights restrictions are legitimate when there is empirical evidence for a trade-off with openness. He contrasts his view to the "uncompromising

human rights approach" enshrined in the 1990 *UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* (ICRMW), which demands comprehensive rights in every dimension. Indeed, the gist of Ruhs' broader argument is that it is precisely because of the conflict between openness and expansive rights that the "human rights approach" has failed. This is evidenced by the non-ratification of the convention in immigrant-receiving high-income countries (see Ruhs 2012). Ruhs therefore calls for an alternative "core rights approach" (Ruhs 2013: ch. 7; see also Ruhs 2017), in which civil rights and fundamental political freedoms should be protected by a "firewall" (Ruhs 2013: 172), while "costly" rights such as certain social and family reunion rights may be restricted.[3] Notably, Ruhs also rejects – in Walzerian fashion – "permanent exclusion from citizenship rights" (ibid. 177) for migrants that can stay long-term. This brings us back to the puzzle of this dissertation: Can long-term immigration be combined with inclusive citizenship?

1.2.3   THE LIBERAL-COSMOPOLITAN POSITION

The *liberal-cosmopolitan* position posits both an entitlement of potential immigrants to enter and establish residence in the desired destination state as well as an entitlement of immigrant residents to rights and citizenship of that state. This position finds an approximation in Carens' book (2013).[4] His argument for inclusive citizenship is based on a theory of "social membership" (ibid. ch. 8). Because immigrants acquire factual membership in the receiving society by residing there, it would be undemocratic not to include those immigrant residents. This aspect can be characterized as *liberal* or *egalitarian*.

Carens' defense of open borders also starts with an observation on membership but adds a more cosmopolitan dimension. Citizenship – attributed at birth and usually maintained over a whole life – is a matter of luck in a world marked by great socio-economic inequality between countries. Hence, birthright citizenship can be characterized as a "lottery" (Shachar 2009) – the winners in rich states enjoy much greater welfare and life chances than the losers in poor states. Expressing this fundamental global injustice, in his seminal article, Carens (1987: 252) has famously stated that "[c]itizenship in Western modern liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances." And he concludes: "Like

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[3]   For more radical versions of neo-liberal utilitarianism see Posner and Weyl (2014), Milanovic (2016), and Weyl (2018). Focused on the reduction of global inequality, these authors argue for extensive rights restrictions and inequality within affluent states as a means of maximizing welfare on a global scale.

[4]   A useful symposium on this book has been published by Abizadeh and colleagues (2015).

feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely" (ibid.). Since this citizenship inequality is further entrenched by migration restrictions, for Carens not only exclusive citizenship but also closed[5] borders are morally illegitimate from the standpoint of global justice in a non-ideal world that features significant inequality across states (Carens 2013: 233-6).

Carens' further defense of open international borders rests on the assumption that individuals need to be free to move in search of opportunities, partners, or their preferred lifestyle. Since these interests are strong enough to ground a human right to free internal movement within states, it is morally arbitrary to deny people free movement across international borders in pursuit of the same interests. This way of defending open borders applies to a more ideal world in which states have similar levels of prosperity (Carens 2013: 236-52).[6]

Carens (2013: 277) concedes that there may be a certain trade-off between the opening of borders and inclusive citizenship. He does not "deny that there are circumstances under which immigration could threaten a state's capacity to govern itself." He explains: "A massive inflow of migrants within a short time might indeed have this effect" (ibid.). Carens also points out that a high number of immigrants can pose a "cultural challenge" (ibid. 285). And finally, he concludes that the potential conflict between open borders and immigrant rights is "strongest" regarding the right to citizenship (ibid. 288-9).

Yet, while he anticipates a potential trade-off, Carens does not rely in any way on it as a valid, strong, or explicit empirical assumption. Carens (2013: ch. 13) maintains that his arguments about the two policy dimensions of immigration rights and immigrant rights are "compatible." He insists that his open borders argument does not conflict with his conclusions about the entitlement of immigrant residents to rights and citizenship "in any important way" (ibid. 288). Hence, the only clear empirical assumption that follows from the underlying liberal-cosmopolitan position is that it should be possible for open-inclusive regimes to exist in the real world.

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[5] Even more, for Carens a state's right to *discretionary border control* is illegitimate. This contrasts with Walzer's insistence on border control as a moral right of states rather than as an imperative for closed borders as such.

[6] For other more *libertarian* theorists this intrinsic value of freedom of movement is the most central aspect. Kukathas (2021) even goes further to argue that controlling immigration also in terms of rights and citizenship seriously diminishes the fundamental value and meaning of freedom not only for migrants themselves, but also for free societies at large.

1.2.4 SUMMARY

Table 1 summarizes the three ideal-typical normative positions and their empirical assumptions. First, *neo-liberal utilitarianism* is anchored in a strong and explicit empirical hypothesis that is fully applicable to the non-ideal world: because both openness and inclusiveness imply costs and can conflict in states' pursuits of overarching political goals, open-inclusive boundary regime combinations should be unlikely, and there should be a negative correlation between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship. On this view, because openness brings benefits to migrants as well as to receiving and sending states, the ideal regime is open-exclusive. The main gap between this stylized depiction and real-world political theory is that this position is defended most clearly in accounts that concentrate on temporary labor migration and immigrant rights rather than their access to citizenship.

Table 1   Normative theories and their empirical assumptions

	Liberal communitarianism	**Neo-liberal utilitarianism**	**Libertarian cosmopolitanism**
Corresponding ideal type	Closed-inclusive	Open-exclusive	Open-inclusive
Important text that approximates the position	Walzer's chapter *Membership* in *Spheres of Justice*	Ruhs' *The Price of Rights*	Carens' *The Ethics of Immigration*
Main gap between ideal type and approximation	Trade-off assumption can be relaxed if national identities are compatible with large-scale long-term immigration and cultural diversity	Applies specifically to temporary labor immigration programs and more to immigrant rights than the access to citizenship	The idealistic aspect of the position about the intrinsic value of the freedom of movement assumes similarly affluent states as a background condition and thus only partly applies to the non-ideal world
Assumption of association between openness and inclusiveness and nature of assumption			
Correlation	Negative	Negative	No assumption
Open-inclusive regimes?	Unlikely	Unlikely	Possible
Nature of assumptions	Weak and implicit	Strong and explicit	Weak but explicit

Second, *liberal communitarianism* also provides arguments for the view that the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship are negatively correlated and that open-inclusive regimes are unlikely. However, while also fully applicable to the non-ideal world, this assumption is weak and more implicit: it does not serve as the starting point, and the gist of the argument is not closed borders but identity-driven self-determination. The normative preference for a closed-inclusive regime is therefore also weak.

Finally, for *liberal cosmopolitanism* the trade-off assumption is least relevant. It is not anchored in a strong view on the correlation between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship. However, it expects explicitly that an open-inclusive regime should be possible without making any clear assumption about their likelihood. Border control in the non-ideal world is accepted as a matter of fact but not as fully normatively justified, while inclusive citizenship can be defended for both the non-ideal and the ideal world.

Figure 1   Boundary regimes: normative ideal-types

Source   Original illustration.

Note   Labels refer to stylized clusters in normative political theory (illiberal nativism has no strong recent defender in political theory) and their ideal-typical policy combinations of open versus closed and inclusive versus exclusive citizenship regimes.

Figure 1 also displays the fourth logical ideal-type of illiberal nativism. According to this position, states should combine closed borders with exclusive citizenship. I have not introduced this type above because it is harder to identify a staunch academic defender for this position, although Miller's communitarianism (2016) may be located between the nativist position and Walzer's more liberal statement. Someone with a deeper understanding of the history of political thought can surely dig up a relevant thinker. For my purposes, which also apply specifically to the recent past, I see the illiberal-nativist position as a political project of nativist political parties. It appears to be consistent also because it does not face the trade-off that the other three positions are concerned about because they regard either openness or inclusiveness, or both, as desirable. Instead, a combination of exclusive citizenship and closed borders neither militates against the trade-off idea nor directly confirms it. One cannot eat the cake and have it, too, but one can certainly not have the cake and not eat it either. This reminds us that the main implication of the trade-off assumption is that the formation of open and inclusive boundary regimes unlikely.

1.3   REVIEWING THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

I now turn to the empirical literature that investigates relevant aspects of the underlying empirical puzzle about the association between immigration and citizenship policies. I start by examining the role that immigration demographics play in explanatory accounts of citizenship and immigrant rights policies in section 1.3.1. Then I turn to the idea that immigration and immigrant rights or citizenship policies are driven by distinct trends and logics in section 1.3.2. Next, various accounts that theorize trade-offs, but also their resolutions or alternative associations, are discussed in section 1.3.3. The role that various contextual factors play in this research area are also discussed. I summarize the lessons of this literature review in section 1.3.4.

1.3.1   THE ROLE OF IMMIGRATION DEMOGRAPHICS

I first review the evidence for a "numbers versus rights" dynamic in immigration and citizenship policies by looking at the role of demographic immigration outcomes, such as the share of the foreign-born population in a country. Even though my dissertation is on the relationship of immigration with citizenship policies, and not on immigration demographics informing immigration policies, I cover selected studies focusing on immigration policies to highlight some important considerations that policymakers may make when designing immigration-related policies. I focus on studies examining determinants of policy output, first on citizenship and

immigrant rights inclusiveness, then on immigration policy openness. I leave aside those studies that investigate the effect of immigration and citizenship policies on immigration demographics (e.g. Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Helbling and Leblang 2018). I could not find any study that looks at the potential reverse relationship by considering demographics such as naturalization rates as an explanatory factor to explain immigration policy openness.

EFFECTS ON CITIZENSHIP POLICIES

Based on a sweeping comparison of citizenship policies in 25 countries across Northwestern, Southern, and Eastern Europe, North America (including Mexico), Australia, and South Africa, Weil (2001) identifies three conditions for liberal citizenship laws: significant long-term immigration and a high number of non-citizens in the territory, consolidated borders and nation-building, and the prevalence of liberal-democratic norms. Hence, in this analysis, rather than inducing a trade-off logic, a high level of immigration is a significant factor in the context of the emergence of liberal citizenship regimes.

Howard (2009) shifts the focus from structural factors to the politics of citizenship and marked the beginning of explanatory policy analyses using quantitative comparative indices. To gauge the accessibility of citizenship for immigrants and their descendants, Howard develops the *Citizenship Policy Index* (CPI). The index measures citizenship policy at two points in time across the EU-15: the 1980s and 2008. After mapping the empirical variation and its change over time, Howard develops a two-stage and (implicitly) set-theoretic explanatory model. First, divergent levels of the CPI in the 1980s are explained by the conjunction of colonial history and early democratization; former colonial powers that democratized early are "historically liberal," whereas other countries are clearly less liberal or restrictive. Second, liberalizing changes in the other countries after the 1980s are explained by various "latent liberalizing pressures," namely international norms, pro-immigrant interest groups (comprising not only immigrants themselves but also businesses), and judicial activism (ibid. 60). According to Howard, more immigration leads to greater "demographic pressure" to liberalize citizenship (ibid. 63-4). These liberalizing pressures can be suppressed, however, if the latent but widespread anti-immigrant sentiment in public opinion is "mobilized" by electorally successful far-right parties. Howard therefore argues that strong electoral support for the far-right is sufficient for keeping citizenship policies restrictive. Only if there is no strong far-right is liberalization possible.

The final step of Howard's argument is that there is a necessary condition for liberalization to occur: a leftist government must be in power. This argument is supported both by statistical data

as well as case study evidence. In the process, a direct and linear correlation between levels of immigration – both in terms of absolute numbers as well as in terms of the percentage of the foreign-born population – is ruled out as an alternative explanation (Howard 2009: 66). The mere fact of immigration, as well as a conducive political environment, is what explains changes in citizenship policies in the EU-15 since the 1980s.

The contribution by Hansen and Clemens (2019) expands on the effect of far-right electoral success on citizenship policy inclusiveness (as well as naturalization rates) across 29 European countries from 2003 to 2014 using a statistical panel data approach. The main finding is that both far-right vote share and far-right seat share have a negative impact on policy inclusiveness. The share of the foreign-born population is used in the statistical models as a control variable, but Hansen and Clemens do not formulate a concrete expectation about a potential effect. The results show that higher numbers of immigrants are associated with lower levels of citizenship policy inclusiveness. Hence, according to this analysis, there appears to be a trade-off between levels of immigration and the inclusiveness of citizenship policies.

Graeber (2020a) offers a more comprehensive account of the party politics of citizenship in Europe. He covers the EU-15 as well as Norway from 1975 to 2014, constructing a novel index of citizenship policies based on a previous comprehensive reassessment of the literature (Graeber 2020b). His main explanatory hypothesis is that center-left governments only enact liberal reforms when they compete electorally with a far-left party, and that center-right governments restrict citizenship only when challenged by far-right parties. Finding evidence for these claims, this study identifies key missing pieces of the citizenship policy puzzle. It tells us what is needed besides leftist party power as a necessary condition for liberalization (as theorized by Howard 2009), and it provides us with a pathway through which far-right parties exert power (as shown by Hansen and Clemens 2019).[7]

Graeber also considers both immigration rates as well as the share of the foreign-born population as control variables in his statistical models. Whereas immigration rates are not statistically significant in any model, the foreign-born population shows a significant positive effect on the likelihood of citizenship restrictions, but not in all models (Graeber 2020a: 12). However, this variable also shows a significant positive effect on liberalizations in one model, making the

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[7] Solodoch and Sommer (2000) show that both far-right and far-left parties, as well as center-left parties, matter independently for birthright citizenship regime reforms. However, as they do not show the effects of control variables relating to immigration demographics (they are included in most models, but also not shown in their appendix), I do not discuss them in this section.

results inconsistent. Finally, models of net policy changes indicate that both demographic variables have no general statistically significant effect.

In his statistical analysis of economic naturalization criteria across nine Western EU member states from 1985 to 2014, Stadlmair (2018) connects far-right party politics and demographic immigration variables. Based on a new index that combines measures of naturalization fees and economic naturalization requirements such as minimum income, he shows that, on the one hand, economic criteria are stricter when far-right parties have enjoyed higher electoral support over the past decade. On the other hand, these criteria also become stricter with higher levels of recent immigration. Furthermore, Stadlmair shows that these two variables interact: the impact of far-right parties on the development of economic criteria for naturalization is stronger when immigration rates are high (ibid. 52). This shows how immigration demographics are moderated by the political process, leading to a conditional effect. This may help explain why most analyses discussed so far (except for Hansen and Clemens 2019) cannot detect a general significant effect of immigration levels, and it highlights the key role of party politics.

EFFECTS ON IMMIGRANT RIGHTS POLICIES

This lack of a consistent and general effect of immigration demographics is also apparent in studies that analyze citizenship as one variable among many other immigrant rights. For instance, Manatschal and Bernauer (2016) find that across 30 European and North American countries in 2010, the share of the foreign-born population has no effect on the extent of immigrant rights, as measured by the composite and multi-dimensional *Migration Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX). In another study, focusing on sub-national variation, Manatschal (2011) shows that the share of the foreign population has no general effect on the extent of immigrant rights afforded across 26 Swiss cantons.

The study of Koopmans and Michalowski (2017) draws the same conclusion. Covering a cross-section of 44 countries from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, Oceania, and the Americas for the year 2008, they report a null effect of the share of the foreign-born population on immigrant rights. Koopmans and Michalowski remind us that there are two basic possibilities for immigration demographics to impact policies. They theorize that the effect could be positive, because "large immigrant populations may be more able to push for rights than small ones" (ibid. 61-2). Conversely, the effect could be negative because "[l]arge immigrant populations could be perceived as more threatening than small populations, resulting in fewer rights" (ibid. 61). It is therefore also possible that there is no general effect because the two mechanisms cancel out.

Another way that immigrants can lobby for their own rights is by acquiring voting rights through access to citizenship or non-citizen voting rights, and to cast their vote accordingly. Covering 10 Western European states in 1980, 1990, 2002, and 2008, Koopmans and colleagues (2012) find evidence for this idea. The share of people with immigrant backgrounds in the electorate is a significant predictor of the extent of immigrant rights. This result holds when accounting for reverse causality by dropping the inclusiveness of citizenship policies and non-citizen voting rights – both leading to a larger immigrant electorate – from the dependent immigrant rights index (ibid. 1231).

This suggests a longer causal process linking immigration policies and immigrant rights and citizenship policies over time. It may unfold as follows. First, borders are opened, allowing more immigrants to enter and settle. These immigrants then acquire rights and some of them citizenship, transforming strangers into voters. Finally, these voters with immigrant backgrounds can exert pressure to further expand immigrant rights. Hence the link between immigration policies and the extension of immigrant rights. There is evidence for each step in this process. There is a liberalizing tendency in immigration regimes from 1980 onwards (Helbling and Kalkum 2018). These liberal immigration reforms lead to more immigration (Helbling and Leblang 2018). More immigration means that more immigrants can become eligible for citizenship, and there is evidence that higher levels of immigration translate into higher naturalization rates (e.g. Hansen and Clemens 2019). Koopmans and colleagues (2012) provide the final link by showing the positive effect of the size of the immigrant electorate on immigrant rights.

This causal chain suggests a dynamic of "policy feedback" (Pierson 1993). The main idea of this analytical perspective is that "new policies create a new politics" (Schattschneider 1935). More specifically, new policies may alter broader socio-political conditions that create a new politics, which, in turn, can also affect subsequent policymaking (Campbell 2012; Mettler and Sorelle 2014). This is one possible way to theorize and analyze linkages between policies as they unfold over time. In the immigration-related literature, it has been applied most explicitly by Peters (2017). She argues that the reduction of tariff rates incentivizes labor-intense firms to shift their production abroad to exploit the newly opened trading channels, which leads these firms to lobby for more immigration restrictions on low-skilled labor. I shall describe and justify my alternative methodological approach in sections 2.8.4 and 5.4.3, as well as in Appendix L.

EFFECTS ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES

The next important study – by Kolbe (2021) – introduces the share of the foreign-born population as a control variable in a model explaining the adoption of labor immigration programs for the highly skilled. Investigating high-skill policy liberalization events across 19 European countries from 1999-2011, she finds that immigration levels are not significant predictors for such liberalizations. However, there is a marginally significant interaction effect of immigration levels with social expenditures. This suggests that high-skilled immigrants may be targeted for economic reasons, not only to boost economic performance in general, but also to help reduce welfare costs more specifically. This reminds us that in immigration-related politics, for many citizens and politicians the elephant in the room is the welfare state, not citizenship. When explaining the restriction of focus of this dissertation in Chapter 2, I will clarify why I leave out the dimension of (social) rights for immigrants.

STUDIES COVERING MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS

Givens and Luedtke (2005) consider the inflow of foreign workers and the number of asylum applications as control variables in their statistical models explaining immigration policies on the one hand and immigrant rights and citizenship policies on the other hand. Regarding immigration policies, they cover illegal immigration, refugees, family reunification, and labor immigration. Anti-discrimination and citizenship are covered in a composite immigrant rights indicator. Their sample comprises 125 policy changes across France, Germany, and the UK during the period 1990-2002. In the model for the average total restrictiveness of the changes, both demographic variables are statistically insignificant. The same holds for immigration rights and citizenship. Only for immigration policies, the inflow of foreign workers has a statistically significant positive effect on the restrictiveness of the new law. Hence, here we find support for the idea that previous levels of immigration can create pressures to restrict immigration altogether.

The study by Abou-Chadi (2016a) features immigration demographics as a control variable in a model explaining liberal immigration policy reforms regarding immigrants' right to enter, and their right to stay, across 11 parliamentary democracies from 1980 to 2006. He considers regulations for "entry" such as the necessity of work permits, and regulations for "stay" such as the number of years required for permanent residence and citizenship. Thus, whereas "stay" regulations are in many ways analogous to immigrant rights and citizenship indices, only "entry" is truly concerned with immigration as such. Abou-Chadi (2016) finds that the demographic pressure

of higher levels of immigration are positively associated with immigration-related policy liberalizations.

1.3.2 DISTINCT TRENDS AND LOGICS?

I proceed with this literature review of the empirical literature by discussing various dimensions and trends in immigration regimes and citizenship regimes. It is essential to understand the underlying dynamics in each policy field to theorize their relationship. I then return to the distinction between immigration policies and immigrant rights in the classical literature and introduce the notion, prevalent in the more recent literature, that the two policy areas follow distinct logics.

IMMIGRATION REGIMES: DIMENSIONS AND TRENDS

Assumptions and broad generalizing claims about trends in immigration regimes in liberal democracies abound. One strand of the literature emphasizes their liberalization (e.g. Joppke 1998; Sassen 1996a, 1996b, 2012), while another emphasizes restriction (e.g. Peters 2015, 2017). Others highlight different trajectories across different historical periods (e.g. Boswell 2005b), and still others point to the multidimensionality of immigration regimes, arguing that borders are simultaneously becoming more open and more closed for different immigrant groups such as high-skilled versus low-skilled labor immigrants (e.g. Shachar and Hirschl 2014). The latter perspective has become prevalent in recent years, suggesting that immigration regimes become both increasingly differentiated and complex as well as more selective (e.g. de Haas et al. 2018). Overall, scholars emphasize that immigration-related policies and their reforms often constitute a "mixed bag" (de Haas et al. 2015: 4) of policy elements going into different directions in different dimensions.

Only with the advent of large-scale policy databases and quantitative measurements have we reached the ability to make strong inferences about policy evolution and trends in different dimensions. In the following, I summarize some important studies and findings leveraging these new data. I start with Peters (2015, 2017) and Shin (2017, 2019), who have compiled an impressive dataset covering a selection of 29 relatively labor-scarce democracies and autocracies across the globe, partly going back to the late 18th century. Peters and Shin focus on "low-skill immigration," but they do consider family reunification and asylum and refugee policies. Peters (2017: 10) distinguishes her work explicitly from studies that examine high-skill immigration. She argues that

policymakers treat the two categories very differently given that they compete for scarce talent in the high-skill sector, while trying to keep at bay much larger numbers of potential low-skill immigrants. In regulating low-skill immigration, so the main argument in her work, policymakers are driven by the preferences of labor-intensive firms, which change in response to the liberalization of imports. As tariffs for imports are lowered, these firms relocate their jobs abroad and therefore lobby for limits on low-skill immigration at home. The result is an overall restrictive trajectory in low-skill immigration regimes, unfolding across centuries because of the increasing liberalization of trade in the process of globalization.

Another widespread distinction in the literature on immigration regimes is that between economic and non-economic immigration. One can distinguish economic labor immigration from non-economic family reunification and asylum in that way. Focusing on labor and asylum as the two main primary entry channels (while family reunification is viewed as secondary as it depends on a sponsor), Schultz and colleagues (2020) introduce the concept of the "immigration policy mix" to capture the relative openness of labor immigration versus asylum policies. They highlight the potentially different logics applied to these categories of immigrants by political parties as well as the different structural limitations that allows states to select labor immigrants, while asylum seekers have stronger external claims for admission based on international law. Their analysis of 33 OECD countries 1980-2010 reveals both a shift in relative openness from asylum to labor as well as a strong pattern of convergence into more liberal policies overall. The findings therefore show that liberal democracies have not become increasingly selective by favoring economically oriented admissions. They conclude that the immigration policy mix can be explained mainly by strong structural constraints leading to cross-country convergence.

De Haas and colleagues (2018) mobilize the DEMIG database (de Haas et al. 2015) to investigate trends in both immigration and integration (and emigration) policy changes across 45 Western and non-Western countries from 1945 onwards. Regarding entry and stay, they find that policies have become less restrictive, namely for both high-skilled and low-skilled labor immigrants, but also for asylum seekers and students. Meanwhile, according to their data, family reunification and the treatment of irregular immigrants has become more restrictive especially in recent decades. Also border control policies and policing measures have been tightened. Given this mixed picture, they conclude that "[t]he essence of modern migration policies is thus not their growing restriction, but their focus on migrant selection" (ibid. 324). In addition, de Haas and colleagues find that immigration-related policy reforms have become more frequent and policy regimes thus more complex over time, and that countries' use of economic criteria for entry and stay regulations has

proliferated. They argue that this shows an increased focus on selectiveness and the potential economic contributions of immigrants (ibid.; see also Ellermann 2019).

Using the IMPIC database (Helbling et al. 2017), Helbling and Kalkum (2018) have shown instead that, across the OECD from 1980 to 2010, not only labor immigration and asylum policies liberalize and converge, but that also family reunification policies follow a liberalizing and converging trajectory. Restriction occurs in another dimension: control mechanisms regarding the enforcement of regulations such as detention, amnesties, and the treatment of irregular immigrants more broadly, have become strongly tightened in that period.

These various results show that the notion of a general liberalization across the board or a general restrictive trend in the same fashion is misguided. We see evidence of the strong liberalization, but we also see evidence for the widespread view that, especially after 9/11, there has been a surge in securitization, namely regarding enforcement and policing (Givens et al. 2009). Finally, there is some evidence for increased selectiveness.

Against this background, we must ask whether it makes sense to reduce immigration regimes to a single theoretical and empirical dimension, and how we may conceptualize and measure this dimension. This is a task that I shall tackle in the second paper of this dissertation (in Chapter 4) and my argument is outlined in section 2.6.1.

CITIZENSHIP REGIMES: DIMENSIONS AND TRENDS

The literature on citizenship regimes also often notes that different policy dimensions have moved into different directions. Regarding territorial birthright conditions, residence conditions, and renunciation conditions, the literature has diagnosed a liberalizing trend, especially across Europe (Howard 2009; Joppke 2003, 2007a; Vink and de Groot 2010). Joppke (2010: 31) has even suggested that this liberal tendency is so strong that the notion that Europe differs fundamentally from the traditionally inclusive classical settler states in North America must be abandoned. Hence, the main diagnosis in assessing trends in citizenship regimes, at least until 2010, has emphasized liberalization.

At the same time, scholars have noted a "restrictive turn," especially after the turn of the millennium, regarding conditions for civic integration such as language and citizenship tests in particular (Joppke 2008; Orgad 2010; Goodman and Howard 2013; Goodman 2014). A broad comparative overview across Europe – by Bauböck and colleagues (2006: 23) – has shown both restrictive aggregate trends in some countries as well as liberalizing countertrends in others. Others

have pointed to the rise of civic integration also in classical settler states (Dauvergne 2016). Civic integration measures have sometimes also been theorized as a separate dimension that is orthogonal to the restrictive-liberal continuum of citizenship policies as defined by the other components (Goodman 2010: 757). Focusing on skills and political values to define the content of citizenship, Goodman (ibid.) conceptualizes this dimension as the "thickness of citizenship." Furthermore, integration conditions can be seen as "promoting membership" rather than the "establishing of citizenship" that is regulated by other policy components (Goodman 2015: 1916).

In addition, Goodman (2014) shows that policy changes regarding civic integration in Western Europe are not linearly associated with the prior inclusiveness of citizenship regimes. Instead, the introduction of civic integration conditions and their purpose and quality vary with the ideological orientation of governments enacting them mainly as a further development and reinforcement of various "citizenship legacies" (ibid.) defined by the other policy components (see also Goodman 2012a). However, this layering of civic integration requirements on top of existing citizenship trajectories can also be shaped by political mobilization pushing for more restrictive measures. In that case, countries can also depart from their more inclusive legacies.

Qualifying the rise of civic integration as a "cultural turn," Bassel and colleagues (2020) highlight that in the past decades there have also been two additional turns, one "neo-liberal" and the other concerning "security." Regarding the access to citizenship of ordinary immigrants, the neo-liberal turn manifests primarily in the rise of economic requirements in terms of income and naturalization fees. Stadlmair (2018) has shown in an analysis of nine EU countries 1985-2014 that such economic conditions have tended to increase. One aspect of the "security turn" is the increased focus on criminal record requirements (another is the citizenship deprivation for alleged members of terrorist groups). Joppke (2021a: 189) notes that these "new hurdles to naturalization" put the burden of proof on individuals and their cultural, economic, and law-abiding performance – today, individuals must *earn* citizenship (Joppke 2021b). Joppke's work most clearly shows how the dominant assessment of citizenship policy trends has evolved from the emphasis on comprehensive liberalization until 2010 (e.g. Joppke 2007a, 2010) to the emphasis on culturally illiberal, securitized, and economically neo-liberal policies (Joppke 2021a, 2021b). In parallel, investor citizenship schemes – the selling of passport in return to monetary investments – have proliferated (Džankić 2018, 2019). Considering the strategic acquisition of multiple passports more broadly, observers thus speak also of an "instrumental turn" in recent citizenship policies (Harpaz 2019; Joppke 2019).

Next to the debate whether we can see liberalization or restriction in citizenship regimes or in certain policy aspects, a parallel concern in studies on the evolution of citizenship regimes has been about the degree to which they are path-dependent and persistently divergent, or dynamic and convergent. The classical assumption is strong path-dependence as they are underpinned by divergent paradigms of nationhood (Brubaker 1992; see also Favell 1998; Bleich 2005). Other studies have emphasized convergence in this area (Hansen and Weil 2001; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002: 7). Joppke (2007b) has formulated this hypothesis specifically regarding civic integration conditions, whereas the work of Goodman (2014) highlights divergence and both quantitative and qualitative differences in these conditions. The dominant view emerging from these different perspectives has been that citizenship regimes can converge, but that this convergence and their overall potential for change and dynamism are significantly constrained by their past trajectory (Manatschal 2011; Cunningham et al. 2012; Koopmans et al. 2012).

Like in the study of immigration regimes, only with the advent of large-scale policy databases and quantitative measurements can we make strong inferences about policy trends and convergence. A quantitative analysis of immigrant rights more broadly (featuring citizenship as one element) has highlighted both aggregate liberalization as well as non-convergence across 10 European countries 1980-2008 (Koopmans et al. 2012). Liberalizing changes in immigrant integration are also shown in the sweeping analysis by de Haas and colleagues (2018). The most systematic study on citizenship specifically is Graeber (2020b), who has created original data quantifying citizenship policies across 16 Western European countries 1970-2017. He documents both a restrictive but diverging trend in conditions related to integration and immigrant performance, and a liberalizing and converging trend in other policy components such as territorial birthright, residence, and renunciation conditions.

Against this background, as was the case before with immigration regimes, we must ask again whether it makes sense to reduce citizenship regimes to a single dimension. I shall tackle this task in the second paper of this dissertation in Chapter 4. The argument I advance on these points is outlined in section 2.6.2.

IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANT RIGHTS: A PERSISTENT DISTINCTION?

The distinction between immigration policies and immigrant rights and citizenship policies goes back to Hammar (1985). He uses the term *immigration policy* to refer to the conditions for territorial admission, and the term *immigrant policy* refers to the treatment of immigrants after the establishment of legal residence. Hammar (1985) argues that "[t]here is a close and mutual

dependence between the regulation of immigration and immigrant policy, but there is no one way cause-and-effect relationship" (Hammar 1985: 272). His starting point is that for immigrants the two boundaries constitute "two faces" (ibid. 273):

> "[…] one face is hard, unkind, and full of rejection, the other face is friendly and inviting. The hard face is turned towards those why apply for admittance, and the more friendly towards those who have already been accepted."

The argument that, once within the territorial boundaries of the polity, non-citizen residents or "denizens" (Hammar 1990) have strong rights claims, reminds us of Walzer's normative justification of the closed-inclusive boundary regime type. However, for Hammar the underlying dependence between the two policy areas does not reflect the dominant "hard-on-the-outside, soft-on-the-inside model" (Bosniak 2006: 119). Instead, Hammar (1985: 27) sees immigrant policies as pull factors:

> "But the two faces go together. The more generous a country's immigrant policy, the stronger are the efforts made by people outside the country to pass through even the most rigorous immigration control."

One possible implication of this hypothesis is that policymakers will bear in mind the effects of both immigration and immigrant integration policy when determining the extent to which they want to attract certain immigrants. This suggests that there might be an overarching political logic in immigration-related territorial and membership boundary-making. In line with this view, some scholars have posited the possible existence of an "immigration-integration nexus" (Meyers 2004; Boucher and Gest 2018: 12; see section 1.3.3). This notion of a policy nexus emerging from a guiding overarching logic does not necessarily imply that immigration and immigrant integration policies are positively (or negatively) correlated. Instead, it can be seen as a reiteration of Walzer's basic empirical starting point: the two policy areas are intrinsically connected in terms of policy functions and demographics.

In the following, I discuss the alternative perspective from the literature, suggesting that policymakers will find it difficult to formulate and implement an overarching strategy because immigration and immigrant integration policies follow fundamentally different logics. As a preliminary observation, this "different logics" approach is reflected in the literature at large: whereas the literature on immigration policies is rife with ideas from economics and political economy, the literature on integration and citizenship policies tends to fall within the domain of political science and political sociology (Helbling 2016: 31-2; see also Freeman and Kessler 2008).

Two seminal pieces illustrate this view. Freeman (1995) has theorized that employers are likely to be successful in pressuring policymakers to liberalize labor immigration policies. Their interests usually prevail over those of other actors, particularly over the anti-immigration tendencies in the broader public. By contrast, in his famous comparison of France and Germany, Brubaker (1992) has suggested that the basic thrust of citizenship policies as manifested in birthright regimes are crystallizations of underlying and relatively stable "idioms of nationhood." Firms and fast-paced economic dynamics have no role to play in Brubaker's theory, and path-dependent and slow-moving national identities have no place in Freeman's framework. Citizenship policies may follow a market logic when states try to attract high-skilled immigrants or potent investors (see Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Shachar 2018; Džankić 2019), but at its core they are about national identities. Immigration policies may follow an identity logic insofar as a state's self-conception is historically tied (or not tied) to immigration (see Walzer 1990a), but at their core they are about markets. However, we must bear in mind that immigration policies amount to more than the labor immigration policies Freeman (1995) considers, and that citizenship policies should not be reduced to birthright regimes, as Brubaker (1992) does. Therefore, it would be premature to expect that the underlying policy spaces and logics of immigration and citizenship never overlap.

To better understand whether and, if so, in what way immigration and citizenship follow distinct logics, I now focus on the realm of party politics as the transmission belt between underlying logics, incentive structures, and relevant societal actors and preferences on the one hand, and immigration and immigrant integration policies on the other. As we will see, for some scholars the distinct dynamics emerge because of policy-specific incentives or underlying *structural constraints*, while for others they are rooted in the cross-cutting nature of immigration-related *party politics*.

Following Money (1999a), Givens and Luedtke (2005: 2) hypothesize that immigration and immigrant integration policies follow different logics and should be considered as separate policy areas. Their first argument is that left-wing parties can capitalize on immigrant participation electorally, because immigrants tend to vote for them. Hence, the ideological left should have a more pro-immigrant orientation in integration and citizenship policies because "these have an obvious and immediate political payoff" (Givens and Luedtke 2005: 8). By contrast, the left "cannot afford to be more generous" (ibid.) in terms of immigration policies because "short-term public backlashes offset any future gains from an expanded immigrant electorate" (ibid.). Meanwhile, they argue, right-wing parties have a restrictive preference on both issue areas. Based on a study of 125 policy changes across France, Germany, and the UK during the period 1990-2002, Givens and

Luedtke (2005) find that partisanship plays a role only for immigrant integration. They conclude that future research should thus focus on the two policy areas separately.

In a more general vein, Money (1999b: 37) also posited that, in contrast to immigration integration, immigration policy is an issue that is "orthogonal to the left-right continuum." It is commonly assumed that immigration politics do not fully align with the classical divide between the economic left and the economic right (e.g. Perlmutter 1996; Breunig and Luedtke 2008). The left is divided between the "Old Left" concerned with the protection of domestic workers and the "New Left" striving for global social justice and international solidarity (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011: 868). The right is divided between the "Old Right" concerned with their core business constituency and their demand for (cheap) labor and the "New Right" concerned with protecting native culture (Odmalm 2011; Schain 2008; Natter et al. 2020). However, once we consider the distinction between immigration and immigrant integration policy, it becomes clear that – as Money (1999b) expected – there are strong reasons to assume that only immigration represents a potentially cross-cutting issue, while integration and citizenship does not (Lutz 2019: 522; Duncan and Hecke 2008). Whereas immigration has both economic (mainly regarding labor immigration) and non-economic components (mainly regarding family reunification and asylum), citizenship is perceived as a cultural issue on which liberal and leftist forces have come to embrace inclusion based on universalistic values, whereas right-wing forces embrace exclusion based on particularistic values (Joppke 2003). Analyzing changes in immigration and immigrant integration policy across 21 Western immigration countries between 1970 and 2012, Natter and colleagues (2020) find evidence for the main empirical implication of this claim: more right-wing ideology in terms of parliament composition is associated with more restrictive changes in integration, but not in immigration.

Classical accounts of immigration-related policymaking suggest that politicization could induce a common restrictive logic in both immigration and immigrant integration. In his theory of client politics, Freeman (1995) notes that the liberalizing logic inherent in immigration regimes rested on a "anti-populist norm" (ibid. 894) among mainstream political actors, who deliberately engaged in a "conspiracy of silence" (ibid. 895) on the issue to cater to the labor demand of employers (see also Joppke 1998). Regarding immigrant rights, Guiraudon's (1998) has argued that rights extensions were carried out by bureaucracies "behind closed doors" and thus away from public scrutiny. Studies by Hollifield (1992) and Zolberg (1999, 2006) have shown that, especially in the United States, this has led to the "confluence of markets and rights" (Hollifield 1992: 225) based on "strange bedfellows" (ibid. 267) of firms and human rights activists jointly fighting for

open-inclusive regimes (see also Tichenor 2002: 35-6). The common subsequent assumption is that this liberal thrust can be halted or even reversed when immigration is politicized (Boswell 2005b: 3). Hollifield (1998: 632) posits that due to increasing politicization, especially after the Cold War, "market-rights coalitions have been breaking apart." According to this idea, politicization-induced "identity politics" can "overwhelm clientelist politics" (Hollifield and Wong 2015: 267).

Recent quantitative analyses show that the structural limits in immigration policymaking are too deep even for political actors with consistent ideologies to overcome. Lutz (2021) shows that even though parties' preferences on immigration and immigrant integration are clearly positively correlated, partisan ideology translates into policy outputs only in immigrant integration and not in immigration. The explanation for these different logics is that policymakers face significantly more structural obstacles when regulating immigration as opposed to immigrant integration. Whereas the strong economic and international dimension of immigration policies limits the room for domestic political maneuvering, these constraints are much weaker in immigrant integration and citizenship policy making. Parties can thus deliver on integration and citizenship more easily than on immigration. In another study, Lutz (2019) links these structural limitations in immigration policymaking to the variation in policy success of far-right parties in government: mainstream-right parties co-opt the far-right – as junior coalition partners – in restricting immigrant integration, but they resist restrictions in immigration. The fact that the far-right cannot influence immigration policies even when they participate in government provides further evidence for the claim that there are strong structural constraints in this policy area.

Another angle on the question of whether immigration and immigrant integration are driven by distinct logics is provided by Goodman (2014). She compares civic integration requirements (such as language and integration or citizenship tests) across the EU-15. They can apply both to pre-entry testing and post-entry integration at the gates of permanent residence and citizenship. Goodman treats the pre-entry and post-entry conditions in distinct analyses. This is because "regulating immigration is an entirely separate policy venue to regulating persons in the process of seeking long-term status, as states have direct interests in seeing that residents integrate" (ibid. 15). Hence, here the difference between the two policy areas is tied to the immediacy of state's interests. And indeed, we see more policy activity in post-entry conditions. Compared to the situation in 1997, in 2014 only few states have introduced pre-entry civic integration measures (among them Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK; Goodman 2014: 49-51). By contrast, all countries but Sweden and Ireland have increased their civic integration requirements regarding the access to permanent residence and citizenship. Thus, on this count

alone, there already is a differential logic of civic integration in pre-entry and post-entry policies. Based on further analyses, Goodman states that "we see distinctly different political processes and conditions impact each policy" (ibid. 225). Notably, the Dutch case shows that the supranational context of the EU has provided opportunities to establish pre-entry conditions (see also Goodman 2011), indicating again the strong international dimension of immigration policymaking. Goodman (2014: 225) then concludes that external and internal dimensions of civic integration are "oftentimes motivated by different objectives and, therefore, serve potentially overlapping but conceptually distinct ends" (ibid.). While pre-entry conditions are intended to facilitate immigrant integration for the post-entry phase[8] alongside internal conditions, they can also serve as more general attempts to curb "unwanted immigration" (ibid. 224) in the first place.

1.3.3   TRADE-OFFS AND THEIR RESOLUTIONS

THE LIBERAL PARADOX

The potential of conflict(s) between democratic politics and economics as well as other structural constraints of "the liberal state" has been one of the core themes of immigration policy research (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001: 10). Hollifield (2004) has coined the term "migration state" to refer to the liberal-democratic state that needs to be economically open to immigration to reap competitive and economic gains in a globalizing world, but the political system of which needs to be relatively closed to be stable and to sustain national cohesion. In developing this argument, Hollifield cites Walzer to introduce the idea that liberal immigration policies can fundamentally challenge states' sovereignty and may undermine the social cohesion necessary to sustain democratic communities (Hollifield 2004: 887). Hollifield then uses this idea to argue that in the context of globalization states are trapped in a "liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992, 2004) because *economic liberalism* creates pressures for opening borders, while *political liberalism* pushes for both territorial as well as citizenship closure to preserve the democratic social contract among (native) residents. Consequently, when economic pressures for more openness become dominant, political forces should seek to restrict citizenship to maintain the "integrity of the national community" (Hollifiled 2004: 900; note the similarity to the wording of Walzer, who speaks of protecting the

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[8]   A study testing this idea more generally shows that immigrants that faced harsher general restrictions when immigrating are not significantly better integrated on several economic, social, and political outcomes, except for employment (Helbling et al. 2020). Some integration outcomes show limited and conditional but positive effects of immigration restrictions, especially for immigrants coming from non-OECD countries.

"character" of national communities). Thus understood, the "liberal paradox" implies a trade-off between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness.

However, across the broader literature, there is considerable confusion about the precise meaning and empirical implications of Hollifield's idea. Instead of trade-offs, often the idea of "policy gaps" is invoked (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015: 662). One interpretation is that the liberal paradox refers to the *democratic gap* between policymakers enacting liberal immigration-related policies despite the opposition of citizens and public opinion (Natter 2021: 112; Morales et al. 2015). For others, there is a *discursive gap* between what politicians promise and what they end up doing (Joppke 1998; Boswell 2007; Lutz 2021). For still others, there is an *effectiveness gap* between the restrictive objectives of immigration policies and the failure of these polices to restrict immigration in terms of migration flows (Castles 2004). Taken together, these gaps amount to what Bonjour (2011: 92) argues is the "true paradox": the fact that liberal states accept "unwanted immigration" – unwanted by citizens, unwanted by parties and politicians, and unintended by immigration laws themselves.

Explanations for "why states accept unwanted immigration" (Joppke 1998) have focused on the many constraints that liberal states confront. For some, the source of these constraints is external to liberal states, manifesting in a decline of national sovereignty and capacity for control due to economic globalization (Sassen 1996a, 1996b, 2012). For others, it is internal, manifesting in a liberal self-limitation and transformation of national sovereignty due to capitalist and liberal-constitutional legal forces (Joppke 1998, 2001). For still others, a similar "loss of control" has occurred due to liberal constraints emanating from the rise of global human rights regimes in immigrant rights and citizenship (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997). Especially the latter perspective suggests that more liberal immigration policies may go together with more inclusive citizenship, thus resolving the liberal paradox.

Along these lines, Hollifield argues that – in the context of a growing international labor market – an individualist understanding of political liberalism points to the possibility of a "gradual resolution of the liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992: 223). Whereas economic liberalism tends to see foreign workers as commodities, the liberal constitutional order of democracies provides the grounds for granting them rights and citizenship. Therefore, incorporating immigrants into democracy by granting rights and creating inclusive citizenship should resolve the underlying tension, while exclusive citizenship would perpetuate it. If this interpretation is correct, then the liberal paradox refers to the tension between making borders more open but keeping citizenship exclusive. In addition, the resolution of the liberal paradox suggests that there can be an

overarching accommodative logic in the form of an "immigration-integration nexus" in which more open borders and inclusive citizenship are combined.

OPENNESS VERSUS RIGHTS? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

As mentioned, the starting point of the *neo-liberal-utilitarian position* is that there is a trade-off between the openness of borders, on the one hand, access to citizenship specifically for temporary migrant workers, on the other hand. The empirical evidence for this idea is mixed. In their initial formulation of the *numbers versus rights hypothesis*, Ruhs and Martin (2008) have used some illustrative cases to support the argument. However, a subsequent response and quantitative test of this specific hypothesis found no systematic relationship between the numbers of immigrant workers and the extent of their rights on the level of nation-states (Cummins and Rodríguez 2010). Criticizing the adequacy of the data used in this first statistical analysis, Ruhs (2010) then questioned these results – and, based on new data, went on to offer a more systematic scrutiny in *The Price of Rights* (Ruhs 2013).

Ruhs (2013) proposes three interrelated hypotheses. First, he argues that, for economic reasons, labor immigration programs targeting high-skilled immigrant workers are more open. Second, he suggests that high-skilled immigrants are granted more rights than low-skilled immigrants because low-skilled immigrants create more net costs in terms of social security and redistribution. Third, and most important for my analysis, he expects possible openness-rights trade-offs for some migrant workers across high-income countries.

His empirical analysis then tests these hypotheses in a disaggregated way so as to detect "the impacts of specific rights for specific groups of migrant workers" (Ruhs 2013: 3), because there may be different costs and benefits associated with different rights for various skill levels across labor immigration programs. After confirming the hypotheses about the higher levels of openness and rights for high-skilled workers, Ruhs assesses the trade-off hypothesis. His analysis shows that across 71 labor immigration programs in 30 upper-high-income countries[9] in 2009, negative correlations are most pronounced and statistically significant between the immigration openness index and the immigrant rights index[10] as well as the separate social, economic, residence, and family reunion rights indices (ibid. 85).

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[9]   Results differ across sub-sets of the sample. There is no general negative correlation between openness and rights across all labor immigration programs. In total, Ruhs covers 104 programs across 46 countries.

[10]   The openness index is composed of 12 indicators, ranging from the need for job offers, quotas, labor market tests, to fees, skills, and language and self-sufficiency requirements. The immigrant rights index is composed of 23

Ruhs also covers access to citizenship, but it is only one among a total of 23 indicators that he uses to construct his aggregate immigrant rights index (indicators are weighted equally to yield the aggregate index; Ruhs 2013: 72, 221-6). Therefore, citizenship as such does not play a significant role in his study. The disaggregated results show that across various immigration programs and different skill levels there is no statistically significant correlation between openness and the access to citizenship (Ruhs 2013: 210-1). Thus, when it comes to the aspect that is most central in this dissertation, the openness-rights trade-off assumption appears fragile.

Two recent studies add to our empirical knowledge in this field. The first study is by Natter and colleagues (2020). While their focus is on how party ideologies in parliaments affect various immigration-related policies, they also model the association between changes in immigration openness and immigrant rights policies across 21 Western immigration countries between 1970 and 2012. They find that rights extensions (including citizenship) are negatively correlated with "entry and stay" liberalizations for all categories of immigrants, and vice-versa, providing strong statistical evidence for a general trade-off between the two policy areas. However, as this negative relationship is not their focus, they do not advance an original causal mechanism that would explain it and refer instead to the piece by Ruhs and Martin (2008) that posits a trade-off between numbers and rights in labor immigration more specifically.

The second study focuses on changes in labor immigration openness and immigrant rights (including citizenship). To explain the relationship between the two, Bearce and Hart (2018) propose an actor-centered theory that posits a positive correlation between openness and rights. They explain that the crucial actors for the numbers versus rights hypothesis are firms seeking cheap low-skilled labor that then lobby governments for both more openness and, to keep labor costs low, fewer rights. Bearce and Hart introduce another actor: firms seeking high-skilled labor. In that sector of the labor market there is much more limited supply and much larger demand. Moreover, firms are concerned about (more) rights as an additional instrument to attract high-skilled migrants. Hence, Bearce and Hart (ibid. 8-10) argue that democratic governments face lobbying pressure for both immigration openness and immigrant rights. Thus, if governments are responsive to business pressure, we should see liberalizing movements towards greater openness and more rights at the same time. Bearce and Hart (2018) then test this "accommodation hypothesis" using an original dataset to measure both dimensions across 38 relatively developed and democratic countries (mostly OECD) for the period of 1995-2016. They find a strong positive

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indicators group into the following dimensions: civil and political rights, economic rights, social rights, residence rights and access to citizenship and family reunification rights.

correlation in openness and rights, in both directions. They emphasize that this is not a causal association, but instead shows a common liberalizing logic in the simultaneous advancement of openness and rights.

Besides the different foci, empirical scope, and nature of data that are employed, one possible explanation for this inconsistency is that certain contextual conditions could moderate the openness-rights association across space and time. Ruhs (2018) addresses this issue of contextual variation. First, he examines the role of the political regime for the degree of the openness-rights trade-off. He finds that autocracies tend to combine few rights with greater openness, suggesting that these countries face much stronger trade-offs than democracies.[11] Building on the literature on varieties of capitalism and welfare states, Ruhs' (2018) investigation shows further that, across democracies, openness-rights trade-offs are only present in liberal market economies. This is surprising because, against the background of Ruhs' rationalist argument about net costs and benefits of labor immigration, one could expect that in liberal market economies – which also have liberal welfare regimes – costs would be lower than in other settings, especially than in social democratic welfare regimes (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). To explain this pattern, Ruhs (2018: S99) suggests that the mechanism at play in this context may relate to constitutive social *norms* rather than a process of rational calculus that balances various potentially conflicting political goals in light of national *interests*. This fundamentally questions the mechanism underpinning Ruhs' theory and reminds us instead of Walzer's insistence on the *identity* and self-conception of national communities as a decisive factor in regulating immigration. Social democratic welfare regimes may promote both openness and rights because both can be justified with reference to the same universalistic national identity. Thus, restricting rights may become increasingly difficult – not easier – as the door for immigrant workers is opened in this specific socio-cultural context. I take up this identity-based mechanism again when formulating the explanatory framework of this dissertation.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC ADMISSION-CITIZENSHIP NEXUS

In a stock-taking and agenda-setting article on comparative migration-related policy studies, Boucher and Gest (2015: 182) argue that research in this area is "hindered by approaches

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[11] Economists add to this literature by focusing on the relationship between openness toward migrants and internal economic inequality. Milanovic (2016: 151) and Weyl (2018; see also Posner and Weyl 2014) argue that liberal affluent states should adopt the model of the Gulf autocracies, which combine very open borders for temporary labor migrants with stark domestic inequality. Their calls for rights restrictions thus go much further than the more moderate position of Ruhs' core rights approach (2013, 2017).

that examine admission and citizenship/settlement regimes independently of each other, ignoring a possible *migration-integration policy nexus"* (emphasis added). In *Crossroads* (2018), Boucher and Gest then mount a response to this lacuna. Regarding the interrelationship between naturalization and immigration, they argue that "naturalization represents a critical factor in state calculations about […] the distribution of visa types, the quotas imposed, and the selection of applicants" (ibid. 178). And they conclude: "In short, when membership […] is likely, states can be expected to select more carefully" (ibid.). Their main empirical analysis is based on an impressive and original collection and compilation of policy outcome data (i.e. demographic correlates of policies, not policies proper) across 30 OECD and non-OECD, and both democratic and autocratic countries, in 2011, the year with the broadest coverage. Their main contribution is a new immigration regime taxonomy identifying seven main configurations of various demographic outcomes using inductive cluster analysis.

My discussion here focuses on the possible "admission-citizenship nexus" (2018: 178), which does not fully align with the taxonomy. Boucher and Gest reach four conclusions on this point. First, very high immigration flows are correlate with lower naturalization rates (ibid. 179). The authors assume that this is "due to the thinner distribution of resources that such high admissions would imply to migrants and citizens across the board," highlighting the Gulf autocracies as the prime examples for this pattern. Second, countries with high inflows of free movers in the EU have only moderately high naturalization rates. Boucher and Gest assume that this is because free movers have less incentives to naturalize (ibid.; see also Stadlmair 2017). Third, high humanitarian and family reunion flows are associated with higher naturalization rates. The authors argue that this is because both groups have strong incentives to permanently settle. Finally, a combination of high levels of economic migration and high naturalization rates is more likely in countries with strong focus on skilled immigration with effective selection (ibid. 180).

Hence, further treading the path charted by Ruhs (2013, 2018), the analysis in Boucher and Gest (2018) paints a more nuanced picture than a generalized trade-off assumption suggests. Most importantly, aspects such as free movement, labor migration, family reunification and humanitarian flows are distinguished, and it is shown that their relationships with naturalization rates differ. However, the general thrust of the argument still alludes to the tension between the openness towards (certain) migrants and the access to citizenship. Against this background, and as the main argument throughout their book, Boucher and Gest contrast the "Liberal Model" with the "Market Model," arguing and empirically documenting that the former has given way to the latter. More generous and permanent immigration and citizenship policy schemes, as identified by

authors such as Freeman and Joppke, have been replaced by a focus on skilled and often temporary migration with fewer outlets for naturalization. Such regimes allow governments "to have it both ways – effectively sanitizing globalization from its purported ills while enjoying the benefits it brings" (ibid. 6).

Crossroads marks a significant step in advancing the field. In line with its stated purpose, it succeeds in resuming and redirecting the scholarly conversation about comparative immigration and citizenship research. However, the interrelationship between immigration and citizenship regimes remains underexplored. Most importantly, future research must focus on policies proper, comprehensively theorize and rigorously test the relationships between policies, systematically trace the theorized mechanisms if significant relationships are found, as well as expand the temporal horizon of empirical data from around 2010 back into the Cold War era, and forward towards 2021. In the following, I describe how my dissertation works towards this goal.

1.3.4 SUMMARY

First, this literature review has shown that there is no indication that immigration demographics play a consistent role in shaping a variety of immigration-related policies and, more specifically, on citizenship policy and immigrant rights policies. In a nutshell, results are mixed, and there is no clear dynamic of *numbers versus rights*. It remains unclear what accounts for the heterogenous findings. Besides the variation in the construction and conceptual meaning of the independent variables capturing immigration levels, as well as variation in case selection, the fundamentally different nature of the dependent variable is likely to explain at least part of these inconsistencies. The same variables may not have the same effects because of this different nature of immigration-related and citizenship-related policies.

This latter point introduces the idea the different policy areas are driven by distinct logics. Regarding this point, I then showed that immigration-related and citizenship-related policies are constituted by multiple dimensions, and that there is some evidence that these different dimensions have moved into different directions. Next, I have set the issue of which dimension to focus on aside for this dissertation to solve, and I have found two arguments in the broader literature for why immigration and citizenship politics are underpinned by distinct logics more generally. The first is political: parties from the left to the right have preferences that are consistently pro-*immigrant* or anti-immigrant, but they do not align along a one-dimensional pro-*immigration* or anti-immigration continuum. The second is shaped by structural forces: there are stronger economic

and international constraints in immigration politics than in immigrant integration and citizenship politics. While also being exposed to liberal constraints in the form of liberal-democratic constitutions, imperatives for inclusion, and certain international law, there are especially no strong economic constraints structuring citizenship. The idea that the policies are structurally distinct should also dilute the link between partisan preferences and policy outputs even if preferences do not cross-cut party lines.

I then provided reasons why the notion of the "liberal paradox" can be interpreted as another manifestation of the "openness versus rights" trade-off assumption. I also discussed that the resolution of the paradox lies in the combination of more open borders with more inclusive citizenship. Next, we discovered that some but not all studies analyzing the relationship between openness and rights in terms of policies proper lend some support to the trade-off assumption. Context-sensitive analyses document that openness-rights trade-offs in terms of labor immigration programs are sharper in autocratic contexts and exist only across liberal market economies in democratic settings. A demographic analysis of the "admission-citizenship nexus" then showed that there can also be trade-offs between immigration demographics and naturalization rates as part of a broader shift from long-term immigration and outlets for naturalization towards more temporary forms of migration and greater selection in both immigration and citizenship.

Overall, this literature review has identified a significant research gap in the study of how immigration openness relates to immigrant rights and citizenship inclusiveness. In the following, I propose that, to move forward, we need to take a step back and rigorously conceptualize immigration and citizenship regimes and their dimensionality, then theorize more robust and context-sensitive mechanisms that can be combined into a more comprehensive explanatory framework, and then mobilize panel data to test this framework. The next section outlines how this dissertation meets these challenges.

2

Question, concepts, claims

Outline

2.1 ASSEMBLING THE KEY BUILDING BLOCKS

In this chapter, I assemble the key building blocks of this dissertation and provide an outline. I start by introducing the research question in section 2.2, then clarifying key concepts and my empirical focus in sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. The boundary regime typology is presented and explicated in section 2.6. I also discuss why, in light of the discussion of the typology and its underlying theory, new citizenship policy data and dimensionality testing is needed. Section 2.7 outlines the boundary politics framework, and section 2.8 explains the case selection and shortly presents the three papers and their research design. I conclude with a discussion of this dissertation's relevance and contributions in section 2.9.

2.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

As we have seen in section 1.2, the main empirical assumption to be evaluated from the perspective of the normative debate is whether widely open borders can be combined with very inclusive citizenship in the real world. And as we have seen in section 1.3, the main question at the heart of the empirical literature is whether there is a trade-off between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship in terms of negative correlations. In my dissertation, I rephrase the underlying empirical puzzle in its most general terms, and I add the possibility for contextual variation across space and time. This leads to the following research question:

RQ   How are *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) associated, and what explains variations in this association across space and time?

In the following, I specify the key concepts of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). I identify specific policy components that, so I suggest, form a single theoretical and empirical dimension. As we will see, this is much harder and contested for immigration regimes because these policies are more complex and multi-dimensional. I also justify why I examine citizenship regimes instead of immigrant rights and permanent residence. Some of these points are further elaborated in Chapter 4, and while I mainly provide some broader context here, there is some overlap of the text in this chapter with Chapter 4.

2.3   KEY CONCEPT I: IMMIGRATION REGIMES

Immigration regimes are comprised of the legal regulations that define the conditions for immigrant intake and for the acquisition of immigrants' legal residence in a receiving country (Goodman 2018: 814; Helbling et al. 2017: 82). Policymakers define the *openness* of immigration regimes by establishing legal ways to enter and by defining the legal obstacles that stand between potential immigrants and their status as legal long-term residents of a receiving state by using one of those legal ways to enter. At their most basic level, immigration regimes are thus constituted by those legal *entry tracks* that policymakers design for different categories of immigrants.

Empirically, the studies in this dissertation rely primarily on data from the *Immigration Policies in Comparison Database* (IMPIC), which covers data across the OECD from 1980 to 2010 (Helbling et al. 2017). IMPIC groups specific entry tracks by distinguishing four "policy fields," which at the same time "reflect the main reasons why states may accept immigrants" (ibid. 83): for economic reasons (labor immigration), social reasons (family reunification), humanitarian reasons (refugees and asylum seekers), and for cultural and historical reasons (co-ethnics).[12] IMPIC differentiates between different groups of immigrants and entry tracks within each policy field. For labor immigrants, it distinguishes between low-skilled, high-skilled, self-employed, and unspecified entry tracks. For family reunification, IMPIC differentiates between sponsors that are citizens (including Second Country Nationals across the EU) versus sponsors that are Third Country Nationals. For the category of asylum, it distinguishes recognized refugees, asylum seekers, and people with humanitarian protection. I will return to how IMPIC deals with this variety of immigrant groups and entry tracks. The final important aspect to note here is that, to facilitate national comparisons, IMIPC only includes the aspects of law that are regulated on that level. Hence, for EU member states, it only considers national-level laws.

As a second step, IMPIC distinguishes between two different "modi operandi," separating *regulations* from so-called *control mechanisms*. The former refers to "binding legal provisions that create or constrain rights" (Dreher 2002, cited in Helbling et al. 2017: 85) as they apply separately to each policy field. These regulations constitute entry tracks. The latter are "mechanisms that monitor whether the regulations are adhered to" (ibid.). They are not distinguished along policy fields, and they also include elements that refer to the treatment of irregular immigrants. They also do not constitute entry tracks but instead reflect the enforcement of regulations and their policing.

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[12]   This section draws on Schmid and Helbling (2016: 4-5).

Furthermore, two "loci operandi" account for the fact that "states regulate and control immigration not only at their borders, but also within their territories" (Helbling et al. 2017: 85). Accordingly, for both regulations and control mechanisms, IMPIC differentiates between laws that operate *externally* and laws that operate *internally*. Moreover, there are several sub-dimensions of regulations. External regulations consist of *eligibility* requirements, which stipulate the criteria for immigrants to qualify for a certain entry track, and *conditions*, which define additional requirements that need to be fulfilled (ibid.). Internal regulations consist of *security of status*, which comprises all policies that regulate the duration of specific permits and the access to long-term settlement, and the *rights associated* with specific permits across entry tracks, which mainly comprise the access to the labor market that makes residence economically viable (see Bjerre et al. 2015: 7 for a justification why these rights are considered, while other more general immigrant rights are not; see also my discussion of "permit rights" below).

To specify the concept of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO), I draw on this conceptualization by IMPIC and focus on six policy components that emerge from two basic dimensions. The first dimension covers three main categories of "ordinary immigrants": labor immigrants, immigrants that reunite with their families, and asylum seekers and refugees. I argue that co-ethnics belong to a category that is separate from ordinary immigrants. This idea can be confirmed statistically, as policies targeting co-ethnics form a separate empirical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016). Moreover, in a third of all countries in the sample, no special entry track for co-ethnics exists (Helbling et al. 2017: 83). In addition, I do not cover control mechanisms. They are conceptually separate from the concept of openness as they do not constitute rights to enter and stay but refer to enforcement and policing. They also form an independent statistical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016). I consider control mechanisms instead as a relevant policy context and control variable in models explaining IRO (see Chapter 5).

The second dimension distinguishes requirements for *entry* from residence rights that regulate the conditions for long-term *stay*. Examples for entry requirements are conditions such as job offer requirements for labor migrants, eligibility criteria such as age limits for family migrants, or regulations in terms of nationality for asylum seekers. Residence rights define how long an immigrant can stay in the receiving country under the relevant permit. This is not to be confused with the regulation of permanent residence proper, which may or may not depend on additional conditions. For instance, some Green Card holders in the US receive permanent residence rights upon territorial admission, whereas in other countries residence rights may not allow any category of migrants to renew their temporary visas or transition toward a permanent stay.

Figure 2   Immigration Regime Openness: Concept tree

Figure 2 shows the resulting concept tree combining these two dimensions into six policy components. The less restrictive the regulations of entry and stay for labor immigrants, family reunification, and asylum seekers and refugees, the higher the level of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO). While further details of measurement and aggregation are discussed further in Chapters 3, 4, and Appendix F, I note here that I use the IMPIC strategy to deal with variation across entry tracks. It proceeds as follows. In each policy field, entry tracks are recorded, coded for each individual indicator, and then averaged to yield the score on higher-level indicators. For instance, both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration policies are recorded independently without considering them as parts of another conceptual construct such as *selectiveness*. Instead, skill-selectivity is coded as one among many indicators for each entry track (grouped under eligibility), and the targeting of higher-level skills is considered more restrictive. The same holds, for example, for selectivity in terms of nationality for asylum seekers. Nationality-based discrimination is simply one indicator among many across each entry track. Another example are quotas. They are not measured to capture an alternative notion of *immigration volume*, but instead for each entry track quotas are coded as one among many indicators. If there are no quotas for an entry track, then it

receives the least restrictive score. This shows that my conceptualization serves to identify tendencies in the *general openness* of borders using a country-year approach. It covers the alternative notion of *selectiveness* by considering if entry tracks targeting specific migrant categories have been established, as well as by coding skill-selectivity as a feature of entry tracks. It also accommodates another alternative concept of *immigration volume* by considering quotas as another policy instrument regulating an entry track.

If a policy field is not regulated at all, it is coded by IMPIC as fully restrictive. This makes sense because if there is no regulation, then there is also no legal entry track. The opposite of fully open borders is constituted by the existence of at least one legal entry track for each policy field, and with regulations that explicitly specify no eligibility criteria or further conditions for entry and allow for long-term stay. This is a viable strategy to deal with the notoriously complex nature of immigration policies. These policies do not only vary cross-nationally but also within countries across different categories of immigrants or permits, and the architecture of this intra-national variation is not fully congruent across countries and years (see e.g. Ruhs 2013; Beine et al. 2016). For instance, not all countries target specific categories of labor immigrants in the same way; some countries at some points in time may have specific policies on low-skilled labor immigrants while not having specific ones on high-skilled immigrants, whereas others may have the opposite combination and still others only have unspecific ones or any combination of the above (Ruhs 2013). I discuss the intricacies of measuring immigration policies and how others have dealt with them in Appendix D.

2.4   THE MIDDLE GROUND: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS AND PERMANENT RESIDENCE

It is important at this stage to clarify why conceptualizing *residence rights* as a part of immigration regimes does not conflate *immigration policy* with *immigrant rights*. Non-transient residence rights short of the regulation of access to permanent residence proper are *immigration rights*, not *immigrant rights* (cf. Hammar 1985). Indeed, regulating the duration of stay is a necessary component of any immigration policy; it is associated directly with entry permits (Ruhs 2013; Bjerre et al. 2015: 7). Depending on the number of possible permits and their variation in legal content, such *permit rights* do not only exhibit cross-national but also intra-national variation across specific permits for specific immigrants and entry tracks (and in federal contexts they might even vary across territorial sub-units). By contrast, more *general rights* mainly show cross-national rather than

intra-national variation (cf. Koopmans et al. 2012). For instance, the right to work is often tied to permits, while anti-discrimination rights are more general.

It is hard to give more examples for rights in the two categories because the distinction is somewhat artificial. Just like immigration regimes more broadly, the architecture of immigrant rights can vary across countries; in some countries one right may be tied to permits, while in others it is not. Also, some immigrant rights are less general because they discriminate between various categories of migrants in terms of nationality or other criteria, but not in terms of permits. An example is the right of non-citizens to vote in local elections. Here, states tend to discriminate on grounds of nationality and duration of residence rather than permits (Schmid et al. 2019). However, cases like Switzerland show that this is also not applicable universally across sub-national units – only some cantons, and sometimes only some municipalities within cantons, enfranchise non-citizens, and some of them tie these voting rights to certain permits (Arrighi de Casanova and Piccoli 2018).

However, one may still mobilize Hammar's alternative conceptualization of the "three gates of entry" to argue against this conceptualization. It assigns an independent intermediary dimension to the access to *permanent residence proper*. One may also argue that the association between immigration and citizenship regimes cannot be understood without the dimension of *general immigrant rights*. My dissertation does not consider this middle ground for theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons. The theoretical reason is that territorial and membership boundaries constitute the two fundamental "social closures of nation-states" (Weber 1946: 78; Brubaker 1992: ch. 1; see also Helbling 2008: 31-2). Permanent residence and general immigrant rights may be interpreted by some scholars as aspects of membership, but they fall short of passport-holding and nationality. Hence, granting permanent residence and general rights amounts to *boundary blurring* between citizens and non-citizen residents, while the establishment of long-term legal residence upon immigration (which may be to some extent separate from permanent residence proper) and the inclusion into a receiving country's national community through citizenship acquisition regulate the more fundamental aspect of *boundary crossing* (cf. Zolberg and Woon 1999).

An empirical reason for restricting the focus of the internal dimension of immigration to citizenship is given by Huddleston and Vink (2015). They show that, across 29 European countries in 2010, citizenship policies and various fields of general immigrant rights (as well as family

reunification rights[13]) can be reduced to the same statistical dimension. The study shows that various rights and access to permanent residence and the ease of access to citizenship are so highly correlated that they can be seen as one-dimensional. It is concluded that citizenship regimes are the "best predictor" of the overall rights regime, at least across Europe.[14]

Finally, a pragmatic reason to focus on citizenship and for leaving aside permanent residence conditions and rights is that comprehensive data on these latter aspects are not available for the sample and timeframe used in this study, especially for the last decades of the past millennium. Such data would be very laborious to collect, especially when one considers a wide variety of rights. To make such an endeavor possible – especially if we cover more than permanent residence – we would have to narrow the number of rights we examine, which would inevitably provoke discussions of what would be a justifiable selection. Because of my interest to bring empirical research into dialogue with normative theory in this specific area, focusing on the fundamental boundaries defined by entry and stay on the one hand, and by citizenship on the other, provides both the most relevant and least controversial alternative.

2.5   KEY CONCEPT II: CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

Let's turn to the notion of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). Regarding immigration and citizenship acquisition, rather than emigration and the loss of citizenship, *citizenship regimes* comprise the regulations that define the conditions for immigrants to acquire the legal status of full membership in the sense of nationality (Goodman 2018: 814). Policymakers define *inclusiveness* by establishing legal obstacles that stand between immigrants and the legal status of full membership. Greater inclusiveness is understood here as implying fewer obstacles to citizenship, and hence to democratic inclusion more broadly (cf. Schmid et al. 2019: 699; Blatter et al. 2015, 2017).

This brings us to the specification of the concept of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). The first policy component I consider is the strength of *ius soli* in terms of territorial birthright conditions. One may argue that adding this component makes CRI incongruent with the concept

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[13]   This wording here shows that family reunification can be considered either as a right of a resident immigrant to bring in her or his family, or as an immigration right for the family members that can thus enter a state. Chapter 3 shows that treating this aspect as a component of immigration regimes makes sense both theoretically and statistically.

[14]   An analysis of the latest version of the MIPEX dataset (Solano and Huddleston 2020) with data across OECD countries ranging from 2007 to 2010 (I leave out the data after 2010 because the second and third article of this dissertation does not consider that period) confirms that the various types of rights form a reliable one-dimensional scale (Cronbach's alpha=0.85).

of IRO, which applies only to first-generation immigrants and not their children. I argue instead that leaving out this component would seriously misconstrue the policy options that are available to states in defining the nature and identity of their national community in terms of intergenerational continuity. It matters whether policymakers want to expand their community easily to children of immigrants they allowed to enter and stay. While the naturalization component of citizenship policies is more akin to voluntary club membership, the birthright component better captures the way in which national communities resemble families (cf. Walzer 1983: ch. 2).

Figure 3   Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness: Concept tree

Source   Original illustration.

Notes   The figure shows a three-level concept for measuring Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness; it results from four policy components: conditions related to (1) territorial birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation; and (4) integration; aggregation rules are additive and based on equal weights whenever there is more than one indicator to aggregate, except for territorial birthright conditions; more details can be found in Chapter 3 and Appendix A.

Regarding the naturalization component, the concept of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) is constituted by three additional policy components: residence conditions (residence duration requirement); renunciation conditions (multiple citizenship toleration); and integration conditions (language and citizenship tests as well as economic and criminal record requirements). As the first paper of this thesis explains in more detail, this concept specification rests upon a thorough review of the literature and extant indices (e.g. Howard 2009; Huddleston and Niessen 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Blatter et al. 2017; Huddleston et al. 2015). Most specifically, I am informed by the classification underlying the CITLAW indicators from GLOBALCIT (Jeffers et al. 2017). Besides territorial birthright, I focus on ordinary naturalization requirements and do not expand coverage to other "special modes" of acquisition such as spousal transfers, even though the latter can be very important in terms of the actual numbers of naturalizations. In sum, the less restrictive the requirements for citizenship acquisition for immigrants and their children across those four policy components, the higher the level of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). Figure 3 visualizes the core elements and aggregation rules used for the construction of my original citizenship regime inclusiveness indicator. Further details are provided in the first paper of the dissertation and in Appendix A.

2.6   THE BOUNDARY REGIME TYPOLOGY

At the core of the analytical framework of this dissertation is the underlying two-dimensional policy space established by *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). In the following, I outline how distinct structural logics drive immigration regimes and citizenship regimes and how these logics make the various policy components in each dimension internally consistent so that they can be reduced to a single dimension. I then describe the resulting *boundary regime typology*. After deriving expectations for trends in policy combinations, I discuss the need for dimensionality testing, and the need for new citizenship policy data. Taken together, these sections pave the way for the first two papers of the dissertation.

2.6.1   STRUCTURAL LOGICS UNDERPINNING IMMIGRATION REGIMES

Against the background of an overview of the empirical literature on the trends in immigration policies in section 1.3.2, I have raised the question whether it makes sense to reduce immigration regimes to a single dimension. Drawing on the conceptualization of IMPIC, and focusing on three specific policy fields (labor, family, and asylum) and two policy components in

each field (stay and entry), I have conceptualized *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) in a one-dimensional way. This conceptual decision needs both theoretical and empirical backing. I provide a supporting theory and analysis in the second paper of my dissertation.

I shortly summarize my argument in the following. Extending and modifying the account of Hampshire (2013), I propose that, on the one hand, economic liberalism and the *market logic of capitalism*[15] drives labor immigration policies. Economic globalization creates a transnational labor market to fill domestic skill shortages and human capital needs. These demands are mediated by client politics (Freeman 1995), with firms often successfully pushing for expansive immigration policies that benefit them, while the costs are diffused across the whole society. On the other hand, political liberalism in the form of *the constitutional logic of the liberal state*[16] drives greater openness in family reunification policies and asylum policies. These policies are significantly constrained by liberal norms operating at both the international and domestic level. Domestic courts have been identified as the main actors that translate these norms into expansive immigrant rights to stay and to bring in their families (Hansen 2002; Joppke 1998, 2001) as well as for non-discrimination based on ethnic criteria (Joppke 2005).

I therefore argue against the idea of the liberal paradox (Hollifield 2004) that economic and political liberalism are not contradictory but complementary. They are two parallel threads knit into the same fabric of liberal-democratic states. These two threads also reconcile political economy with neo-institutionalist accounts in explaining immigration policies (see Boswell 2007). Hence, while it can be useful to disaggregate various policy dimensions, for the purposes of this dissertation it makes theoretical sense to reduce these policies to a single continuum of openness. If this hypothesis is correct, it should be possible to reduce the various policy components of immigration regimes to a uniform statistical dimension measuring IRO. The market logic of capitalism and the constitutional logic of the liberal state should also create a strong liberalizing and converging tendency in immigration policies. On aggregate, immigration regimes should become both more open and more similar over time.

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[15] In Chapter 3, I refer to this logic as the *economic logic of the market*. I find the updated terminology here more adequate. Thanks to Vicki Finn for the suggestion.

[16] This wording is also updated; in Chapter 3, I refer to it as the *legal logic of the liberal state*.

2.6.2   STRUCTURAL LOGICS UNDERPINNING CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

After the overview of trends in citizenship regimes in section 1.3.2, I have asked again whether it makes sense to reduce citizenship regimes to a single dimension. The decision to reduce *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) to such a single continuum again needs both theoretical and empirical backing. I provide an empirical *dimensionality test* (see below) in both the first and the second paper of the dissertation; the theoretical account is spelled out in more detail in the second paper. In the following, I expand on the underlying theory about the structural logics driving citizenship regimes, which also provides reasons why these regimes can be reduced to a single dimension.

Building on Hampshire (2013), I theorize two main structural logics that drive citizenship regimes into the same direction in a complementary way – exerting either liberal or restrictive thrust. The first is the *identity logic of the nation*.[17] I use the term *national identity* as a real feature that individuals possess (Malesevic 2019; Miller 2008b: 529). However, and more importantly, this identity also has a collective appearance as a structure or institution rather than as an idea. It is a socially constructed and never fully fixed object that defines an essential aspect about the nature of a specific national community. The specific aspect I focus on is the *inclusiveness* of a national identity. This concept denotes the relationship of a particular nation with immigration as well as the extent to which all legal residents of a national territory are imagined as belonging to the nation (cf. Anderson 2006). It is inclusive if it tends to associate immigration with the national narrative and defines the nation in an expansive way to include also non-citizens as members or citizens in the making (see Motomura 2006), and it is exclusive if it tends to negate any relationship with immigration and equates the nation with resident citizens and sees non-citizens mainly as foreign intruders that can never fully belong.

I therefore focus on *territorial inclusiveness* rather than the alternative notion of *ethnocultural inclusiveness*. The latter is an independent dimension that measures inclusiveness regarding emigrants and co-ethnic members of the nation or kin groups also beyond the national territory (cf. Vink and Bauböck 2013). However, of course, my conception has affinities to the classical civic-ethnic distinction in nationalism studies. Yet, I want to avoid the term nationalist or nationalism because, beyond it theoretical range from to "ethnic" versus "civic" understandings of the nation (see Brubaker 1992; Kohn 1944; for an overview see Helbling 2008: 41-5), it has not only many gray

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[17]   I update my terminology also in this case. In Chapter 3, I use the wording *cultural logic of the nation*. Vicki Finn deserves credit also for this suggestion.

zones in between (Bloemraad et al. 2008: 158), but can also come in the form of alternative notions such as "liberal nationalism" (Miller 2008a) or "cosmopolitan nationalism" (Nielsen 1999; Eckersley 2007). Finally, it refers more generally to the broader reality of nation-states and nationalist projects in the modern era (Wimmer 2018). In my view, the term *national identity* can be more easily understood as an object that has both an individual appearance more as an idea, as well as a collective appearance more as a structure or institution, and which can be contested within nation-states in a process of continuous reconstruction and reimagination (Adamson et al. 2011: 853; Helbling 2013: 11).

The second structural logic driving citizenship regimes is the democratic logic of the liberal state. This logic can also have two appearances: it can conceptualize democratic legitimacy in terms of inclusion or exclusion. For some, democracies are legitimate if they include non-citizens either now or soon, and for others the exclusion of non-citizens or even non-natives is legitimate if it is the outcome of procedurally democratic decisions. Thus understood, national identities are complementary to the democratic logic; in some sense, they also depend on each other (Helbling 2013). The democratic logic is even emphasized over national identity in its inclusive appearance, while national identity is more important for those who think that democracy and membership in the nation go together.

The individual policy components of CRI – conditions regarding birthright, residence, renunciation, and integration – cannot be neatly aligned with these logics as was the case with the policy components constituting IRO. I argue instead that the identity logic of the nation and the democratic logic of the liberal state from a complementary pair in justifying different levels of inclusion both in each of these policy components individually and in their combination. Inclusive identities and democratic logics can be used to invoke more inclusive policies, while exclusive identities and illiberal logics can be used to argue for more exclusive policies. Conceptions of identities and democracy are slow-moving and strongly rooted in path-dependent national political processes, and they are exposed only to weak and mostly domestic liberal constraints that demand democratic inclusion and access to citizenship also for non-citizen residents. Crucially, in contrast to immigration, here also a strong economic logic shaped by global capitalism is missing, at least regarding ordinary immigrants. Therefore, I argue that citizenship policies can be expected to have only a weak liberalizing and weakly converging tendency. In other words, on aggregate, citizenship should thus become only slightly more inclusive and slightly more similar over time.

2.6.3   HOW DISTINCT LOGICS MATTER

I have argued that there are two sets of logics structuring immigration regimes and citizenship regimes, respectively. Responding to market forces and liberal-constitutional imperatives, immigration regimes react directly to globalization pressures to regulate immigrant inflows. Citizenship regimes react to the fact of immigration and reflect an amalgam of national identities and logics of democracy. These different logics do not only pull these policy areas into different directions, and they do not only generate different dynamics of liberalization and convergence, but they vary also in their nature and strength. Economic forces of globalization are not something that national policymakers can directly change after an election. Nor are liberal-constitutional protections something that a liberal state can just dispose of if it wants to remain liberal. By contrast, visions of democracy regarding the specific aspect of the inclusion of immigrants can be contested and are less integral to the liberal state. A democracy that is illiberal regarding only its lack of inclusion of non-citizens into the *demos* is still more liberal, and democratic, than a state that does away with an independent judiciary that can check executive and legislative power.

Figure 4   Boundary regimes: Structural logics and trends

National identities, as I have conceptualized them here, can be both fluid and path-dependent, depending on whether one emphasizes their structural collective nature as a feature of national communities or as an ideational phenomenon and discursive device that can be used to debate that nature itself. In some sense, they are least pre-defined by the forces of economic and political liberalism that also drive immigration regimes and citizenship regimes; they are the feature most internal to a national community. This is why I shall argue that national identities can be used as the overarching logic tying the two policy areas together, streamlining the other logics in their image – inclusive and open, or exclusive and closed – when immigration and citizenship are politicized.

This theory of four underlying structural logics generates the two-dimensional policy space constituted by *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). The theory implies that each dimension should be internally consistent and one-dimensional, and that the two dimensions should be independent. Figure 4 further summarizes the patterns that follow from the theory of distinct structural logics. Immigration regimes have strong liberalizing and converging tendencies, and citizenship regimes have a weak liberalizing and converging tendencies. Also, as immigration regimes directly respond to globalization pressures, and citizenship regimes reply to immigration, we should first see the liberalization in immigration, and only later a liberalization in citizenship. Therefore, we can expect that especially closed-exclusive regimes, but also closed-inclusive regimes, are more prevalent in more distant historical periods, and that open-exclusive regimes are more common at an intermediate stage, while open-inclusive regimes are most common in recent times. At the same time, we must keep in mind that certain countries may already be open and/or inclusive in 1980, when the analysis of this dissertation starts. In some of these cases, the adaption to immigration in the realm of citizenship, and in immigration regimes itself, can also be going into a restrictive direction (see e.g. Howard 2013; Dauvergne 2016).

2.6.4 EMPIRICAL POSSIBILITIES AND POLICY ASSOCIATIONS

The resulting two-dimensional policy space allows us to map the empirical possibilities of immigration regimes and citizenship regimes and their combination. I argue that there are no clear thresholds above which cases are *open* or *inclusive* in an absolute and qualitative sense. Differences in IRO and CRI are matters of degree, not of kind (see Vink 2017: 226; Schultz et al. 2020). For the purposes of categorization, I rely on relative differences using arithmetic means as the cut-off points. Different ways of combining these policies mainly show *quantitative* variation and refer to the location of specific cases. There is, however, also a *qualitative* element to these associations as,

for instance, relatively inclusive citizenship policies have different meaning in the context of relatively open borders than they do in the context of relatively closed borders. This provides the core rationale to construct a typology in the first place. Using this approach, we can therefore still assess to what extent observations approximate the underlying ideal types in the four corners of the policy space. We can investigate both relative and absolute variation, making this tool especially suited for analyses that are informed by, and that can speak to, a normative debate. For normative theorists, absolute variation compared against a benchmark is more important (see Blatter et al. 2017).

Figure 5   Boundary regimes: A map of empirical possibilities

Source   Original illustration.

Note   The figure maps the empirical space of how immigration regimes and citizenship regimes can be combined; labels show the four possible combinations; but note that this typology is used in a relativistic and statistical rather than a set-theoretic way; arithmetic means are used as cut-off points for regime classification.

Policy combinations can be either congruent or incongruent. Policy combinations of IRO and CRI are *congruent* if they have the same tendency – that is, if they are relatively open and inclusive, or relatively closed and exclusive. When IRO and CRI have contrasting tendencies – as in relatively closed-inclusive and relatively open-exclusive combinations – we can instead speak of

incongruent policy combinations. The observation of a congruent combination implies that in a certain country at a certain time IRO and CRI are maximized, or minimized, at the same time – depending on how close the combination is to the ideal typical corners of the policy space. Overall, patterns of more congruent policy combinations lead to more positive policy correlations, and patterns of more incongruent policy combinations lead to more negative policy correlations. Furthermore, policy combinations that resemble the underlying ideal types more closely in absolute terms will have a greater influence on policy correlations. This makes policy combinations that more closely mirror an underlying normative model more significant, thus ensuring again that there is a link between empirical and normative aspects in my analysis. Figure 5 shows this typological space as a map of empirical possibilities.

With this differentiated use of a typology, my dissertation follows the migration and citizenship literature in moving beyond "national model approaches" (Koopmans 2013: 696). For both immigration and citizenship, simple nominal classifications have been deemed too static, too simplistic, or too normative (Helbling and Vink 2013: 552; see also Finotelli and Michalowski 2012: 233-5; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). However, few have called for the abandonment of a typological approach altogether. For instance, Bloemraad (2013: 40-1) has pointed out that both a more Weberian and case-oriented ideal type approach and a more variable-oriented approach can still be fruitful for various analytical purposes. Bertossi (2011) has also emphasized that typologies are useful if we emphasize the relative nature of empirical reality vis-à-vis theoretical ideal types. Last but not least, as already indicated, for Boucher and Gest (2015: 9) "there are strong arguments for the development of typologies that combine the two dimensions of immigration" – entry and stay on the one hand, and immigrant rights and citizenship on the other. My dissertation answers this call.

2.6.5   WHY WE NEED DIMENSIONALITY TESTING

Beine and co-authors (2016) "challenge the idea that any one country is systematically the most or least restrictive toward admissions." They therefore recommend disaggregate analyses of immigration policies. In addition, to justify their own disaggregated analysis, Schultz and colleagues (2020: 3; see also Freeman 2006) criticize the construction of regime typologies to capture immigration regimes also because they "make unrealistic assumptions about the cohesiveness of policies across various subfields." They assume that inconsistencies and "deliberate malintegration" (Boswell and Geddes 2011: 47-8) may be a core part of immigration policymaking.

I acknowledge that disaggregate analyses are useful and timely. Nevertheless, when our analytical interest concerns a broader dimension of immigration openness – as in this dissertation – the assumption of one-dimensionality across this complex policy area should not only be derived from theory but also be subjected to statistical testing. The need for more empirical validations of theoretically assumed dimensions has already been identified by Koopmans (2013: 696). This also responds to the concern of Bader (2007), who has urged scholars to reduce the unstructured complexity of immigration-related policies to patterns that show some internal coherence. Hence, as I do in the second paper of this dissertation, we must ask: Can labor immigration, asylum, and family reunification policies concerning entry be reduced to the same empirical dimension?

Regarding immigration regimes, *dimensionality testing* – as I shall call this validation technique – is largely absent. An exception is Peters (2015, 2017), but she uses factor analysis primarily as a tool for aggregation rather than for the confirmation of dimensionality. For citizenship policies, there is already some evidence regarding the statistical consistency of various policy components. Helbling (2013: 546) finds that the degree of restrictiveness of civic integration conditions is only weakly correlated with the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes as measured by other indices. Similarly, using indicator-level data, Graeber (2020b) identifies two dimensions of citizenship regimes, concluding that integration conditions are separate from birthright, residence, and renunciation, which form a dimension of their own.

I argue in Chapter 3 that *dimensionality testing* is an essential part of index validation. This idea is not new, as various techniques for factor or principal component analysis have a rich history across the social sciences and psychology. They are used widely for the identification and reduction of dimensions as well as the construction of indices (see e.g. Coppedge et al. 2008; Ruedin 2015). What makes my approach original is that I see this internal validation of statistical consistency in the context of a deductive and ontological three-level approach to concept formation most prominently advanced by Goertz (2006, 2020). I argue that factor analytical methods should be applied not on the third level of operationalized indicators, but on the second level of conceptual components that constitute the concept that has itself been defined on the basic level. This differs from the classical approach in factor-analytical techniques (see e.g. Bollen 1989). I argue that dimensionality testing on the second level is more adequate because dimensions are to be located on that intermediate level of the concept, which is also most central in its significance for causal relations (Goertz 2006: 50-3). I propose further that the second precondition for dimensionality testing is that the relationship between the conceptual components that are theorized as a single dimension must be specified beforehand theoretically as *additive* in nature. This is because factor-

analytical techniques also operate with this assumption when estimating latent variables. Those techniques cannot tell us how we should combine conceptual components in other ways, or more generally, how we should combine multiple dimensions. I maintain that these are theoretical tasks that should also be sensitive to how we specify a concept regarding it causal role on specific outcome (Goodman 2015: 1919).

2.6.6   WHY WE NEED NEW CITIZENSHIP POLICY DATA

As we have seen, there are already several trend analyses in the area of immigration regimes (e.g. Helbling and Kalkum 2018). The same is not the case for citizenship regimes. While Koopmans and colleagues (2012) have explored both citizenship and broader immigrant rights, the only systematic trend analysis using a quantitative dataset measuring citizenship policies specifically across Europe is Graeber (2020b). The main starting point of Chapter 3 is to argue that we lack valid and reliable panel datasets quantifying citizenship policy across multiple decades and a large set of countries, going also beyond Europe. While numerous indices exist, I find that they are neither satisfactory for the purpose of this dissertation nor for broader analyses in this field.

I identify shortcomings in the conceptualization, validation, and aggregation of existing indices, but the main reason for adding a new dataset is to expand the coverage across space and time. Therefore, I choose to improve and expand the strand on citizenship from the *Migrant Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX). Others have also expanded MIPEX back in time (Cunningham et al. 2012; Ruedin et al. 2015). The version by Huddleston and colleagues (2015) provides the starting point for CITRIX in its first incarnation, as at the time of the construction the latest version by Solano and Huddleston (2020) was not yet available. Notably, the latest MIPEX version is more similar to CITRIX in indicator selection and construction, and it was used as a reference point for the second version of CITRIX. Also note that the index by Graeber (2020b) was developed in parallel to CITRIX.

As its original purpose is to assess countries against standards of "best practice" (see Huddleston and Niessen 2011), MIPEX as a more general index has been criticized as being overly normative (Goodman 2010: 759; 2012b; 2018: 584). Furthermore, its methodological rigor in terms of conceptualization and indicator selection has been questioned (Ruedin 2011).[18] As I demonstrate in my first paper, however, when taking MIPEX as a starting point for the specific purpose of creating a citizenship policy index, the conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation can both

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[18]   For further critical reflections on the validity of the MIPEX see Bauböck and Helbling (2011).

minimize normative judgements and meet high methodological standards. Extensive validity testing in various forms further corroborates the adequacy of CITRIX.

2.7 THE BOUNDARY POLITICS FRAMEWORK

In this section, I outline three consecutive hypotheses of what I call the *boundary politics framework*. The first two specify how the *politicization* of immigration-related issues in terms of salience and the electoral support of nativist parties moderates the policy *correlation* between *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). I argue that when immigration is not politicized, the distinct logics shaping IRO and CRI lead to a non-correlation. When immigration is politicized, IRO and CRI correlate positively as they align along a *common cultural dimension* of party politics. I call this dynamic *boundary politics*. The third hypothesis specifies how the extent of *nativist party power* in terms of long-term seat shares in legislatures determines the policy *combination* in the already politicized settings in which IRO and CRI are associated. I argue that larger seat shares of nativist parties translate into more closed-exclusive boundary regimes; both IRO and CRI start following a *common restrictive logic*. This is *nativist boundary politics*.

This framework is fully spelled out and tested quantitatively in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. The main innovation of the theory is to specify how the distinct logics and the interplay between politicization, broadly understood as jointly constituted by issue salience and nativist parties' vote shares, and more specific long-term nativist power in terms of seat shares are associated with different IRO-CRI correlations and combinations. This theoretical triplet allows us to pin-point IRO-CRI combinations with increasing accuracy in the underlying two-dimensional typological space. The proposed mechanisms are to be tested further by process-tracing case studies. As I elaborate in section 6.5 in the conclusions, this is a task for future research that goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.

2.7.1 WHEN IMMIGRATION IS NOT POLITICIZED: NO CORRELATION

The argument that immigration and citizenship policymaking follow distinct logics has been discussed at various points in this introduction. I have emphasized the theory of distinct *structural* logics, rather than distinct logics of *party politics*, to provide the theoretical basis for the boundary regime typology. Simply put, the idea has been that capitalism and constitutionalism drive immigration regimes in one direction, and democracy and national identity drive citizenship regimes in another. The original point here is that boundary-making in immigration and citizenship

follow these distinct logics when immigration-related issues are *not politicized*. The politicization of immigration-related issues is constituted jointly by the salience of these issues in party manifestos of all relevant parties in a party system and the electoral support or vote share of *nativist parties*. I use this latter term rather than far-right or radical right populist parties because it signifies more precisely their ideology in the context of this dissertation. When politicization is low, immigration and citizenship politics generally lack a strong and salient cultural dimension that would unify the various logics underpinning them. They *lack a common logic of party politics*. Consequently, we can expect that immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness should not be systematically correlated. All boundary regime combinations, congruent and incongruent, are possible. This includes open-inclusive regimes, which thus also invalidates the main implication of the trade-off assumption.

2.7.2 WHEN IMMIGRATION IS POLITICIZED: POSITIVE CORRELATION

When immigration is politicized – understood as the combination of high issue salience and strong electoral support for nativist parties – the party politics related to immigration and citizenship is underpinned by a common dimension. In this setting, various aspects of immigration-related politics become part of a transformed cultural dimension of political contestation, which is distinct both from the classical economic left-right division and older cultural conflicts about religion. This transformed cultural dimension is an integral part of what has been called the *globalization cleavage* (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; for other labels referring to the same underlying idea see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2018). I argue that, regarding issues related to immigration, the underlying division can be more clearly and specifically identified as an *identity divide*. On one side of this divide, nativists seek to subsume protectionist labor markets and illiberal democracy under *exclusive and particularistic national identities*. Borne out of this alignment of boundary logics, they push for closed-exclusive boundary regimes. On the other side of the divide, cosmopolitans adopt the diametrically opposed view: *inclusive and universalistic national identities* combined with a defense of inclusive liberal democracy and transnational labor markets lead to a preference for open-inclusive regimes. This *common logic of party politics* in territorial and membership boundary-making is what I call *boundary politics*. It should lead to an alignment of immigration and citizenship policymaking along this dimension, making the correlation between IRO and CRI positive as a result.

2.7.3   POLITICIZATION AND NATIVIST POWER: CLOSED-EXCLUSIVE REGIMES

The third proposition of the boundary politics framework is the idea of *nativist boundary politics*. This refers to a situation in which immigration is not only politicized in terms of issue salience and nativist vote shares, but in which nativist parties have also held more legislative power across past elections – in short, *long-term nativist power*. This combination of factors should induce not only a common logic of *party politics* created by politicization, but also a *common logic of policymaking*. The more seats nativists have occupied in parliament over several preceding legislative periods, the more likely it becomes that immigration and citizenship regimes start following a similar restrictive logic, leading to more closed-exclusive regimes. This, however, also implies that if nativists do not accrue much power, the other side of the identity divide will dominate immigration and citizenship boundary-making, and regimes will be more open-inclusive. This is *cosmopolitan boundary politics*.

2.8   THE THREE PAPERS AND THEIR RESEARCH DESIGN

In the following, I outline the three papers of this dissertation, focusing particularly on their research design. I then conclude with discussing the relevance and contributions of this dissertation. I start with the research design basics: which cases do I study and what data do I use to operationalize the two key variables of IRO and CRI?

2.8.1   THE BASICS: CASE SELECTION AND DATA

I select 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019 as relevant cases for the first paper, and the same set of countries from 1980 to 2010 for the second and third paper. The countries include the EU member states forming the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Japan, as well as the classical Western settler states – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This selection balances a broad coverage across space and time and at the same time satisfies the criterion of sufficient unit homogeneity. The selected countries are all independent and affluent liberal-democratic states whose adherence to the rule of law and whose robust state apparatus means that policy outputs (which are analyzed here) are effectively implemented (implementation is not covered in this dissertation; rather, it can be assumed due to this case selection). All countries can also be considered as attractive for migrants as countries of destination.

This selection also defines the scope of the argument in this dissertation. This scope does not go beyond the liberal-democratic and Western context, and for the analyses that combine citizenship with immigration regimes I only cover the period until 2010. This dissertation therefore occupies a middle ground between immigration and citizenship policy studies that are restricted to Europe (e.g. Givens and Luedtke 2005; Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2012; Goodman 2014; Lutz 2019) and those that expand their samples beyond the Western-democratic world (e.g. Ruhs 2013; Koopmans and Michalowski 2017; Boucher and Gest 2018). Adding cases beyond Europe allows us to explore variations across geographical regions as well as outside the context of EU member states. Analyzing the classical immigration nations, or settler states, in North America and Oceania allows us to see whether and how boundary politics, if present, differs from its European version. While cleavage theorists would expect boundary politics to emerge primarily in Europe (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018), migration scholar Albert Kraler expects that the link between immigration and citizenship policies is far stronger in the settler states. He argues that "[in settler states], citizenship is an instrument of migration policy and an essential element of the overall migration regime in these countries, whereas in Europe the link between citizenship regulations and the overall immigration regime has been far more tenuous" (Kraler 2006: 39). Often omitted in the existing literature, the cases of Japan and Iceland are chosen because they add further theoretically relevant contextual variation. Both are relatively homogenous in their ethnic make-up and are therefore especially useful for testing cultural versions of the trade-off hypothesis. Japan also has been prominently discussed in the literature as a notable case (Hollifield and Sharpe 2017; Komine 2018; Goodman and Pepinsky 2021). I do not add further cases in order to retain a clear focus on the Western liberal-democratic world. Japan belongs to this "cognitive world region" (Adler 1997).

Finally, this case selection also has a pragmatic aspect. As indicated, to measure the policy components of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO), I employ data of the *Immigration Policies in Comparison Dataset* (IMPIC; Helbling et al. 2017). Unfortunately, IMPIC data before 1980 is not and after 2010 is not yet available. The third paper of this dissertation will be developed further using an upcoming update in IMPIC.

2.8.2 THE FIRST PAPER: INTRODUCING A NEW CITIZENSHIP POLICY INDEX

Published in *Global Policy*, the first paper – included here as Chapter 3 – is entitled *Stagnated Liberalization, Long-term Convergence, and Index Methodology: Three Lessons from the CITRIX Citizenship Policy Dataset*. The main aim of this paper is to introduce a new citizenship policy dataset and

complement the effort with a trend and convergence analysis that can further inform the other papers of this dissertation. As indicated, it also innovates on the front of index methodology by introducing the notion of dimensionality testing within a three-level approach to concept formation (Goertz 2006, 2020).

After explaining why the dataset is needed, I address the challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). In conceptualizing the notion of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI), I argue that on the second level the concept is constituted by four policy components – territorial birthright, residence, renunciation, and integration – that form a single theoretical and empirical dimension. This specification is based on an overview of existing indices and validated in terms of content by comparing it to these alternatives. The overall aim is to steer a viable and defensible course between minimalism and maximalism. To this end, I rely on the existing conceptualization of CITLAW (GLOBALCIT 2017), which draws on a comprehensive typology of modes of acquisition (and loss) of citizenship developed by the GLOBALCIT Observatory. Besides territorial birthright conditions, I rely on policy components and indicators that are part of "ordinary" rather than "special modes of acquisition." In terms of measurement and operationalization, I use and sometimes refine a total of eight MIPEX indicators. The main reference point is especially the latest version (Solano and Huddleston 2020).

Because the variables are ordinal (and one numeric), I use *categorical principal component analysis* (CATPCA) to validate the conceptual structure of the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX). I validate the index in terms of convergence with alternative indices. The results confirm its convergent validity, though results can vary strongly across different indices. More explorative in nature, a trend and convergence analysis show the aggregate trajectories of citizenship regimes across the past four decades across 23 countries. I use aggregate means to analyze trends, standard deviations to analyze *sigma* convergence, and visual inspection to assess the results.

2.8.3   THE SECOND PAPER: MAPPING NATIONAL BOUNDARY REGIMES

The second paper – included here as Chapter 4 – was written before the first paper and thus employed a slightly different version of CITRIX, which the second paper then improved and specified more rigorously (compare Appendix C showing CITRIX 1.0 to Appendix A showing CITRIX 2.0). Published in *Comparative Migration Studies*, its title is *The Architecture of National Boundary Regimes: Mapping Immigration and Citizenship Policies in 23 Democracies 1980–2010*. Its main aim is to test the dimensionality and map the variation in immigration and citizenship regime trends, as well

as in their policy combinations and pooled correlations, over time. It combines CITRIX with IMPIC to measure CRI and IRO, and then validates their dimensionality also using CATPCA. The results confirm the two-dimensional *boundary regime typology*, as both CRI and IRO are two internally consistent and distinct statistical dimensions. Like the first paper, I use again aggregate means to analyze trends, standard deviations to analyze *sigma* convergence, and visual inspection to assess the results. Using arithmetic means as cut-off points, I categorized the country-year observations into the four regime types and then analyzed how the distribution changed across the last decade of the Cold War, the 1990s, and the Post 9/11 period. Finally, I estimated pooled correlations for the whole sample and across the three historical periods.

2.8.4   THE THIRD PAPER: A QUANTITATIVE SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE

Entitled *Open Borders versus Inclusive Citizenship? Distinct and Common Logics in Immigration and Membership Politics*, the third paper – included here as Chapter 5 – is a comprehensive draft of an that is to be further streamlined and submitted after several conference presentations and the defense of this dissertation. To assess the boundary politics framework, we need a measure for politicization and nativist power. To this end, I combine data from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP; Volkens et al. 2020) to measure issue salience with election data from the *Comparative Political Dataset* (CPDS; Armingeon et al. 2020) to measure the vote and seat shares of nativist parties. To operationalize issue salience in party manifestos, I follow the approach of Alonso and da Fonseca (2011). I start the empirical investigation with descriptive analyses of country policy trajectories and aggregate patterns in IRO, CRI, and in politicization and nativist power. I then use mixed-effects (Garritzmann and Seng 2019) and random-effects panel regression models (Plümper et al. 2005) to test the three hypotheses of the boundary politics framework. I complement the quantitative analyses with case illustrations that probe the proposed mechanisms. I draw both on secondary literature and in some cases also on primary sources.

2.9   RELEVANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Gerring (2001: 257) tells us that there is a key "trick" in the social sciences, which is to "make social science speak to problems that we care about without sacrificing the rigor that qualifies it as a science." This dissertation tries to perform this trick. Immigration and citizenship are not only important in normative political theory, or in empirical political science, but matter also for the lives of both migrants themselves as well as those encountering them, potentially

transforming these individuals, actors, and broader social structures in the process. Immigration and citizenship policies, and they boundaries they draw, are topics that matter normatively, theoretically, empirically, and practically. We should care about them. But how do we study them in a way that has normative import and at the same time can qualify as scientific?

The main contribution of this dissertation lies precisely in the connection of a specific debate in normative political theory with an empirically rigorous analysis that is valid on its own but cannot only speak to empirical political scientists, but also to political theorists. The main conceptual instrument to bridge the normative-empirical divide is the two-dimensional typological space of boundary regimes, which is key to understanding and locating both normative arguments as well as to mapping empirical variations in immigration regimes and citizenship regimes, as well as in their combinations and correlations. By doing so I join a conversation that started with Walzer's second chapter in *Spheres of Justice* in 1983, and which – to my knowledge – was first addressed in a peer-reviewed article in the study of Givens and Luedtke (2004), who were themselves inspired by a conference paper by Money (1999a). They boldly concluded that, because immigration and citizenship policies follow different logics of party politics, future studies should study the two policy areas in isolation. But they only studied Germany, France, and the UK, and they did not employ large-scale databases and panel data. Hence, it comes as no surprise that, after a decade of various studies that speak to this debate, including the key work of Ruhs (2013), Boucher and Gest (2015: 184) conclude that the "interrelationship between these various stages of the migration process is underexplored."

This holds true even after the publication of *Crossroads* (Boucher and Gest 2018). We still need a comprehensive analysis using panel data for both immigration and citizenship regimes – in terms of policies proper – that can capture not only policy changes, but also relative and absolute levels, and an explanatory framework accounting for how these policy dimensions are (not) associated. Only then will we know whether we can indeed observe a shift from a "Liberal Model" to a "Market Model," as proposed by Boucher and Gest (2018), and whether the widespread assumption of general trade-off between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness holds.

My dissertation addresses these challenges. In doing so, I make the following contributions. In conceptual and theoretical terms, I present not only a typology of boundary regimes, but I also advance a theoretical account of structural logics that underpin immigration and citizenship policies, and which generates the dimensionality and the distinct nature of those two policy areas as well as their trends over time. I do so by drawing together separate threads in the literature and extending an existing theoretical account (Hampshire 2013). In empirical terms, I

provide original evidence for the validity of this conceptual tool and its underlying theory by testing the dimensionality and the trends in immigration and citizenship regimes, and their combinations, across 23 comparable democratic countries 1980-2010. Among other things, I show that in 2010, liberal open-inclusive regimes have become more frequent than neo-liberal open-exclusive regimes. This provides evidence for both a "Liberal Model" and a "Market Model" and advances our knowledge by estimating their relative prevalence over time. I also highlight that other regime combinations still exist, and that the closed-inclusive regime that can be deduced from classical normative accounts is in fact least frequent overall.

In methodological terms, I advance an original citizenship policy dataset that serves not only the purposes of this dissertation, but can also be used more widely, and which innovates on the frontier of index methodology. Synthesizing ontological and latent variable approaches, I propose the idea of *confirmatory dimensionality testing* that is applied on the second level of concepts crafted with a three-level approach proposed by Goertz (2206, 2020). The new dataset also presents several empirical results, among them a novel finding of a restrictive citizenship turn in the 1990s, a peak of liberalization in 2003, and a pattern of stagnated liberalization produced by the combination of further restrictions in integration conditions and a counter-movement of further liberalization in other policy components. While the finding of a first restrictive turn after the Cold War – before the second one after 9/11 – is novel, the finding of stagnated liberalization after 9/11 echoes other studies (Koopmans et al. 2012; de Haas et al. 2018). In addition, I find a pattern of long-term convergence that fully unfolds only by applying this longer window of analysis. This finding puts into question the classical assumption that citizenship regimes are persistently non-convergent.

I then contribute further to theory by developing the boundary politics framework. One of the main innovations is to argue that politicization, also when it includes nativist party support as one of its components, does not imply policy restrictions in immigration and citizenship, but instead links them as parts of a common cultural dimension of party politics. Only when nativists haven been strong in terms of long-term legislative power in an already politicized setting will they make not only citizenship more exclusive, but also immigration more closed – or at least less liberal. The empirical analysis supports this claim. Indeed, this political configuration is what allows us to pinpoint boundary regimes that resemble a "Market Model" that combines semi-open borders with exclusive citizenship. Furthermore, this negative or inhibiting effect of nativist boundary politics on immigration regimes is a novel finding compared to other large-scale studies in the field (e.g. Lutz 2019, 2021). I also explain and demonstrate empirically when a "Liberal Model" in the form

of open-inclusive regimes is more likely: when nativists do not hold much legislative power, but immigration is politicized. In these cases, cosmopolitan forces at the opposite pole of the common cultural dimension of party politics are dominant. This falsifies the idea that relatively open borders cannot be combined with inclusive citizenship. I show more generally that immigration and citizenship regimes are statistically independent in most cases, providing further evidence against the widespread trade-off assumption that expects a negative correlation between the two. I also probe the mechanisms proposed by the boundary politics framework using illustrative case studies. I conclude that future research can build on these insights to provide further process-tracing evidence.

Overall, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of immigration-related politics and policymaking in multiple ways. Based on an original combination of existing and novel data, I contribute to the empirical literature on party politics, as well as to our theoretical and empirical understanding of state boundary-making in the context of globalization more broadly. The results may also inform political action by elucidating the political and structural constraints that policymakers face in a liberal-democratic context. For normative theorists, it will be most important to learn that there is no general empirical trade-off between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness. Even more, for cosmopolitans among them, it will be relevant that politicization alone may even help make possible more open-inclusive boundary regimes if it does not provide nativist parties with enough power to subvert liberal agendas. I reflect on these issues in greater depth in the concluding Chapter 6.

3

Stagnated liberalization, long-term convergence, and index methodology

*Three lessons from the
CITRIX citizenship policy dataset*

ABSTRACT

In this article, I present the second version of the Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index (CITRIX 2.0). It measures the inclusive- ness of regulations for immigrants' access to citizenship across 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019, zooming in on four essential policy components: conditions regarding (1) birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation; and (4) integration. While explaining the construction of the dataset, I advance a synthetic approach to index methodology. The main idea of this approach is to use statistical dimensionality tests to validate deductively specified additive concept structures. This is the first lesson we can learn from CITRIX. After validating the index in terms of content, dimensionality, and convergence, a short empirical analysis presents two additional lessons. First, after two cycles of liberalization and subsequent restrictive turns, mostly in integration conditions, aggregate citizenship policy inclusiveness has stagnated, but liberalized overall. 2003 marks the peak of liberalization. Second, there has been long-term convergence constituted by two phases of convergence with one diverging phase in between. I conclude that liberalization is more limited, and convergence more pronounced, than often assumed. CITRIX offers a versatile toolbox for future research to explore citizenship policies and their correlates. Regular updates are planned.

ADAPTIONS

I have streamlined the referencing style and references as such with the rest of the dissertation. Endnotes have been transformed into footnotes and numbered continually according to their placement in this dissertation. Figures and Tables are also numbered according to their placement in the overall text. I reproduce the original Appendix in Appendices A-B of this dissertation. In addition, some errors have been corrected, and some formatting has been improved. Spelling is based on American English; British English is not adapted if quoted.

3.1 WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM A NEW CITIZENSHIP POLICY DATASET

In a world where there is stark inequality across nation-states, by assigning individuals to these states, citizenship policies confer specific opportunities associated with being a member of particular societies. The chance to get a passport from another country can re-shuffle the cards that individuals hold in all kinds of social dimensions, especially when the new passport grants membership in an affluent democracy, and even more so when the country of origin is poor. But citizenship is more than a passport, and it amounts to more than the (economic) opportunities it implies. Citizenship for immigrants is a fundamental especially in democratic societies because it endows them with the "highest standard of equal treatment" (Baubök et al. 2013: 40). If access to citizenship were completely blocked, immigrants could never become full members of a democratic community. Thus, in many respects, access to citizenship for immigrants is key.

Given the fundamental importance of citizenship, it is not surprising that citizenship policy indices have boomed during the last two decades (Goodman 2015; Helbling 2013). However, existing datasets are not optimal in several respects. There are indicators that are crude in construction, for instance that of Fitzgerald and colleagues (2014). By contrast, indicators such as MIPEX (at least in earlier versions; Huddleston et al. 2015) could be considered too detailed and expansive in terms of content. Another problem is that some measures are not publicly available, as is the case with the BNI by Janoski (2010). As a result, we cannot do justice to some of the nagging citizenship questions that are pertinent in both academic and political debates. We might begin with the following puzzle: How have citizenship policies regarding immigrants evolved? Have they become more liberal or more restrictive? And have they converged across countries?

An analysis using the first version of the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX 1.0) has shown that there has been limited liberalization as well as non-significant convergence in citizenship policies until 2010. More details can be found in Schmid (2020), which embeds the analysis of citizenship policies in a broader theoretical framework of two-dimensional boundary regimes featuring both immigration and citizenship policies.

In this article, I introduce CITRIX 2.0. It improves its predecessor by expanding the dataset until 2019, refining the coding scheme of some indicators, and correcting a few coding mistakes. Following the rationale of this Special Section, CITRIX does not reinvent the wheel but instead assembles existing sets of indicators for concept specification, measurement, and data (Solano and Helbling 2021, this Special Section). Mainly anchored in selected and partly refined

indicators that feature in MIPEX, CITRIX covers four essential policy components that pertain to the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants and their children: conditions concerning (1) birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation; and (4) integration. The dataset is available for 23 OECD countries across Southern and Western Europe, the Anglo-Saxon settler states as well as Japan, and covers 40 years (1980-2019). CITRIX therefore expands the citizenship measurement toolbox, particularly facilitating the hitherto limited potential for the analysis of policy change (Solano and Huddleston, this Special Section).

I argue that there are *three lessons* that CITRIX 2.0 can teach us. The first lesson and main focus of the article concerns *index methodology*. I advance a synthetic approach in which latent variable models serve as *confirmatory dimensionality tests* of three-level concepts theorized within an ontological framework (Goertz 2020). A robust quantitative index should not only be firmly rooted in ontology, but also statistically validated in its dimensionality. More specifically, the second-level constituent parts of a one-dimensional concept theorizing an additive structure among these parts should be strongly and positively intercorrelated and thus reducible to a single consistent statistical dimension. Showing how this synthetic approach can be applied, CITRIX advances the "conversation on methodology" (Goodman 2015: 1909) in the field of migration-related policy indicators.

The second lesson of CITRIX concerns the aggregate trend of *stagnated liberalization* in citizenship policy inclusiveness over time. This trend unfolds in *three phases*. The first phase is a cycle of initial liberalization until 1992 and a first restrictive turn until 1999. This first restrictive turn is an *integrationist turn*, as it is mostly caused by the tightening of integration conditions. The second phase is a rapid liberalization until a peak in 2003 and a second restrictive turn until 2006. This second restrictive turn has been noted in much of the literature (e.g. Joppke 2008) and is also mainly caused by a restrictive trajectory in integration conditions; it marks the *second integrationist turn*. The third phase is *stagnation* and fluctuation until 2019, ending up at a level lower than the 2003 peak. This pattern is produced by a continuing restrictive trend in integration conditions that is offset by a liberalizing trend in other conditions.

The third lesson of CITRIX concerns the *long-term convergence* in citizenship policy inclusiveness over time. This tendency also unfolds in *three phases: early convergence* until 2000, *intermediate divergence* until 2010, and *late convergence* until 2019. Many quantitative analyses so far show non-convergence or very limited convergence (e.g. Koopmans et al. 2012; Schmid 2020). I demonstrate in this article that substantial convergence only comes into view with a prolonged

window of analysis. Overall, my analysis shows that liberalization is more circumscribed, and convergence more noticeable, than often assumed.

3.2   WHY ANOTHER CITIZENSHIP POLICY INDEX?

Why do we need yet another citizenship policy index? The extant literature gives us some important hints. Providing an overview of the state of art, researchers from the IMPALA project – an undertaking that seeks to collect migration-related policy data – come to the conclusion that "disagreement remains over which are the best indicators of naturalization policies" (Gest et al. 2014: 264). However, empirical analyses show that, despite conceptual differences, most of the existing indices are positively correlated to a high degree (Helbling 2013). Helbling (ibid. 569) therefore concludes that "[i]nstead of building yet another index, it would […] be better to expand the existing ones."

Following this advice, the goal in this section is to survey existing indicators and to identify a dataset suitable for expansion. I start with the *Barrier to Nationality Index* (BNI), which was introduced by Janoski (2010). It covers 18 OECD countries from 1960 to 2005. Another is the index that can be derived from the indicators of Fitzgerald et al. (2014). It covers 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. The data collected by Peters and Shin also includes an indicator measuring citizenship policy (Peters 2017; Shin 2017, 2019). Their data covers a total of 29 democratic as well as autocratic countries, extending back into the 18th century in some cases. Finally, the DEMIG database records migration policy changes that also cover the area of access to citizenship for immigrants across 45 various countries around the globe in the period from 1945 to 2014 (de Haas et al. 2015).

These datasets have significant limitations. Besides not being available online, the BNI (Janoski 2010) is complex and not transparent in its construction. Conversely, the data by Fitzgerald et al. (2014) are narrow in indicator selection and crude in measurement. The dataset by Peters (2017) and Shin (2017, 2019) has a flexible but composite coding scheme and citizenship policy is only one among a broader set of indicators intended to measure a more comprehensive concept. Lastly, DEMIG is not suitable to quantify the relative levels of citizenship policy inclusiveness because it focuses on policy change (de Haas et al. 2015).

Other indices such as the *Citizenship Policy Index* (CPI; Howard 2009) or the *Indicators for Citizenship Rights of Immigrants* (ICRI; Koopmans et al. 2012) may be better concerning their conceptualization and measurement, but they provide only a relatively low spatio-temporal

coverage that could be used as a starting point. Finally, the CITLAW[19] indicators from the GLOBALCIT Observatory (2017, 2019) offer a comprehensive, fine-grained, and transparent conceptualization and measurement. However, it would be very demanding for a single researcher to expand them beyond the currently available cross-sections covering 2011 and 2016 to a large set of observations extending several decades back in time. I conclude that it would be useful to create a new dataset that uses a broad conceptualization and covers many countries across the past decades. The same conclusion motivated CITRIX in its first version (Schmid 2020).

While CITRIX was being developed, others have also found it necessary to produce new datasets. For instance, for their study of far-right party influence on citizenship policies, Hansen and Clemens (2019) cover: (1) a three-point indicator for the strength of *ius soli*; (2) the residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalization, for spousal transfer, and the duration of marriage for the latter; and (3) a three-point indicator for the toleration of multiple citizenship. The data spans 29 European countries from 2003 to 2014. The main limitation here is that the data only covers this century, and that integration conditions such as language tests are not considered.

Graeber (2020b) has also developed a novel dataset to investigate trends and convergence. It is based on a com- prehensive and systematic theorization, rooted in an encompassing reassessment of the literature. Graeber covers: (1) the residence duration requirement; (2) a three-point[20] indicator for the toleration of multiple citizenship; (3) a three- point indicator for the strength of *ius soli*; (4) a dummy indicating whether there is privileged access for co-ethnics; (5) a four-point indicator for language tests; (6) a three-point indicator for economic requirements; (7) a three-point indicator for citizenship tests; (8) a three-point indicator for criminal record conditions; and (9) a three-point indicator for the ease of spousal transfer. The data includes 16 European states from 1970 to 2017. The only clear limitation I can identify here is the restriction to Western Europe.

Developed in parallel, CITRIX provides an alternative to Graeber (2020b). Applying a more pragmatic approach and following the plea of Helbling (2013) to build on existing data, I identify MIPEX as a broad and solid basis for refinement and expansion. MIPEX has a straightforward and transparent coding scheme, is readily available, and has far-reaching coverage across a maximum of 52 countries from 2007 to 2019 (the number of countries has increased over time and some indicators have been modified; Solano and Huddleston 2020). An early version of

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[19] https://globalcit.eu/citizenship-law-indicators/

[20] This is my interpretation of the text. I could obtain neither the appendix nor the data from Graeber (2020b), where these details are clarified.

MIPEX has been shown that it is reliable as a general scale (Ruedin 2011). The various dimensions of MIPEX have also been found to be reliable, but "in most instances the scales could be improved by removing specific items" (ibid. 2). Considering this finding, and in light of the conceptualizations in extant indices, CITRIX reduces, regroups, and – where useful – refines the MIPEX indicators covering access to citizenship.

3.3 CITIZENSHIP REGIME INCLUSIVENESS: CONCEPT SPECIFICATION AND CONTENT VALIDITY

The basic-level concept of CITRIX can be called *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI). Policymakers define inclusiveness by establishing legal obstacles that stand between immigrants and the legal status of full membership. Greater inclusiveness is thus understood here as implying fewer obstacles and not as a feature making political systems more or less democratic (cf. Blatter et al. 2015, 2017; Schmid et al. 2019: 699). It is useful to use the normatively charged notion of inclusiveness nevertheless because it serves as a reminder of associated democratic values and theories.

Furthermore, CRI is not about *policy effects* or *intents*. For instance, language tests can be assumed to facilitate integration, but their presence is an obstacle that immigrants have to overcome on their way to a new passport. Regardless of their effects on *de facto* inclusion, and independent of whether more or less inclusion or integration was the intent behind the policy, tests are more exclusive than no tests. This contrasts with existing research on civic integration policies that considers the meaning of these policies – in terms of intended effects – also in a qualitative way (Goodman 2014). I appreciate this additional dimension of analysis, but it is indeed additional. Intents and effects should not be conflated with legal obstacles as such.

Implementation and *policy outcomes* such as naturalization rates are also not considered. CRI focuses on policy outputs, that is, on laws as such. Other scholars also argue that this distinction is crucial and should be maintained (e.g. Gest et al. 2014; Janoski 2010; see also Helbling 2013). While combining outputs with implementation and outcomes is useful to get a complete picture for a normative evaluation (see Blatter et al. 2017), for empirical purposes, and especially for causal analyses, the two should not be conflated.

The main challenge of concept specification is to identify all relevant attributes of the basic-level concept, while avoiding both minimalism and maximalism (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). I argue that the basic-level concept of CRI is constituted by four second-level policy

components that regulate the access to citizenship for immigrants. The first policy component defining CRI defines the strength of *ius soli*, which refers to *birthright conditions* that regulate how easy it is for children of immigrants to obtain citizenship by being born on the territory of a receiving state. The other policy components defining CRI concern the group of "ordinary" first-generation immigrants and their naturalization: *residence conditions* refer to requirements regarding the duration of stay, *renunciation conditions* refer to the degree to which states tolerate multiple citizenship, and *integration conditions* refer to immigrant performance in terms of language tests, citizenship tests, criminal record requirements, and economic requirements.

In selecting policy components measuring ordinary naturalization, I was informed by the theoretical framework underlying CITLAW. It is based on the most systematic conceptualization of modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship (Jeffers et al. 2017). The CITLAW indicators measuring ordinary naturalization cover residence conditions, renunciation conditions, as well as language tests, citizenship tests, economic requirements, and criminal record requirements. CITLAW groups the latter four indicators as integration conditions. I do the same because it creates a better conceptual balance on the second level of the concept.

While dropping one of these policy components would create an imbalance and a tendency towards minimalism, considering further features would put CITRIX on a slippery slope towards maximalism. One could consider spousal transfers where the immigrant marrying a citizen can get a passport more quickly. This has been done, among others, by Howard (2009), Hansen and Clemens (2019), and Graeber (2020b). But then it is unclear why we should not also consider the special requirements that are often made for refugees, or those that are made in some countries for investors (Džankić 2019). This is why I exclude such modes of acquisition, which are defined as "special" by CITLAW (Jeffers et al. 2017).

A comparison of the coverage of the existing indices further demonstrates that CITRIX provides a balanced option to measure citizenship policies across numerous OECD countries for recent decades (see Table 2). Its substantive coverage is situated in between the most elaborate indices, namely, MIPEX 2015, CITLAW, and Graeber (2020), and those that are more reductionist, such as CPI, Fitzgerald et al. (2014), and Hansen and Clemens (2019). Furthermore, CITRIX covers both European and non-European states (the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) – a decision that I justify below. Finally, by starting in 1980, CITRIX expands the horizon beyond the "second epoch" (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 99) of international migration after the Cold War.

Table 2   Overview of immigration-centric citizenship policy indicators

Index	CPI	MIPEX	BNI	ICRI	CITLAW	Fitzgerald et al.	Peters/Shin	Clemens/Hansen	Graeber	CITRIX 2.0
Year published	2009	2015/2020	2010	2012/2017	2013/2017	2014	2015/2017/9	2019	2020	2020
N countries	27	38/52	18	10/29	36	20	29	29	16	23
Countries covered										
Western Europe (WE)	X	X/X	X	X/X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Eastern Europe (EE)	(X)	X/X		--/X	X		X	X		
Western settler states		X/X	X	--/X		X	X			X
Other democracies		X/X		--/X			X			X (Japan)
Autocracies		--/X		--/X			X			
Panel data		X/X	X			X	X	X	X	X
Years covered										
Before 1945							X (some countries)			
Before 1980			1960-				X		1970-	
1980s	Year varies (WE)		X	1980/--		1980-	X		X	1980
1990s			X	1990/--		X	X		X	X
2000s	2008 (also EE)	2007/2007-	2005	2002/-- 2008/2008		X	X	2003-	X	X
2010s		2015/2019			2011 2016	2014	2010	2014	2017	2019
Content										
Residence	X	X/X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Permanent residence		X/--			X					
Renunciation	X	X/X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Birthright	X	X/X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Citizenship test	X (only 2008)	X/X		X	X				X	X
Language test	X (only 2008)	X/X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Economic conditions		X/X		X	X				X	X
Criminal record		X/X	X		X				X	X
Other		X/--	X	X	X			X	X	
Special features	Incorporates naturalization rates				Also covers provisions for loss and emigrants		Single indicator for overall inclusiveness		Co-ethnics covered	
Dimensionality test		X			X		Latent variable used to measure broader concept	Latent variable used to aggregate	X	X

3.4 MEASUREMENT AND DATA

In this section, I do not discuss the details of measurement, but instead highlight and justify the most important modifications that CITRIX makes to MIPEX 2015 (MIPEX 2020 was developed at the same time as CITRIX 2.0 and is more similar). This is to show the added value of CITRIX. The detailed coding schemes are described in Appendix A.

MIPEX generally uses a three-point ordinal scheme (0–50–100) to measure its indicators. 100 represents the most inclusive legal situation. This is a useful simplifying device for laws that can be quite complex, but sometimes this means that relevant complexities cannot be captured as different legal aspects get reduced to the same static frame. An example is the measurement of birthright conditions for second-generation immigrants. In the MIPEX scale, unconditional and conditional *ius soli* are not distinguished. This is a crucial policy distinction. In today's mobile world, it matters whether any children born on the territory get citizenship or whether this birthright is conditional upon parents' residence in the state that confers citizenship. We would miss these relevant policy changes from unconditional to conditional *ius soli* that have happened in various instances (e.g. Ireland and New Zealand in the 2000s). Going into greater detail than most measures, CITRIX thus records a four-point scale for second-generation immigrants and expands its measurement to third-generation immigrants in an additional indicator.

The second instance in which MIPEX unnecessarily reduces complexity is in coding residence conditions. Specifically, the residence duration requirement is a number of years, and any categorization of these years into an ordinal scale is arbitrary. CITRIX records the exact number of years and then normalizes the data by linearly re-scaling the range of variation to an interval from 0 to 100.0 reflects an empirical minimum observed in Germany 1987-99 and Luxembourg 1980-85 (15 years required), and 100 reflects the theoretical maximum of zero years required. The most inclusive case is a two-years requirement in Australia 1984-2006, which yields a maximum empirical score of 86.67 on this indicator. This scaling might be counter-intuitive at first, but it serves to harmonize the indicators combining theoretical maxima with empirical minima.

Regarding renunciation conditions, the MIPEX indicators instead seem overly complex. CITRIX combines and recategorizes two three-point MIPEX scales by clearly discriminating major from minor exceptions of all kinds. The resulting single three-point scale goes into much detail in the coding scheme, but the logic is straightforward: the impossibility to renounce citizenship and the cost to do so are matters that are not in the power of destination countries. Hence, these two aspects should constitute minor exemptions that almost any democratic country would seem to be

inclined to make (most indeed do). Refugeehood as well as holding a citizen- ship of certain countries should count as other minor exceptions (and many democracies also do that). However, if the latter are combined, we can speak of major exceptions. Therefore, we can distinguish (1) minor exceptions from (2) major exceptions from (3) no renunciation requirements in any case.

The three-point MIPEX scale of language tests suffers from two problems. The first is that an easy test is equated with no requirement. The second is that a general informal requirement is not recorded. While CITRIX 1.0 used the MIPEX scale, CITRIX 2.0 creates a four-point scale with no requirement as is maximum. The second most inclusive category is an easy test or an informal general requirement. The bottom categories are the same as in MIPEX, the minimum being a test on the B1 level or higher. The MIPEX scale for citizenship tests correctly records no test or voluntary access to information about citizenship as maximum inclusion. But it does not record a general informal requirement for civic knowledge. I add this possibility in CITRIX 2.0 as the second most inclusive and thus expand the scale to four points.

CITRIX 2.0 covers 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019. This includes the EU member states forming the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Japan, as well as the classical Anglo-Saxon settler states – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The sample therefore encompasses 920 country-year observations. The focus on these countries – and therefore the reduction of country coverage compared to MIPEX – is analytically useful because the broad societal context for regulating citizenship across these countries and years is sufficiently uniform to enable robust comparison across the period observed. More specifically, these are the countries in the MIPEX sample that have been *independent high-income democracies* that are *attractive for immigrants* and *have an effective state apparatus to implement policy outputs* from 1980 onwards. CITRIX is, therefore, deliberately immigration-centric and focused on the Western-democratic world.

For data collection, the main reference point is MIPEX, especially the more similar latest version (Solano and Huddleston 2020).[21] I first checked these codes and filled in the blanks where the CITRIX coding scheme requires additional information. For this purpose, I used the following sources: CITLAW (GLOBALCIT Observatory 2017), DEMIG (Haas et al. 2015), ICRI (Koopmans et al. 2012), Howard (2009), Goodman (2014), and the Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship[22] as well as the Global Nationality Laws Database[23] from the GLOBALCIT Observatory. I used these resources in an iterative and circular rather than in a linear

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[21] I am grateful to Giacomo Solano for sharing these data.
[22] https://globalcit.eu/acquisition-citizenship/
[23] https://globalcit.eu/national-citizenship-laws/

way, cross-referencing and validating various codes in series of steps that has varied across countries and indicators. For the residence duration requirement, I relied on the indicators by Fitzgerald et al. (2014). They cover this information for 18 countries. I used the same sources as listed above to check and complete this data. I then drew on the coding of Stadlmair (2017) as a first step to go back in time.[24] Using the original MIPEX 2015 coding scheme, Stadlmair covers all indicators regarding citizenship for nine EU member states from 1995 to 2014. I again checked the data against the sources listed above and refined the coding where CITRIX differs.

The last and most laborious step was to use the main sources indicated above to complete the dataset for all other country-years. The main strategy was to check and adjust MIPEX and then use DEMIG to identify policy changes in the past and, if available, the substance of these changes. If the substance was unclear, I again used the various sources indicated above. This was again an iterative and circular rather than a linear process, with most resulting codes relying on more than one source.

3.5   INDEX METHODOLOGY AND AGGREGATION

When we aggregate indicators, we should do so based on a sound specification of the structure of the concept we aim to capture with an aggregate measure. This point has been most forcefully argued by Goertz (2020). Goertz insists that concepts are about ontology and proposes a three-level approach. To conceptualize is to define what a concept means is at its basic level, what dimensions constitute the concept at its second level, and what indicators measure these dimensions at the third level. This concept structure is translated into aggregation rules by moving back up this three-level structure by determining how indicators relate to each other ontologically in constituting dimensions, and how dimensions relate to each other to yield measures of the basic-level concept.

The ontological approach has an affinity to qualitative and set-theoretical thinking. In the quantitative measurement literature, "ontological indicators" have also been called "formative" – they form or "cause" the concept (Teorell et al. 2019). By contrast, "reflective indicators" are "symptoms" of a concept – the concept causes the observable indicators (Bollen, 1989). The latter view has a greater affinity to statistical methods. It uses latent variable models that assign indicators to dimensions based on their empirical intercorrelations rather than ontological properties. If the

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[24]   Jeremias Stadlmair deserves my gratitude for sending me his dataset quickly upon request.

intercorrelation of indicators is very high, they are assumed to reflect the same dimension. Ontology still matters here, or at least it should. If the approach is *confirmatory*, ontological considerations matter both in selecting the indicators and in evaluating the results. If the approach is *exploratory*, ontological considerations matter in deciding the number of dimensions to be extracted and, relatedly, in assigning meaning to these dimensions.

Latent variables are sometimes used as aggregate measures. Most commonly, the score of cases on the latent variable is determined by a regression equation. Indicator values are combined with an additive model and weighted by the degree to which indicators "load" on the latent variable. I argue that we should not outsource aggregation to latent variable models. This would put the "statistical cart before the theoretical horse" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 23).[25] The specification of aggregation and weighting should follow instead from the ontological concept structure. Within a three-level approach, this applies most clearly to third-level indicators, which are best combined into second- level components using a purely ontological or formative logic (Goertz 2020).

But latent variable models should still have a role to play. If the second-level components of concepts are theorized as one-dimensional and additive, latent variable models can be used to validate this concept structure. If a latent variable model tells us that one-dimensionality cannot be statistically confirmed, we should go back to the conceptualization and ask whether the basic-level concept is better understood as multi-dimensional on its second level – if we have not done so from the outset. We can then apply multi-dimensional latent variable models to test the reformulated concept specification. If this structure is confirmed, and if theory tells us that it can be combined to reflect a higher-order concept, we must determine how these separate dimensions are ontologically related and specify aggregation accordingly. Latent variable models cannot tell us how to combinemultiple dimensions.

In sum, I propose that to construct robust quantitative policy indices it is best to use latent variable models as *confirmatory dimensionality tests* of deductively specified basic-level concepts and their second-level components. Analogous to the usual dialogue and iteration between theory and data in empirical analysis, this is to accommodate both ontological and statistical concerns. Therefore, this approach appropriately puts the statistical cart behind the theoretical horse rather than putting it in front or letting the theoretical horse run away with no statistical cart to pull at all.

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[25] Note that the original context of the quote is about the problem of losing information in the process of aggregation and the statistical temptation to do so in order to get one-dimensional variables.

While earlier immigration-centric citizenship indices such as the CPI (Howard 2009) and the BNI (Janoski 2010) use an ontological approach without dimensionality tests, more recent measures in the field of citizenship and integration have tended to employ latent variable models (see also Table 12). Using indicator-level data from CITLAW, Vink and Bauböck (2013) have validated a two-dimensional model of citizenship policies covering not only conditions for acquisition but also for loss. Using second-level data from CITLAW and MIPEX, Huddleston and Vink (2015) have shown that across Europe integration and citizenship policies are one-dimensional. Graeber (2020) also uses latent variable models to test his two-dimensional concept. He comes closest to my proposed approach – besides the lack of a three-level concept structure, the only aspect that is missing is a justification of the weighting scheme.

Instead of comparing my proposal to (other) existing studies at length, however, I want to mention a problematic example that shows how letting statistics override theory can lead to flawed measures. Peters (2017) uses a latent variable to measure *Immigration Policy Openness* (among them is a single indicator for citizenship). In contrast to most policies, policies regarding refugees, asylum seekers, and family reunification load negatively on the latent variable (Peters 2017: 287). Using this latent variable as an index therefore means that while the other policies are correctly valued, *more open borders* for refugees, asylum seekers, and family migrants count towards *more closed borders* in the resulting index – *ceteris paribus*. This obviously leads to concept-measure inconsistency. The statistical direction and the conceptual meaning of indicators do not align. This should highlight that index methodology is more than mere technical detail. It deserves greater attention than its routine relegation to appendices suggests. In the case of Hansen and Clemens (2019), the latent variable model is not even shown in their appendix and simply used as an aggregation tool without explicitly testing whether the data fits the conceptual structure.

Let us see how CITRIX moves forward in addressing the challenge of aggregation (see Figure 6). First, regarding the two sub-components measuring birthright conditions for the second and third generation, we must realize if the second generation is included, there is no need for a birthright provision for the third generation. The former implies the latter. This is why in cases where a country allows second-generation immigrants to acquire citizenship unconditionally at birth, the third-generation indicator is automatically set to the maximum. Once this is done, the two indicators can be aggregated using a weighted arithmetic mean. I allot a double weight for the second-generation indicator, while the third-generation indicator receives a single weight. This is because, by significantly speeding up generational inclusion, granting automatic birthright

citizenship to the second generation is considerably more liberal than allowing it only for third-generation immigrants.

Second, the four integration conditions – language tests, citizenship tests, economic requirements, and criminal record requirements – are not ontologically interwoven like the two birthright indicators. They are separate aspects demanding certain behavior or performance from immigrants. Each policy sub-component can add or remove obstacles for immigrants to pass – and adding obstacles can be plausibly compensated by removing obstacles in another sub-component. I cannot find a strong reason to argue that one is more important than the others. Following CITLAW (Jeffers et al. 2017), I argue that the integration indicators should be weighted equally and combined with an arithmetic mean to constituting the score on this policy component.

The next challenge is to determine whether and how these different second-level policy components can be aggregated to a one-dimensional statistical construct. I first consider the idea that CRI is two-dimensional: we should distinguish the conditions that make an individual eligible for citizenship and the conditions that discriminate further among those who are *eligible* based on some aspect of performance or *behavior* (e.g. Goodman 2010; Graeber 2020b). The most prominent aspects of *eligibility conditions* in the literature are residence conditions and birthright conditions. The most prominent aspects of *behavioral conditions* are civic integration requirements such as language and citizenship tests (e.g. Goodman 2014). Further requirements such as economic and criminal record conditions also relate to behavior. Moreover, renunciation conditions can also be considered a behavioral condition. Actively relinquishing another citizenship has to do more with behavior than eligibility. Based on this perspective, we would separate eligibility conditions and behavioral conditions, and then would need further theory to specify how they relate to each other.

Figure 6   Three-level concept tree and aggregation scheme of CITRIX

There are alternative conceptions. One is to conceive of residence and integration conditions as belonging to naturalization, and birthright and renunciation as instances of national communities expanding vertically or over generations (through birthright) and horizontally or across states (through the lack of renunciation requirements). Accordingly, Blatter et al. (2017) assign the same weight to naturalization (residence and integration) as to birthright and renunciation, respectively, positing an additive structure between them (see also Howard 2009). Similar to my introduction of the policy components, CITLAW draws a line between birthright and ordinary naturalization. Regarding ordinary naturalization, furthermore, the CITLAW indicators weigh residence conditions as much as integration conditions (each 40 per cent), but

renunciation conditions are given a lower weight (20 per cent). However, the justification for this decision – especially the lower weight on renunciation – is very brief and advances no clear theoretical reason beyond the assertion that residence is an especially important precondition of citizenship for ordinary immigrants (Jeffers et al. 2017: 34).

While I understand this intuition, I advance a more generic view. Theory has told us that each of the four CITRIX components are instruments to regulate the inclusion of ordinary immigrants and their children by defining how many obstacles there are for birthright and naturalization. Each set of conditions taps into the same underlying conceptual continuum – and the policy components can be seen partial substitutes. Components can add and take away obstacles independently of the obstacles assigned by other components, and a high score on one component can compensate a low one on another. Against this background, I argue that for general purposes the most neutral and theoretically balanced option is to aggregate the CITRIX policy components using an arithmetic mean applying equal weights (Figure 6). This additive model of second-level policy components now has to undergo a dimensionality test.

3.6   DIMENSIONALITY TEST AND CONVERGENT VALIDITY

Can the various CITRIX policy components can be reduced to the same statistical dimension? Principal component analysis can answer this question. It is a type of latent variable model that tests whether various indicators measure the same statistical dimension. I use *categorical* instead of standard principal component analysis (CATPCA; Meulman and Heiser 2011). This is because – except for the numeric residence condition – the CITRIX components are ordinal (ordered categories). CATPCA can accommodate variables that are scaled at various levels and aims to model non-linear relationships. CATPCA is still similar to standard PCA, and the output can be interpreted in the same way (Linting et al. 2007).

A CATPCA extracting one dimension applied on the pooled data shows that the various CITRIX components indeed tap into the same statistical continuum (Table 3). All dimension loadings are higher than 0.5 (this indicates how well the variable is captured by the dimension) and the model parameters indicate that the resulting dimensions are reliable (Cronbach's alpha > 0.7) and explains more than 50 per cent of variation in the variables. This finding validates the statistical consistency and reliability of CITRIX 2.0 as a single composite scale combining the four policy components with an additive concept structure – CITRIX 2.0 passes the dimensionality test.

Table 3   Confirmatory CATPCA extracting one dimension

Variables	Pooled	Cold War	1992–2001	Post 9/11	Great Recession	Post Refugee Crisis
Birthright	0.85	0.73	0.54	0.82	0.85	0.80
Residence	0.84	0.89	0.91	0.81	0.77	0.80
Renunciation	0.59	0.81	0.82	0.59	0.72	0.65
Integration	0.67	-0.62	-0.74	0.77	0.85	0.80
Eigenvalue	2.23	2.36	2.32	2.26	2.55	2.32
Explained variance	55.76	59.00	58.23	56.54	63.81	58.22
Cronbach's alpha	0.73	0.77	0.76	0.74	0.81	0.77
N	920	276	230	161	138	115

Notes   Principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA in SPSS) using the policy components of CITRIX 2.0 (values of zero replaced by 1, because zeros are counted as missing); residence conditions defined as numeric, other policy components defined as ordinal; discretization uses ranking; variable principal normalization; entries are dimension loadings and model parameters and N country-years.

However, there is important variation over time. I split up the years from 1980 to 2019 into five historical periods: the last decade of the Cold War (1980-91), the period 1992-2001, post 9/11 (2002-08), the Great Recession after the financial crash (2009-14), and the refugee crisis and its following years (2015-19). 9/11 marks a turning point in the dimensionality of citizenship policies. Before 9/11, integration conditions load negatively on the common dimension, while the other policy components load positively. This means that immigrants faced more integration conditions in countries that had more inclusive laws regarding birthright, residence, and renunciation – and that the latter three were strongly positively correlated. This demonstrates that the most important empirical difference within citizenship policies is between integration conditions and other policies. This result could be taken as a motivation to conceptualize integration conditions as a separate dimension, as Goodman (2010) and Graeber (2020b) have done.

However, after 9/11, countries started adopting more coherent citizenship regimes. Integration conditions show the same statistical tendency as policies regarding birthright, residence, and renunciation; they can be reduced to the same statistical dimension. This suggests that when introducing or modifying integration conditions during the *second integrationist turn* (see below) states crafted them in view of other policy components. In this way, new integration conditions have reinforced existing citizenship policies (cf. Goodman 2014).

Table 4   Correlation of CITRIX with other indices

Index	N	rho	p
CITRIX CATPCA latent variable score	920	0.94	0.000
MIPEX 2015 Access to Nationality	162	0.76	0.000
MIPEX 2020 Access to Nationality	277	0.91	0.000
Fitzgerald et al. aggregated	558	0.81	0.000
ICRI Nationality Acquisition	38	0.89	0.000
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI)	30	0.85	0.000
Barrier to Nationality Index (BNI)	55	-0.72	0.000
Peters/Shin (citizenship indicator)	538	0.67	0.000
CITLAW ANATORD (without *ius soli*)	36	0.80	0.000
CITLAW ASOL02 (only *ius soli*)	36	0.55	0.000
CITLAW Birthright ASOL02 (only *ius soli*)	23	0.55	0.000
CIVIX (language and citizenship tests)	30	-0.86	0.000
Hansen and Clemens (without integration)	255	-0.61	0.000

Note   Entries are N of overlapping observations and Spearman's rho correlation coefficients (adequate for the ordinal measurement levels) and p-values; CITRIX latent variable scores are derived from the CATPCA of the four policy components (Table 3, pooled); CITRIX 1.0 as specified in Schmid (2020); Fitzgerald et al. (2014) indicators aggregated with unweighted arithmetic mean after normalization; ICRI are from Koopmans et al. (2012); CPI from Howard (2009); BNI from Janoski (2010: 40); Peters/Shin from Peters (2017) and Shin (2017, 2019); CITLAW from GLOBALCIT (2017, 2019); CIVIX from Goodman (2014) is compared with the equivalent CITRIX mean of language and citizenship tests; the measure from Hansen and Clemens (2019) is the latent variable score used in their article and is compared with the equivalent CITRIX mean without integration conditions.

We now turn to the convergent validity of CITRIX: How strongly is it correlated with other indices? On the one hand, the aggregate CITRIX 2.0 is very highly correlated with the object scores from the pooled CATPCA (these latent variable estimates are also available in the dataset) as well as with CITRIX 1.0. Thus, the various versions of the CITRIX data and their latent variable scores have only minor differences. On the other hand, CITRIX 2.0 is highly correlated with several alternative indices (Table 4).[26] All correlation coefficients (I use Spearman's rho because the data are not numeric but ordinal) also have very low p-values.

Furthermore, removing the birthright conditions from CITRIX 2.0 leads to a high correlation with the CITLAW indicators for ordinary naturalization (called ANATORD; GLOBALCIT 2017). The birthright conditions alone also correlate positively with the respective strand of CITLAW and the CITLAW Global Birthright Indicators (called ASOL02; GLOBALCIT 2017 2019), but they show the lowest coefficient, presumably because of differences in aggregation (CITLAW is more complex). The average of the sub-components measuring integration testing

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[26]   The BNI and its coding scheme are not publicly available. I used the data indicated in Janoski (2010), which leads to 55 overlapping observations with CITRIX.

(language and citizenship tests) is also highly correlated with the civic integration index (CIVIX) as reported in Goodman (2014). The average of the components without integration conditions yields a substantial correlation with the latent variable score employed by Hansen and Clemens (2019), but the coefficient is not as high as most others, most probably owing to conceptual differences.[27] Nonetheless, these tests demonstrate the convergent validity of CITRIX 2.0. The high correlations show that it taps into the same statistical continuum as alternative indicators.

3.7   STAGNATED LIBERALIZATION AND LONG-TERM CONVERGENCE

The general trend in citizenship policies regarding ordinary immigrants is liberalizing on aggregate (see Figure 7 on the left and Table 5; country trajectories are shown in Appendix B). CRI is higher after the refugee crisis than it was during the last decade of the Cold War. Especially renunciation conditions have been liberalized. This trajectory unfolds in three phases that roughly align with the historical periods. The first is a cycle that is constituted by a liberalizing trend until 1992, which is then punctuated by a restrictive turn until 1999. This restrictive turn is due primarily to restrictions in integration with the exception of language tests. It thus marks the *first integrationist turn*. The second phase is marked by similar but more pronounced cycle of liberalization followed by restriction. First there is a surge in liberalization that stops in 2003, which marks the overall peak in the aggregate value of CRI. Then there is strong restriction. It is mainly due to the further introduction of integration conditions, thus marking the stronger *second integrationist turn*. The third phase is one of fluctuation and *stagnation* from 2007 onwards. This is because integration conditions continue to be tightened, while the other policy components liberalize. The liberalization is primarily driven by increasing toleration of multiple citizenship and secondarily by limited liberalization of birthright conditions. CRI reaches an aggregate level in 2019 that is similar to the level in 2008 but is lower than the 2003 peak. This is why we can speak of *stagnated liberalization* overall. This stagnation is most evident regarding residence conditions, which shows about the same level after 9/11 as in the following two periods. But the findings also show that there has been convergence in residence conditions. We turn to this aspect now.

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[27] The correlations with BNI, CIVIX and the measure of Hansen and Clemens (2019) are negative because they are oriented towards measuring higher levels of restrictions rather than inclusiveness. I want to thank Michael A. Hansen for sending me the data used in Hansen and Clemens (2019).

Figure 7   Trends and convergence

Trend in aggregate means   Trend in standard deviations (sigma convergence)

Source   Original illustration.

The trends in standard deviation show citizenship policies holds across the board: every policy component has become less diverse, and here integration conditions do not stand out (Table 5#). This long-term convergence unfolds also in three phases, whose turning points are close to 9/11 and the financial crisis (Figure 7 on the right). There is *early convergence* from 1980 to 2000. This is because birthright and renunciation conditions have become more similar, while residence and integration conditions show no convergence during this period. The second phase is *intermediary divergence* from 2000 to 2010. It only comes to light when analyzing the aggregate score and cannot be attributed to specific policy components. Third, there is *late convergence* from 2010 to 2019, though the years after the refugee crisis see an uptick in divergence. However, except for residence, it is notable that the policy components continue to feature zero as the empirically observed minimum. For instance, there are still countries in 2019 that make no accommodations for birthright citizenship, neither for second nor for third-generation immigrants – namely Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland (see the country trends in Appendix B). This also highlights the limited nature of liberalization.

Table 5   Summary statistics and trends

CITRIX	Overall	Cold War	1990s	Post 9/11	Great Recession	Post Refugee Crisis
Mean	**53.10**	49.82	52.99	56.12	54.68	55.08
SD	**22.16**	24.02	22.00	21.38	21.18	19.22
Min	**5**	5	8.38	10.40	8.33	8.33
Max	**90.88**	90.88	90.88	90.88	83.56	79.77
N	**920**	276	230	161	138	115
Birthright conditions						
Mean	**44.38**	40.14	44.53	45.14	48.12	48.71
SD	**36.89**	39.89	37.34	36.29	33.34	32.67
Min	**0**	0	0	0	0	0
Max	**100**	100	100	100	100	100
Residence conditions						
Mean	**55.33**	55.07	53.57	56.48	56.62	56.34
SD	**18.78**	20.11	21.11	17.69	15.58	15.20
Min	**0**	0	0	20	20	20
Max	**86.67**	86.67	86.67	86.67	80	73.33
Renunciation conditions						
Mean	**55.33**	39.49	54.13	71.74	76.09	80.43
SD	**18.78**	48.79	48.04	41.38	38.79	35.48
Min	**0**	0	0	0	0	0
Max	**100**	100	100	100	100	100
Integration conditions						
Mean	**53.30**	64.60	59.75	51.11	37.91	34.82
SD	**30.95**	29.96	30.30	28.57	27.65	24.84
Min	**0**	0	0	0	0	0
Max	**100**	100	100	100	100	100

The finding of a general liberalizing tendency corroborates a central diagnosis in the literature (e.g. Howard 2009; Joppke 2010). Unlike the first, the *second integrationist turn* is also often noted in the literature (e.g. Joppke 2008). Both turns appear in Graeber (2020b) as well. He also finds evidence similar to the phase of intermediate divergence regarding the trend in standard deviations. However, CITRIX 2.0 shows clearer patterns of convergence, while Graeber documents differential patterns contrasting integration conditions with other policies. Overall,

CITRIX 2.0 can be located between contrasting with studies that find no significant or very limited convergence (e.g. Schmid 2020, which uses CITRIX 1.0 and stops in 2010; see also Koopmans et al. 2012) and expectations of stronger and more encompassing convergence (e.g. Joppke 2010).

3.8   WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHERE TO GO FROM HERE

In this article, I have introduced the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* in its second version: CITRIX 2.0. This panel dataset mainly builds on selected and partly modified indicators of MIPEX and covers 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019. CITRIX is not too complex yet attentive to relevant substantive details in its conceptualization and measurement, pragmatic yet broad in its spatio-temporal coverage, and valid in terms of content, dimensionality as well as regarding the convergence with alternative indicators.

I have argued that CITRIX can teach us *three lessons*. The first and main lesson is about *index methodology*. I have formulated a synthetic approach in which latent variable models serve as *confirmatory dimensionality tests* using the second-level components of deductively and ontologically specified three-level concepts if the components have an additive concept structure. CITRIX shows how this approach can be applied.

The two other lessons are empirical. First, the aggregate trajectory of citizenship policies from 1980 to 2019 can be summarized as *stagnated liberalization*. It can be divided into three phases: a first cycle of initial liberalization until 1992 and a subsequent restrictive turn until 1999, a second cycle of rapid liberalization until 2003 and a subsequent restrictive turn until 2006, and stagnation and fluctuation until 2019. 2003 marks the peak of aggregate liberalization. The second empirical lesson is *long-term convergence*, which also unfolds in three phases: early convergence until 2000, intermediate divergence until 2010, and late convergence until 2019. I conclude that liberalization is more limited, and convergence more pronounced, than much of the existing literature assumes.

Besides serving as a general index, CITRIX provides a toolbox that can be rearranged for various purposes. One could dispose of the birthright component to gauge policies towards first-generation immigrants. Or one could select the integration conditions to further investigate these specific policies. Since all data is available in disaggregated form, users can also change the aggregation scheme. This makes CITRIX a versatile instrument to study the important phenomenon of citizenship and its correlates. Regular updates are planned.

4

The architecture of
national boundary regimes

*Mapping immigration and citizenship
policies in 23 democracies 1980–2010*

ABSTRACT

In this article, I introduce a typology that maps the regulation of two fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states regarding immigration: territorial boundaries and membership boundaries. Based on a theory of the structural logics underlying Immigration Regime Openness (IRO) and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI), I make four observations on the two-dimensional policy space determined by the relative porousness of these two boundaries. First, a Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) using a combination of original and existing panel data across 23 liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010 confirms that IRO and CRI are internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. Immigration policies therefore appear more coherent than often assumed. Second, the distribution of cases over the four ideal-typical policy configurations from 1980 to 2010 shows that more and more cases combine relatively liberal immigration policies with relatively liberal citizenship policies. Behind this finding are, third, overall liberalising trajectories in both policies as well as a pattern of convergence in immigration policies. The liberalisation of immigration policies is most notable until 1996 and the level of openness fluctuates thereafter. Regarding citizenship, I provide evidence for a much-cited restrictive turn during the 2000s. In addition, I show that there has already been a restrictive turn in citizenship during the 1990s. Fourth, instead of the trade-off anticipated by much of the literature, I find an increasingly positive correlation between IRO and CRI. The new typology, its underlying theory, and the subsequent findings significantly advance our understanding of the most fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states.

ADAPTIONS

I have streamlined the referencing style with the rest of the dissertation. Endnotes have been transformed into footnotes and numbered continually according to their placement in this dissertation. Figures and Tables are also numbered according to their placement in the overall text. I reproduce the original Appendix in Appendices C-H of this dissertation. In addition, some errors have been corrected, and some formatting has been improved. Spelling is based on British English (also in the relevant Appendix) because it was required by the journal; American English is not adapted if quoted.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Immigration-related policies can be conceptualised along two basic dimensions. On the one hand, territorial boundaries are about *immigration policy* and refer to territorial admission and the granting of (long-term) legal residence. On the other hand, membership boundaries are about *immigrant policy* and refer to the treatment of immigrants after the establishment of (long-term) residence. Hammar (1985), who popularised this distinction, further differentiates *two kinds of immigrant policies*. The first concerns the rights afforded to "denizens" (Hammar 1990), while the second concerns citizenship policies – that is, the regulation of the access to citizenship in the sense of passport-holding or nationality.

The aim of this article is to theorize, explicate, and assess this two-dimensional architecture of national boundary regimes and explore its evolution over time. I zoom in on *immigration regimes* and *citizenship regimes* to address three intertwined questions:

(1) What are the main structural logics shaping immigration regimes and citizenship regimes in liberal democracies?

(2) Do these two policy dimensions and the resulting two-dimensional policy space follow from these structural logics, and does this two-dimensional model withstand empirical testing?

(3) What do the structural logics tell us about the *trends in*, the *configurations of*, and the *correlations between* immigration regimes and citizenship regimes across space and time, and can these theoretical expectations be empirically corroborated?

To answer these questions, I draw on the account of Hampshire (2013) to argue that immigration policies and citizenship policies are driven by the divergent logics of markets and nations, as well as the intermediate logics of overarching liberal-constitutional and democratic institutions. Immigration policies are mainly exposed to economic and legal forces, while citizenship policies are primarily driven by democratic concerns and national identities. This structural divergence gives rise to the distinct empirical nature of immigration regimes on the one hand and citizenship regimes on the other.

I further propose that each structural logic can come in a liberal or open or inclusive, or an illiberal or closed or exclusive variant. It should thus be possible to observe all four logical combinations of open or closed immigration policies and inclusive or exclusive citizenship policies. Moreover, in line with much of the existing literature that discusses this problem under the heading

of the "gap hypothesis" (e.g. Cornelius et al. 2014; Lutz 2019), I argue that external constraints imposed by global markets and international institutions favour open and liberal policies in the realm of immigration, while citizenship policies are less externally constrained and thus more malleable by domestic structures and political forces. This should set immigration policies on a more liberalising and convergent trajectory than citizenship policies. I then suggest that the structural logics underpinning each dimension pulls immigration regimes and citizenship regimes apart. Hence, they should not only be conceptually and statistically distinct, but also not systematically correlated.

Using Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) to scrutinize data across 23 liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010, the empirical investigation validates *The National Boundary Regime Typology*. The policy components of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) can be reduced to two internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. By demonstrating the empirical existence of theoretically assumed dimensions, this analysis thus addresses an important gap in the literature (Koopmans 2013: 696). There are studies that have introduced two-dimensional policy spaces of integration and citizenship regimes without testing this dimensional assumption (Koopmans et al. 2005; Goodman 2010), while others who analysed citizenship regimes more comprehensively (by adding, among other things, indicators on the loss of citizenship) validated their two-dimensional model (Vink and Bauböck 2013). Inspired by recent literature (Boucher and Gest 2015), this study is the first to combine immigration policies and citizenship policies with a novel two-dimensional scheme capturing regimes proper (i.e. policies as such).

Based on the typology, I then show that over the observed time period, an increasing number of cases can be described as *open-inclusive boundary regimes*: they have relatively open borders and relatively inclusive citizenship. In fact, open-inclusive regimes are the most common in the sample. However, many cases still show other configurations. One notable finding regarding these other types is that *closed-inclusive regimes* are the least frequent, even though they embody the conventional *liberal-communitarian model* defended in classical normative accounts in democratic theory (e.g. Walzer 1983: ch. 2).

Furthermore, the analysis shows that the aggregate levels of both IRO and CRI follow overall liberalising trajectories. However, after a surge in liberalisation from 1980 onwards, immigration policies start fluctuating after 1996. Citizenship policies show a much-observed restrictive turn during the 2000s. I also show that there has already been a restrictive turn in

citizenship during the 1990s. Finally, I find that immigration regimes show increasingly similar levels of openness while citizenship regimes do not converge significantly overall.

The liberalising tendencies in both immigration policies and citizenship policies contrast with the finding of a proliferating "Market Model" (Boucher and Gest 2018), which occupies a middle ground between the closed-exclusive and open-exclusive types of boundary regimes. The sample and type of indicators used in this article show that, instead, the "Liberal Model" (ibid.) of open-inclusive regimes is more prevalent. Furthermore, these results cast doubt on the notion that democracies remain trapped in a "liberal paradox" that manifests itself in a tension between open borders and inclusive citizenship (Hollifield 1992, 2004). Rather, this "paradox" is increasingly resolved. Meanwhile, the finding of substantial convergence in immigration regimes but not citizenship regimes is more in line with the existing literature (e.g. Helbling and Kalkum 2018; Koopmans et al. 2012).

The last part of the article uses the two-dimensional policy space to analyse the correlation between immigration regimes and citizenship regimes. Calculating the pooled correlation for three time periods (last decade of the Cold War: 1980-1991; 1992-2001; and post 9/11), I show that the two dimensions are in fact not uncorrelated; the correlation has become increasingly positive. Challenging widespread notions of trade-offs between openness and inclusiveness (e.g. Ruhs 2013), this finding suggests a more intricate interplay and potential convergence of the structural logics behind the two policies realms across time.

4.2   DEFINING NATIONAL BOUNDARY REGIMES REGARDING IMMIGRATION

National boundary regimes regarding immigration are constituted by two sets of policies: *immigration regimes* and *citizenship regimes*. Immigration regimes are, on the one hand, constituted by the legal regulations that define the conditions for and guide the volume of immigrant intake to a receiving country (Goodman 2018: 814; Helbling et al. 2017: 82). These policies distinguish different types of immigrants, namely labour immigrants, immigrants that reunite with their families, and asylum seekers and refugees (Helbling et al. 2017). Examples are conditions such as job offer requirements for labour migrants or eligibility criteria such as age limits for family migrants.

On the other hand, immigration regimes confer residence rights. These rights define how long an immigrant can stay in the receiving country under the relevant permit. This is not to be confused with the regulation of permanent residence proper, which may or may not depend on

additional conditions. For instance, Green Card holders in the US receive permanent residence rights upon admission, whereas in other countries residence rights may not allow any category of migrants to renew their temporary visas or transition toward a permanent stay.

Conceptualizing residence rights as a part of immigration regimes does not conflate immigration policy with immigrant policy. Non-transient residence rights short of the regulation of access to permanent residence proper are *immigration rights*, not *immigrant rights*. Indeed, regulating the duration of stay is a necessary component of any immigration policy; it is associated directly with entry permits. Depending on the number of possible permits and their variation in legal content, such *permit rights* do not only exhibit cross-national but also intra-national variation across entry tracks (cf. Ruhs 2013).

By contrast, more general rights mainly show cross-national rather than intra-national variation (cf. Koopmans et al. 2012). General rights may still discriminate between various categories of migrants, but not based on permits. It is hard to give examples for rights in the two categories because the distinction is somewhat artificial, and the rights architecture can vary across countries – a fact that is usually not acknowledged and is hard to capture empirically. A safe bet for a general right is the right of non-citizens to vote in local elections. Here, states discriminate on grounds of nationality and duration of residence rather than residence permits (Schmid et al. 2019).

Permit rights, and especially residence rights, constitute the inner belt of the territorial boundary instead of an intermediate stage between entry and naturalisation (Helbling et al. 2017; see also de Haas et al. 2015). Hence, immigration regimes, as conceptualised here, feature *entry* and *stay* as their constituent components. The less restrictive the regulations of entry and stay, the higher the level of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO).

Regarding immigration, citizenship regimes comprise the regulations that define the conditions for immigrants to acquire the legal status of full membership in the sense of nationality (Goodman 2018: 814). Based on a review of extant indices and other conceptualisations in the literature (e.g. Howard 2009; Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Blatter et al. 2017), this analysis focuses on four core policy components of citizenship regimes: (1) the strength of *jus soli*; (2) residence duration requirements; (3) the toleration of multiple citizenship; and (4) further naturalisation requirements (language and citizenship tests as well as economic and criminal record requirements). The less restrictive the requirements for citizenship acquisition for immigrants, the higher the level of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI).

The overarching concept of *national boundary regimes regarding immigration* therefore focuses the two fundamental "social closures of nation-states" (Brubaker 1992: ch. 1; Weber 1946: 78). The inner boundary of citizenship is fundamental because it endows immigrants with the "'highest standard of equal treatment" (Bauböck et al. 2013: 40). If access to citizenship were completely blocked, immigrants could never become equals. In addition, the transformation of non-citizens into citizens has crucial repercussions on territorial admission: It permanently unlocks access to a state's territory by establishing the right of unconditional re-entry and residence. The outer boundary of immigration is also fundamental. If it were completely blocked, citizenship could never be reached. Indeed, the territorial boundary is "citizenship's perpetual gatekeeper" (Joppke 2010: 150).

Immigrant rights are important, but not as fundamental as immigration policies and citizenship policies. Still, one may argue that the architecture of national boundary regimes cannot be properly conceptualised and understood without the dimension of immigrant rights. However, there are empirical, theoretical, and pragmatic reasons to omit this dimension. First, Huddleston and Vink (2015) provide empirical evidence showing that various general rights and the ease of access to citizenship are so highly correlated that they can be reduced to the same empirical dimension. They identify the citizenship policy component as the "best predictor" of the overall rights regime. Second, granting rights amounts to *boundary blurring* between citizens and non-citizen residents, while the establishment of long-term legal residence upon immigration and the inclusion into a receiving country's national community regulate the more fundamental aspect of *boundary crossing*. Lastly, comprehensive data on immigrant rights for the sample and timeframe used in this study are not available, especially for the last decades of the old millennium. Such data would be very laborious to collect, especially when one considers a wide variety of rights. To make such an endeavour possible we would also have to narrow the number of rights we examine, provoking the need for a selection that can be widely agreed upon. For these reasons, I leave aside immigrant rights and focus instead on the fundamental boundaries defined by IRO and CRI.

4.3   THEORIZING THE ARCHITECTURE OF NATIONAL BOUNDARY REGIMES

To theorize the architecture of national boundary regimes, I first take a step back and examine the idea of the *liberal paradox*. Coined and elaborated by Hollifield (1992, 2004), it refers to the tension between economic liberalism and political liberalism in regulating immigration and the access to citizenship. To maximize material welfare in a globalizing world, transnational

economic forces propel liberal states toward greater openness in territorial admission (Hollifield 2004: 902). At the same time, however, to ensure security, to preserve the democratic social contract, and to protect the cultural cohesion of the national community, political forces push for greater territorial closure (ibid.). Furthermore, however, whereas economic liberalism tends to see foreign workers as commodities, the liberal constitutional order of democracies provides the grounds for granting them rights and citizenship (Hollifield 1992).

Against this background, Hollifield points to two possible outcomes. The first is that – in the context of a growing international labour market – an individualist understanding of political liberalism points to the possibility of a "gradual resolution of the liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992: 223). Indeed, for Hollifield, "rights-based liberalism goes hand-in-hand with the spread of market relations", and it is this "confluence of unregulated markets for foreign labour and the rise of rights-based politics that explains the failure of restrictionist policies and the persistence of immigration" (ibid. 170). The second possibility – stated as a conclusion in various pieces (e.g. Hollifield 2004: 905; Hollifield and Faruk 2017: 143) – is that "[e]ven as states become more dependent on trade and migration, they are likely to remain trapped in a liberal paradox for decades to come."

These two possibilities still feature in the current scholarly discourse. However, where Hollifield has envisioned a gradual resolution to the liberal paradox towards a comprehensively liberal model reconciling open borders and inclusive citizenship in the long run, others have suggested that more and more states show a seemingly "paradoxical" configuration of open borders and exclusive citizenship. For instance, Boucher and Gest (2018) contrast the "Liberal Model" with the "Market Model." The latter embodies the tension between the openness towards certain (mostly temporary and high-skilled) labour migrants and the closure towards others, as well as patterns of citizenship exclusiveness. However, rather than "being trapped" in this tension, governments may embrace it because it allows them "to have it both ways – effectively sanitizing globalisation from its purported ills while enjoying the benefits it brings" (ibid. 6).

In the following, I suggest that not only two but four national boundary regime types should be theoretically possible and empirically observable. This is based on a theory of structural logics and their interaction in shaping coherent immigration regimes and coherent citizenship regimes, respectively. The resulting two-dimensional policy space and its four ideal-typical configurations follow from these structural logics.

My starting point is the account of Hampshire (2013). He argues that there are four potentially "contradictory imperatives of the liberal state" (ibid. 2). These are: capitalism,

constitutionalism, representative democracy, and nationhood. Hampshire then goes on to argue that the former two tend to induce openness, while the latter two tend to generate closure. However, he also extends this structural account with a complex and comprehensive framework of how factors such as politicisation, public opinion, or labour market conditions, and actors such as far-right parties, courts, or firms may affect immigration- related policymaking in these four facets of the liberal state (ibid. 51-4).

My modified version of Hampshire's framework mirrors these liberal imperatives by focusing on the following structural logics: the economic logic of the market, the legal logic of the liberal state, the democratic logic of the liberal state, and the cultural logic of the nation. I shall argue that the former two are complementary in shaping immigration regimes, while the latter two are complementary in shaping citizenship regimes. Furthermore, I suggest that each structural logic comes in two variants, liberal or illiberal, open or closed, and inclusive or exclusive.

The *economic logic of the market* is where, first and foremost, labour immigration policies can be located. They are embedded in the dynamics and the regulation of transnational trade and shaped by the behaviour and lobbying activity of labour-intensive firms (Peters 2017). Because of their commitment to economic liberalism in the context of globalisation, democracies tend to allow certain interest groups – namely firms – to capture command in steering labour immigration. In the modern dual labour market, low-skilled and high-skilled immigration policies can thus expand simultaneously. This dynamic of "client politics" is likely to emerge despite popular opposition because the costs of immigration for the broader and disorganised public are diffused, while the benefits are highly concentrated in well-organised business coalitions (Freeman 1995). Thus, the inherent tendency in the economic logic of the market regarding immigration policies is one of expansive openness. However, we can imagine a situation in which national labour markets start following a closed protectionist logic. Peters (2017) shows, for instance, that in reaction to greater openness to trade, firms move their production abroad, taking their jobs with them. Such firms then demand more closed immigration policies at home as the need for migrant labour decreases.

The *legal logic of the liberal state* manifests in "legal-constitutional constraints on the executive" (Joppke 1998) by independent judiciaries on both the international and the national level. Because of these constraints, in liberal democracies rights to family re-unification cannot be significantly curbed and may acquire an expansive dynamic (Joppke 1998, 2001; see also Hollifield 1992: 94). A case in point is the liberalisation of family reunification after officially terminating temporary guest worker schemes in countries like Germany after the oil crisis in the 1970s. Rather than (re-)uniting in their countries of origin, the families of migrant workers did so in the countries

of destination. Courts intervened, and executive and administrative authorities had to follow suit (Hollifield 2004: 895).

Policies targeting asylum seekers and refugees also find grounding in liberal norms. Some of these norms, namely the principle of non-refoulment, operate at the international level (Neumayer 2005: 56-7). Independent judiciaries in democratic nation-states often further facilitate the access of those with claims to asylum and refugee status. As with family reunification, in this realm courts again appear as the phalanx of political liberalism. However, asylum and family reunification have become increasingly politicised over time. Thus, an illiberal variant of the legal logic seems possible when certain political players are in power, and especially when strong illiberal political forces hijack the liberal state and the independent nature of the judiciary (which is not so hard to imagine in the current populist era).

Thus understood, economic liberalism and political liberalism can be interpreted as two parallel threads knit into the same fabric of liberal democracies. They are friends, not enemies. Rather, their common enemy is closed and exclusive illiberalism. One implication of this proposition is that immigration policies in all their aspects – labour migration, family reunification and asylum and humanitarian protection – should be positively correlated to a high degree; they should be reducible to a single consistent dimension of IRO. In addition, for democracies the liberal mode can be assumed to be the natural mode; some illiberal element or actor must be added to derail this inherent liberal tendency. This liberal logic underpinning immigration policies is further amplified by strong economic and political constraints imposed by globalised (labour) markets and liberal international institutions (cf. Sassen 1996a). These factors lead to a "liberal bias" in immigration policies – a gap between the restrictionist bent of public opinion and liberal immigration policymaking (Cornelius et al. 2014; Lutz 2019). Thus, contrary to what many believe to be an age of restrictionism, we can expect that immigration regimes should exhibit an overall liberalising trajectory over recent decades.

To theorize citizenship regimes, I go back to Hollifield's usage of the term political liberalism. It combines rights-based liberalism with the collective right of (native) democratic communities to national self-determination. This conception of political liberalism is, therefore, intimately connected to concepts of nationhood and citizenship. Against this background, I suggest that citizenship regimes are, first and foremost, underpinned by a *cultural logic of the nation*. Citizenship policies with an inclusive tendency are based on inclusive conceptions of national identity (cf. Brubaker 1992). Emphasizing the individual right of immigrants to inclusion, the key purpose of such an inclusive citizenship regime is to ensure democratic legitimacy vis-à-vis migrant

newcomers as they are subjected to the rule of the receiving state. Inclusive national identities are thus wedded to a *democratic logic of the liberal state.*

By contrast, citizenship policies that tend towards the exclusionary pole are rooted in exclusive conceptions of national identity (cf. Brubaker 1992). They subsume the egalitarian logic of the liberal state under a collectivist logic of the nation and the rights to self- determination and the idea of boundedness of the native majority. Emphasizing the right to exclusion, the key concern here is democratic legitimacy vis-à-vis native citizens as they strive to preserve socio-cultural cohesion and the cultural distinctiveness of their national identity. Hence, exclusive national identities are wedded to an *illiberal democratic logic.*

The *modus vivendi* of liberal states can be located in a comprehensively democratic logic. This should lead to a tendency of greater inclusiveness in citizenship over time. However, this tendency is weak because citizenship regimes regarding long-term immigrants are not subject to forces of globalisation and liberal biases as much as immigration regimes are (Lutz 2019).[28] Instead, marking the last, though perhaps falling, "bastion of sovereignty" (Dauvergne 2004; Spiro 2011), citizenship policies can be expected remain on trajectories that continue to significantly vary across states (cf. Koopmans et al. 2012). Table 6 provides an overview of these arguments.

In sum, on the one hand, citizenship regimes can be conceived as being mainly exposed to slow-moving logics of culture and national identity as well as the medium-paced logic of democracy. Thus understood, citizenship regimes are a product of the interaction of the *cultural logic of the nation* with the *democratic logic of the liberal state.* Immigration policies, on the other hand, are mainly driven by fast-moving economic forces as well as medium-paced legal and political dynamics. They are a product of the interaction of the *economic logic of the market* with the *legal logic of the liberal state.*

This brings me to my last proposition. Since the two policy areas of immigration and citizenship tap into different societal domains and are driven by distinct structural logics, IRO and CRI should not only be conceptually and statistically *distinct*, but also statistically *independent* – that is, they should not be systematically correlated. This hypothesis stands in contrast to the common assumption that there is a trade-off between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship (e.g. Ruhs 2013).

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[28] There has also been a marketisation of citizenship. For instance, certain states have introduced citizenship for sale schemes to attract "high value migrants" and investments (Shachar 2018; Džankić 2019). However, this has happened at the margins of citizenship regimes as they are defined here. They do not concern ordinary immigrants.

Table 6   Overview of the analytical framework and its empirical implications

Logic	Variants		Relevance		Globalisation Constraints	Tendency	
			Immigration Regime	Citizenship Regime		Immigration Regime	Citizenship Regime
Economic logic of the market	Open	Transnational labour markets	High	Low	Strong	Strong liberal tendency	
	Closed	Protectionist national labour markets					
Legal logic of the liberal state	Liberal	Independent and strong judicial review					
	Illiberal	Non-independent and weak judicial review				Convergent	
Democratic logic of the liberal state	Liberal	Democratic rights extended to immigrants	Low	High	Weak		Weak liberal tendency
	Illiberal	Democratic rights reserved for natives					
Cultural logic of the nation	Inclusive	Inclusive national identities					Non-convergent
	Exclusive	Exclusive national identities					

3.4   THE NATIONAL BOUNDARY REGIME TYPOLOGY

If immigration regimes and citizenship regimes are distinct and internally coherent, the resulting policy space should feature four ideal-typical configurations. Bosniak (2006: 119) explains that the "hard-on-the-outside, soft-on-the-inside model […] is the prevailing and commonsense normative account." This is the broad agreement that the relatively hard shell or highly erected gate (restricted immigration) of democratic nation-states makes possible and protects the soft inside (inclusive citizenship). The normative model that corresponds most closely to this regime is *liberal communitarianism* (the classic statement is Walzer 1983: ch. 2) and can be abbreviated as closed-inclusive.

Figure 8   The National Boundary Regime Typology

Source   Original illustration.

The diametrically opposing normative ideal-type is *neo-liberal utilitarianism* (see e.g. Ruhs 2013): Immigration is liberalised, but citizenship is exclusive; it is open-exclusive. By emphasizing economic openness to harness the benefits of globalisation, while at the same time controlling its impact on the fabric of the national political community by keeping or making citizenship exclusive, the neo-liberal regime type resembles the notion of the liberal paradox (Hollifield 2004).

The typology is completed by *liberal cosmopolitanism* and its counterpart *illiberal nativism*. The former combines open labour markets with rights to family reunification and the right to humanitarian protection and asylum as well as inclusive citizenship (see e.g. Carens 2013). This *open-inclusive* policy configuration thus embodies the resolution of the liberal paradox and has been abbreviated as the "Liberal Model" (Boucher and Gest 2018). Illiberal nativism has relatively closed borders, and its citizenship is relatively exclusive; it is *closed-exclusive*. The "Market Model" (Boucher and Gest 2018) is selectively open but exclusive and thus can be located in between the illiberal and the neo-liberal model. Figure 8 summarises this typology.

If IRO and CRI indeed increase over time, we can expect that more and more cases should be open-inclusive. However, if the liberalising and convergent tendency is indeed stronger for immigration regimes, the continued non-convergence in CRI should also lead to a substantial number of open-exclusive cases.

4.4   DATA AND METHODS

To measure the various components of Immigration Regime Openness (IRO), this article uses data of the Immigration Policies in Comparison project (IMPIC; Helbling et al. 2017). IMPIC covers 33 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 (unfortunately, at this point, no data is available after 2010 and it is too resource-intensive for an individual researcher to update it). To measure Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI), I have created an original dataset that builds on the most essential elements that can be found in the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) strand on *Access to Nationality* (Huddleston and Niessen 2011). In addition, I have relied on data from Stadlmair (2017), Fitzgerald et al. (2014), de Haas et al. (2015) as well as those provided by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT).[29] Called *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX), the dataset therefore does not reinvent but rather reassemble the citizenship wheel. I only provide a short description of CITRIX here, while more details and validity tests can be found in Appendix C.

Attempting to find a balance between high spatio-temporal coverage and sufficient unit homogeneity, the case selection criteria are as follows. For pragmatic reasons, a country must be covered by both IMPIC and CITRIX. In terms of substance, a country must have been an independent and liberal-democratic state, whose adherence to rule of law and whose effective state apparatus mean that policy outputs are implemented. Even though such states do not necessarily

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[29]   www.globalcit.eu

have a net migration rate that is tilted towards immigration rather than emigration over the whole period, one can assume that all of them are attractive for migrants as countries of destination. IMPIC and CITRIX overlap for 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 (though CITRIX is also available until 2014). These countries also fulfil the substantive case selection criteria. They include the EU member states forming the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Japan, as well as the classical Western settler states – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This leads to 713 country-year observations.

Part of the analysis will sub-divide the timespan from 1980 to 2010 into three geopolitical periods to detect changes over time. They roughly correspond to the three decades. The 1980–1991 period marks the final years of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has become fundamentally different. Globalisation picked up speed and the USA sat at the top of the liberal world order during the 1992-2001 period. The world changed again in fundamental ways after 9/11. Especially the latter event is often assumed to be important for (changing) immigration and citizenship policies.

In line with the concept specification outlined in the first part of this article, the measurement of IRO covers the policy fields of labour immigration, family reunification, and asylum. There are two components for each field: *entry* and *stay*. Entry requirements define the criteria that immigrants need to fulfil to be able to enter a host country (called eligibility and conditions in IMPIC). Conditions for stay define the security of status and the possibilities for long-term settlement associated with a specific entry permit (called security of status in IMPIC; for details see Bjerre et al. 2016). This leads to a total of six policy components.

Based on the conceptualisation of CRI above, CITRIX is composed of four policy components. These are (1) the strength of *jus soli*; (2) residence duration requirements; (3) the toleration of multiple citizenship; and (4) further naturalisation requirements, namely language tests and citizenship tests as well as economic and criminal record requirements. The first is measured as years and then rescaled from 0 to 100 with 100 indicating the least amount of years required in the sample. For the others the three- point 0-50-100 MIPEX scales are applied, though for one jus soli indicator the scale is refined and for the dual citizenship component it is rearranged. More details as well as validity tests of CITRIX can be found in Appendix C. In Appendix D, I also offer some reflections on building indices of immigration policies, elaborating on how the country-year methodology used to measure immigration regimes qualifies the analysis, and how it compares to other approaches in the literature.

The IMPIC components are coded with an ordinal restrictiveness scale from 0 to 1, using theoretical minima and maxima (Helbling et al. 2017: 89). A score of 1 indicates maximum restrictiveness. I reverse the scales and linearly transform them so that 0 represents the empirical minimum and 100 the empirical maximum. Except for the residence duration requirement, the data of CITRIX are also ordinal. Also, there 0 represents the empirical minimum and 100 the empirical maximum. Given the ordinal scaling, I use *categorical* instead of standard principal component analysis (CATPCA; Meulman and Heiser 2005) to analyse the dimensionality of the data. This method can accommodate variables that are scaled at various levels (residence duration is deemed numeric) with the aim of modelling non-linear relationships. The output of CATPCA is similar to standard PCA – it can be interpreted in the same way (Linting et al. 2007: 27-8).

For the empirical analysis, the 713 country-year observations are pooled. This means that each indicator in each country and year is correlated with the indicator in that country in the previous year. Whether this autocorrelation poses a problem for principal component analysis has been contested. Jolliffe (2002: 299) argues that this problem poses no serious threat if the main goal of PCA is descriptive. This applies to my analysis. In addition, this pooled approach has already been used to construct immigration policy openness indices by applying standard PCA analysis to ordinal data (e.g. Peters 2017).

The CATPCA is confirmatory rather than exploratory. Hence, rather than relying on extraction criteria such as component Eigenvalues greater than 1 – a criterion often used for exploratory principal component analyses – a solution with two dimensions is specified *ex ante*. The CATPCA therefore tests whether the various policy components can indeed be reduced to two distinct and internally consistent dimensions that describe IRO and CRI, respectively. Additional tests with more and fewer dimensions are provided in Appendix E. The tests show that the two-dimensional model is the most adequate.

For the subsequent analyses, I do not use the component scores from the CATPCA. This is not only because they are highly skewed, but also because the rotation used (VARIMAX; see below) assumes statistical independence, thus making correlation analyses futile. Instead, I use equally weighted average scores based on the six IRO policy components and the four CRI policy components, respectively. As the IRO values are still highly skewed, however. I apply a cubic transformation to better identify the important sources of variation. More details and justifications for this decision are elaborated in Appendix F.

For the configurational analysis, the typology is used as a heuristic tool to make simplified nominal regime classifications. Both theoretically and empirically there are no clear thresholds

above which cases are open or inclusive in an absolute sense. At least when conceptualised and measured in a statistical rather than a set-theoretic the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship are matters of degree, not of kind (cf. Vink 2017: 226). However, I still categorise cases as instances of the four regime types, but only in a relative way by using the arithmetic means of IRO and CRI as the cut-off points.

4.5 DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS

Do the components of IRO and CRI configure along two internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions? A confirmatory CATPCA reveals that a two-dimensional model indeed provides an adequate description of the data. Both dimensions are relevant in terms of their Eigenvalue, and the model explains almost 60% of the variation in all items (Table 7; a correlation matrix of all variables can be found in Appendix G). The first dimension describes Immigration Regime Openness (IRO), the second Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI). While the dimension describing CRI is not fully consistent as the Cronbach's alpha score is below the standard threshold for internal consistency of 0.7, the model performs well. This indicated by the high value of the Cronbach's alpha assessing the full model.

Table 7   Categorical Principal Component Analysis – two-dimensional solution

Variables	Dimension IRO	Dimension CRI
Labour entry	**.79**	−.23
Labour stay	**.80**	−.20
Family entry	**.80**	.11
Family stay	**.81**	.18
Asylum entry	**.72**	−.07
Asylum stay	**.76**	.10
Strength of *jus soli*	−.17	**.83**
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	.05	**.84**
Multiple citizenship toleration	.05	**.57**
Further naturalisation requirements	−.02	**.65**
Eigenvalue	3.69	2.30
Explained variance	36.86	22.97
Cronbach's alpha	.81	.63
Model Eigenvalue	5.98	
Model explained variance	59.83	
Model Cronbach's alpha	.93	

Notes   N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al. 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold.

This finding adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, previous studies have cautioned against the idea that there is a general tendency in immigration policies across its various dimensions in terms of degrees of restrictiveness (Beine et al. 2016; de Haas et al. 2018). The analysis presented here instead suggests that immigration regimes are rather coherent. It corroborates the idea that IRO – in terms of entry and stay policies regarding labour immigration, family reunification, and asylum seekers and refugees – can be reduced to the same dimension (for the same finding with the original components of IRO see Schmid and Helbling 2016). This supports the argument that economic and political liberalism are complementary rather than contradictory structural forces. The logic of the market and the legal logic of the liberal state appear to go together. Furthermore, this scrutiny suggests that democracies letting immigrants enter more easily have also tended to let them stay; these two aspects do not trade off (cf. Ruhs 2013).

Second, the existing literature points to possible multi-dimensionality also in the realm of citizenship regimes. On the one hand, the literature has diagnosed a liberalising tendency in citizenship policies concerning the reduction of residence duration requirements, the toleration of multiple citizenship, and the strengthening of *jus soli*, especially across Europe (Bauböck et al. 2006; Joppke 2010). Faced with the fact of immigration, European democracies have developed (or retained) relatively inclusive citizenship laws – unless this movement toward more inclusive conceptions of nationhood and its manifestation in greater political liberalism was successfully contained by anti- immigrant counter-reactions from the far-right (Howard 2009). On the other hand, however, there has been much talk of a "restrictive turn" in citizenship regime trajectories across Europe (e.g. Joppke 2008). This literature tends to focus on the remaining component of citizenship regimes, conceptualised here as further naturalisation requirements: language and citizenship tests – subsumed under the rubric of "civic integration" – as well as, secondarily, economic and criminal record requirements. Civic integration requirements have been theorised as a separate dimension that is orthogonal to the restrictive-liberal continuum of citizenship policies as defined by other components such as the residence duration requirement (Goodman 2010: 757).

Based on a much larger number of observations than is typically employed, the analysis presented here supports the alternative view that the most important policy components of citizenship regimes regarding ordinary immigration – residence duration requirements, multiple citizenship toleration, the strength of *jus soli*, as well as further naturalisation requirements (language tests, citizenship tests, and economic and criminal record conditions) – can be reduced to the same dimension of CRI. While the differentiation of civic integration as a separate dimension may be important in conceptual terms, and useful for specific analytical purposes, this analysis thus suggests that this aspect can also be incorporated into a one-dimensional statistical measure of

citizenship regimes, more comprehensively understood. This supports the view that liberal-democratic concerns (or illiberal ones) and inclusive conceptions of nationhood (or exclusive ones) go together in structuring coherent citizenship regimes, though the various policy components cannot be neatly aligned with these two underpinning structures.

4.6   CONFIGURATIONAL ANALYSIS

How do the observations configure in the two-dimensional space defined by IRO and CRI? Figure 9 presents the empirical distribution of all country-year combinations, both for the whole observation period (on the very right) as well as broken down by three geopolitical periods, which roughly correspond to the three decades from 1980 to 2010. Overall, most cases have relatively open immigration regimes and inclusive citizenship regimes (Figure 9; 30% of observations). Regimes with this liberal cosmopolitan quality have become much more frequent over time. They were least frequent during the last decade of the Cold War (1980–1991), but in the most recent observation period (2002–2010) they make up almost half of all observations (46%).

Figure 9   National boundary regimes over time

Source   Original illustration.

Note   Bars indicate percentages; the categorisation is made according to whether an observation is above or below the arithmetic mean of IRO and CRI, respectively; Cold War period 1980–1991; Post 9/11 period 2002–2010; total period 1980–2010; N = 713 country-year observations.

Closely following the open-inclusive cases, the second on the list are the open-exclusive cases (29%). They have reached a peak during the 1990s (36%), while the decades before and after they make up about a fourth. As will be further demonstrated below, this has to do with the overall liberalising trajectory in citizenship policies, which led to a decrease in regimes akin to the "Market Model" and to corresponding increase in regimes akin to the "Liberal Model." The number of observations that feature a closed immigration regime and an exclusive citizenship regime has dropped steadily by more than 20 percentage points from 1980 to 2010. During the Cold War they were very frequent (37%), but then rapidly declined. Finally, it is striking that the classical model that dominates in the normative literature (closed immigration regime, inclusive citizenship regime) is clearly least prevalent empirically (17%). Its highest share was also during the Cold War (22%) – the decade in which this model found its classical formulation in Walzer (1983: ch. 2).

4.7   TREND ANALYSIS

How have immigration regimes and citizenship regimes evolved during recent decades? The previous analysis suggests that they have both liberalised. Figure 10 shows this aggregate liberalising tendency in both IRO and CRI.[30] However, after a surge of liberalisation from 1980 onwards, the trend toward more open immigration policies stops in 1996 and IRO fluctuates thereafter. Hence, the structural tendency of IRO towards greater openness – as a result of the constraints imposed by globalization – is limited. The trajectory of citizenship policies clearly shows the restrictive turn in the 2000s, which has been discussed in much of the literature (e.g. Joppke 2008). One can also detect an- other restrictive turn in citizenship during the 1990s. This is a novel finding. However, albeit limited, the aggregate tendency is toward greater CRI.

Regarding convergence, the declining trend in the standard deviation of IRO is particularly striking. It also continues after the aggregate level of IRO stagnates and fluctuates after 1996. The convergence in CRI is very limited (Figure 10). Thus, whereas policy variation in immigration has decreased, variation in citizenship policies has not converged significantly. Indeed, citizenship policies have diverged somewhat during the time of its backsliding after 9/11. This indicates that the "restrictive turn" in civic integration requirements has increased the variation across countries (Goodman 2014).

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[30]   The evolution of policies by country is shown in Appendix H.

Figure 10 Aggregate trends and convergence in IRO and CRI 1980-2010

Source   Original illustration.

Notes   Lines represent the mean and standard deviation of IRO and CRI, aggregated across 23 democracies from 1980 to 2010; reference lines indicate 1992 and 2001 to distinguish historical periods; IRO is based on selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al. 2017). CRI is composed of the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes.

These findings of liberalising trends and convergence in IRO but not CRI are in tune with the implications of my theoretical arguments. They also confirm previous analyses (e.g. Helbling and Kalkum 2018; Koopmans et al. 2012), while contradicting contrasting conjectures expecting greater liberalisation and convergence in CRI (e.g. Joppke 2010). However, the results also show important variation across geopolitical periods; the structural forces underpinning immigration and citizenship policies, their liberal and illiberal variants, and the interplay among them, appear to be dynamic.

4.8   CORRELATION ANALYSIS

Are immigration regimes and citizenship regimes statistically independent? The CATPCA has used an orthogonal VARIMAX rotation, which assumes a priori that the dimensions are uncorrelated. Solutions with non-orthogonal rotations show not only the same pattern of two-dimensionality, but also confirm that the correlation between IRO and CRI is low (PROMAX estimates a correlation of − 0.07; OBLIMIN estimates a correlation of − 0.03). Using the IRO and CRI scales with (for IRO, transformed) arithmetic means is more adequate, because they are completely free of any assumptions and, in addition, are not dependent on variable parameters that go into the estimation of correlations between the dimensions when using PROMAX (I used the default Kappa = 4) and OBLIMIN (I used the default Delta = 0).

Table 8   How IRO-CRI cross-sectional correlations increase over time

	Historical Period			
	Pooled	Cold War	1992-2001	Post 9/11
rho	0.19	0.08	0.18	0.38
p-value	0.000	0.164	0.007	0.000
N	713	276	230	207

Notes   Entries are Spearman correlation coefficients, p-values, and the number of observations.

Table 8 shows that there is a conditional cross-case correlation between IRO and CRI: it increases over time. While there was virtually no correlation during the last decade of the Cold War, it increases to 0.18 during the 1990s, and to 0.36 after 9/11 (coefficients are Spearman's rho because of the ordinal nature of the data). The overall correlation is substantially low (0.19) but has a very low p-value. Though there is only a moderate correlation after 9/11, this means that neither the widespread expectation of a negative correlation between IRO and CRI nor the alternative idea that the two policy areas are not systematically correlated receives empirical support. Instead, the increasingly positive correlation suggests that the logics driving immigration policies and citizenship policies have converged over time.

Figure 11   Configurations, trends, and correlations over time

The correlation and its variation over time is visualised in Figure 11 (thick dashed line). It also shows the variation in degree of all country-year observations. The movement of these dots over time gives us another angle on the configurational and trend analyses. From 1980 onwards, there is a movement to the right, which is accompanied by an in-creasing movement upwards. The latter inclusive move of the membership boundary becomes more significant over time (until the restrictive turn), whereas the opening move of the territorial boundary becomes less pronounced over time. Many countries become less closed-exclusive by becoming more open-exclusive, and then more open-inclusive.

While the above configurational analysis shows what can be gained by a dichotomising typological strategy, the full variation shown here should make us aware of what is hidden by this simplification. Note that, for instance – as can be expected from statistical measures – many observations cluster around the arithmetic means (indicated by the reference lines on both axes). This highlights the relativistic nature of the typology. Relatively open may not match the notion of openness as implied by some normative theory, and just because citizenship has become more inclusive does not necessarily mean that it is inclusive enough (or over-inclusive) when bearing a normative benchmark in mind (cf. Blatter et al. 2017).

4.9   CONCLUSION

In this article, I have formulated a theory of the structural logics shaping immigration policies and citizenship policies – the logic of markets, the logic of nations, as well as the legal and the democratic logic of the liberal state (cf. Hampshire 2013). Based on this theory I have introduced a novel typology – called *The National Boundary Regimes Typology* – that focuses on the regulation of two fundamental social boundaries of modern nation-states: territorial boundaries (*Immigration Regime Openness*, IRO) and membership boundaries (*Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness*, CRI).

I have made four main empirical observations on the two-dimensional policy space determined by the different degrees of IRO and CRI, most of which are in accordance with the specified theoretical framework. First, a Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) based on a combination of original and existing panel data across 23 liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010 has confirmed that IRO and CRI are internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. I have thereby provided empirical evidence for the existence of these dimensions – something which is lacking in the literature (Koopmans 2013: 696). The finding that there is no internal trade-off in immigration policies regarding different migrant groups suggests that economic liberalism – embodied in the *economic logic of the market* – and political liberalism – embodied in the *legal logic of the liberal state* – are rather complementary than contradictory forces in determining the openness of immigration policies. Similarly, the finding that citizenship policies are coherent suggests that the interaction of the *democratic logic of the liberal state* with the *cultural logic of the nation* leads to a single empirical dimension of inclusiveness. Often seen as something different, civic integration requirements are part of this singular statistical continuum.

Second, the distribution of cases over the four ideal-typical policy configurations from 1980 to 2010 has shown that more and more cases combine relatively liberal immigration policies with relatively liberal citizenship policies; they are open-inclusive and thus have a liberal-

cosmopolitan quality. This demonstrates that the "liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992, 2004) has been increasingly resolved, and the "Liberal Model" rather than the "Market Model" (Boucher and Gest 2018) has become more prevalent.

Third, the aggregate levels of both IRO and CRI follow overall liberalising trajectories with convergence in immigration and non-convergence in citizenship. However, the liberalisation in immigration policies stops in 1996 and fluctuates thereafter. This trend indicates that the constraints by globalization, which should lead to greater openness, are limited. The non-convergence in citizenship policies highlights national path- dependencies. This is confirmed by a disaggregated analysis showing the evolution of policies by country (see Appendix H). The analysis has also shown a restrictive turn in citizenship policies during the 2000s, which is concurrent with expectations in the literature. The novel finding in this article is that another restrictive turn has already taken place during the 1990s. This suggests that also illiberal and exclusive forces have been at work in the realm of citizenship.

Fourth, this article has also shown that there is an increasingly positive correlation between IRO and CRI. This stands in contrast to the widespread assumption that there is a general trade-off or negative correlation between the territorial and membership dimensions of national boundary regimes (e.g. Ruhs 2013; Walzer 1983: ch. 2). This result suggests that the different structural logics do not remain distinct; they converge or coalesce over time.

These four observations corroborate the theory proposed in this article. However, this theory needs to be both more rigorously tested and developed further. Indeed, the analytical framework has many more empirical implications, most of which will manifest only in qualitative data of specific cases. Besides looking for traces of the theorized structural logics and their interactions in case studies, the framework also must be subjected to tests using further statistical techniques – namely panel regressions of IRO on CRI, and vice-versa – to ascertain whether there is a correlation. In addition, this structuralist framework has to be complemented by an account of how politics unfolds within, employs, manipulates, and shapes the underlying logics.[31] By arguing and illustrating empirically that these structural logics underpinning national boundary regimes create an architecture that is not set in stone but has evolved over time, in this article I have provided both a theoretical and empirical yardstick to address these questions.

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[31] For a unique example of such a theory and supporting empirical analysis showing a strong positive correlation of immigration openness and immigrant rights in labor migration policies see Bearce and Hart (2018).

5

Open borders
versus
inclusive citizenship?

*Distinct and common logics in democratic
immigration and membership politics*

ABSTRACT

Many theorists assume that the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship trade off. Yet, there is no consistent empirical evidence for this negative relationship. In this paper, I propose the boundary politics framework to explain the association between immigration and citizenship regimes in democratic states. I argue that when immigration is not politicized, immigration and citizenship politics are not correlated because they follow distinct logics. But when politicized, immigration and citizenship politics become part of a common cosmopolitan-nativist conflict about boundary-making, which manifests in a positive correlation between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness. Nativist party power further induces a restrictive logic, making boundary regimes more closed and exclusive. I test these propositions using quantitative analyses across 23 democracies 1980-2010 along with some evidence from case illustrations. The results support but also qualify the new framework and bear implications for long-standing normative and empirical debates on boundary-regime making.

5.1   INTRODUCTION

"A nation that cannot control its borders is not a nation," Ronald Reagan once claimed. Three decades later, Donald Trump reformulated the idea. "A nation without borders is not a nation at all," he tweeted. In some sense, Reagan and Trump are right. A modern nation-state has two constitutive elements: one is the nation, which is based on the collective of a national community, and individual membership therein. The other is the state and its territory, marked by its border, which defines its jurisdiction and extent of immediate control. Membership and territorial boundaries are also key regarding immigration. They constitute the two fundamental "social closures of nation-states" (Weber 1946: 78; Brubaker 1992: ch. 1; see also Helbling 2008: 31-2). States can determine immigrants' access to passports by adjusting its citizenship policies. And states can determine who, besides its citizens, can enter and stay in their territory in the first place, by calibrating their immigration policies.

Are Reagan and Trump right in assuming that nations need immigration control? Many political theorists rely on this assumption. Most famously, Walzer (1983: ch. 2) conceptualizes the moral right to restrict immigration at their discretion not only as an essential aspect of national self-determination, but also as a condition that is necessary to set all immigrants on a path to democratic citizenship. Others deny states' right to border control. Most prominently, Carens (2013) vouches for radically open borders instead, while also insisting on inclusive citizenship for democratic reasons. He acknowledges that there may be a conflict between the two commitments (ibid. 289) but maintains that they are "compatible" (ibid. ch. 13). Another strand in the literature argues that more open borders should be combined with restricted rights of immigrants (e.g. Chang 2002, 2003; Ruhs and Chang 2004; Bell and Piper 2005; see Ruhs 2013, 2017 for a more moderate approach). However, this literature is mainly concerned with temporary migrant workers. The dilemma between the openness of borders and democratic egalitarianism is especially virulent for this group (e.g. Lenard and Straehle 2012; Ottonelli and Torresi 2012; Barry und Ferracioli 2018). But advocates of temporary labor migration see temporariness as part of the solution. The idea is to escape the dilemma not only by limiting rights but also by curtailing long-term immigration in order to "drop the assumption that immigrants are citizens in the making" (Miller 2008a: 375).

Ruhs (2013) finds negative correlations between the openness of temporary labor immigration programs and the rights they confer to immigrant workers. More rights come at the price of less openness – so the provocative argument goes. Based on this finding, Ruhs argues that certain rights should be limited to safeguard openness for more migrant workers, which is assumed to maximize welfare on a global scale (see also Milanovic 2016; Weyl 2018). Recent research shows

that liberalizations in entry regulations, also for non-economic immigrants, are negatively correlated with liberalizations in immigrant rights (Natter et al. 2020). However, other research qualifies these findings. Ruhs (2018) finds that openness-rights trade-offs across labor immigration programs are more pronounced in autocracies, and that across democracies they only manifest in states with liberal rather than coordinated market economies. Bearce and Hart (2018) find that more open labor immigration policies are positively correlated with extensions of immigrant rights and the access to citizenship. Therefore, while a trade-off is often expected by both theorists and empirical analysts, the available evidence is inconclusive.

In this paper, I explore the potential association between the openness toward long-term immigration and the inclusiveness of citizenship policies for these immigrants. I focus on the openness of immigration policies more broadly – not only covering labor immigration, but also family reunification and asylum – and how these policies relate to the membership boundary more specifically, in terms of the inclusiveness of the access to citizenship for ordinary immigrants and their children. The main analytical tool is the two-dimensional space that these separate policy areas constitute. Countries combine various levels of what I conceptualize as *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) and *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) across different years, and the two variables can correlate across cases depending on how these policy combinations distribute.

Mobilizing literatures on the party politics of immigration and citizenship, I focus on how specific political conditions are associated with combinations of immigration regimes and citizenship regimes in this two-dimensional space. My central claim is that the correlation between the two is determined by the politicization of immigration in terms of the salience of immigration-related issues and the electoral support for nativist parties, and that their specific combination within politicized contexts is further conditioned by nativist parties' long-term legislative power. When immigration is not politicized, immigration regimes and citizenship regimes are driven by distinct logics and should thus not be systematically associated. While citizenship clearly divides left demands for inclusion versus right demands for exclusion, the cleavage underpinning immigration politics may crosscut the traditional left-right divide. Moreover, because they have a strong international dimension and are exposed to greater liberal constraints, immigration regimes are less malleable by domestic political forces. These structural limits further weaken the capabilities of parties to change policies in a clear and coherent way.

By contrast, when immigration is politicized, immigration and citizenship politics share a common logic of party politics. Based on competing visions of national identity, this political conflict pits nativists seeking closure against cosmopolitans seeking openness in both territorial and membership boundary-making (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; see also de Wilde et al. 2019;

Sobolewska and Ford 2020). I describe this dynamic as *boundary politics* because this conflict is not about perceived or real consequences of immigration – as proposed by accounts invoking the contrasting notion of *trade-off politics* – but about national boundaries and their redefinition in a globalizing world as such. A positive correlation between immigration openness and citizenship inclusiveness should emerge as a symptom of boundary politics. I argue further that long-term nativist power determines what side of the underlying *identity divide* – between cosmopolitans and nativists – is dominant in politicized settings. The more nativist parties accrue legislative power over the long run, the more closed-exclusive boundary regimes should become, and less nativist power should translate into more open-inclusive policy combinations, thereby transcending the trade-off assumption.

I test the boundary politics framework using various panel data modeling techniques covering 23 Western liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010. The results support but also qualify the framework. The first qualification is that most hypotheses consistently withstand testing only when considering observations after the Cold War. This is in line with expectations in the party politics and broader migration literature, as the politicization of immigration, and immigration more generally, has become substantial and consequential especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second qualification is that nativist parties have a stronger and more consistent effect on citizenship policies than on immigration policies. Even when nativists are very strong in politicized settings, they cannot fully suppress the liberalizing tendency induced by the constraints of immigration policymaking. This results in exclusive but semi-open boundary regimes in these specific settings.

I proceed in the following steps. First, I review the existing literature concerned specifically with the association between immigration policies and immigrant rights and citizenship policies. Second, based on a review of further literature, I specify the alternative account of *boundary politics*. Third, the research design is elaborated. Next, I conduct the empirical analysis and discuss the results. The conclusion summarizes the main insights, reflects on the normative implications, and points to avenues for further research.

5.2   LITERATURE REVIEW

Ruhs and Martin (2008) introduce the *numbers versus rights hypothesis*. They propose that there is an inverse relationship between inflows of labor migrants and migrant workers' rights. This is because rights can be costly for employers, thus decreasing their demand for migrant labor. Ruhs (2013) elaborates this proposition, arguing that when crafting labor immigration programs,

policymakers simultaneously determine the numbers, the selection in terms of skills and nationality, and the rights of labor immigrants. To accommodate economic efficiency with concerns about equality and distribution, national identity, social cohesion, as well as national security and public order, openness (in terms of numbers and selection) and rights must be balanced accordingly. He posits that "if certain rights for some migrants create net costs for the receiving country (e.g., full access to the welfare state for low-skilled migrant workers), policy openness to admitting such migrants can be expected to critically depend on the extent to which some of their rights can be restricted" (ibid. 6). Hence, Ruhs expects that "greater openness to migrant workers will be associated with relatively fewer rights for migrants and vice versa" (ibid.).

Regrading citizenship policies specifically, Ruhs (2013: 173) argues that any "guarantee" of future citizenship "would significantly lower receiving countries' incentives to admit some migrant workers – especially low-and medium-skilled workers – in the first place" (see also Bell and Piper 2005: 209; Chang 2003: 770). His empirical analysis then shows that across 71 labor immigration programs in 30 upper-high-income countries in 2009, negative correlations are most pronounced between the aggregate immigration openness policy index and the aggregate immigrant rights index as well as the separate social, economic, residence, and family reunion rights indices (Ruhs 2013: 85). Notably, there is no statistically significant correlation between aggregate openness and the indicator for access to citizenship (ibid. 213). Based on these findings, Ruhs (2013) concludes that the openness of borders should be prioritized. While core civil and political rights should be protected (see Ruhs 2017), he argues that immigrant rights that induce costs should be curbed to yield maximum utility and welfare for immigrants as well as receiving and sending states on a global scale.

More recent research reaches contrasting conclusions. First, as part of a broader analysis, Natter and colleagues (2020) model the association between changes in immigration openness and immigrant rights, including the access to citizenship, across all categories of immigrants in 21 Western immigration countries between 1970 and 2012. They find that rights extensions are negatively correlated with immigration liberalizations, and vice-versa. As it is not their main focus, however, they do not discuss concrete mechanisms but instead refer to the numbers versus rights hypothesis introduced by Ruhs and Martin (2008). Second, Bearce and Hart (2018) argue that the basic logic of the demand-side model proposed by Ruhs (2013) should be extended to account for the pressure of firms seeking not only openness for low-skilled labor but also seeking to extend immigrant rights to attract high-skilled immigrant workers. Covering 38 democracies from 1995 to 2016, they find a strong positive correlation in openness and rights, including the access to citizenship, with both showing a liberalizing tendency over time.

Finally, in a follow-up analysis using the data from Ruhs (2013), Ruhs (2018) finds that labor immigration programs in autocratic countries face much stronger trade-offs than those in democracies. This holds especially for the Arab Gulf States, which combine very open programs with strongly restricted rights (cf. Boucher and Gest 2018: 179). Ruhs (2018) then shows that, across democracies, openness-rights trade-offs are only present in liberal market economies. This is surprising because, against the background of Ruhs' rationalist argument about net costs and benefits of labor immigration, one could expect that in liberal market economies – which also have liberal welfare regimes – costs would be lower than in other settings, especially than in social democratic welfare regimes (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). To explain this pattern, Ruhs (2018: S99) suggests that the mechanism at play in this context thus may relate to constitutive social *norms* rather than a process of rational calculus that balances various potentially conflicting political goals in light of national *interests*. This shows that contextual conditions can activate different mechanisms and patterns of political behavior.

In the following, I build on this insight to develop an alternative and more comprehensive framework that allows us to understand the context-dependent association between immigration and citizenship regimes across Western democracies. It theorizes broad political conditions as mechanisms that explain variation in this association – both in terms of policy correlations and combinations – across space and time. This will also help us understand what may drive some of the divergent findings in previous studies.

5.3   THE BOUNDARY POLITICS FRAMEWORK

5.3.1   CORE CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL BASIS

Immigration regimes are comprised of the legal regulations that define the conditions for immigrants to enter and stay in a receiving country. These policies distinguish different types of immigrants, namely labor immigrants, immigrants that reunite with their families, and asylum seekers and refugees. The level of immigration regime openness increases with decreasing restrictiveness in the relevant regulations. Citizenship regimes comprise the regulations that define the conditions for immigrants to acquire the legal status of full membership in the sense of nationality. I focus on four core policy components of citizenship regimes: conditions regarding territorial birthright, residence duration, toleration of multiple citizenship, and integration. The level of citizenship regime inclusiveness increases with decreasing restrictiveness in these policies. These two conceptualizations are compatible, as they apply to all categories of ordinary immigrants.

Even though it applies only to children of non-citizen parents, it is still important and not inconsistent to consider birthright, because policymakers may consider that natural possibility when regulating immigration.

I zoom in on the relative and absolute levels of immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness, and how they configure across countries and over time in the two-dimensional policy space introduced and validated by Schmid (2020).[32] The *national boundary regime typology* features four logical policy combinations of immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness, which can be ideal-typically connected to stylized normative positions and labels. Closed-inclusive regimes have a liberal-communitarian flavor (e.g. Walzer 1983: ch. 2), open-inclusive regimes show a liberal-cosmopolitan quality (e.g. Carens 2013), open-exclusive regimes have neo-liberal-utilitarian properties (e.g. Ruhs 2013), and closed-exclusive regimes can be labeled as illiberal-nativist. There is no recent theorist defending the latter, but Miller's communitarianism (2016) can be located between the nativist position and Walzer's more liberal statement. In the following, I shall describe open-inclusive and closed-exclusive regimes as *congruent*, whereas closed-inclusive and open-exclusive regimes are *incongruent*. More congruent policy combinations lead to more positive correlations between the two areas, while incongruent combinations will drive negative correlations.

The theoretical foundation of this typology – elaborated in Schmid (2020) – is that labor immigration policies are underpinned by the market logic of capitalism, while policies regulating family reunification and asylum policies follow a complementary liberal-constitutional logic. By contrast, citizenship policies are driven by the identity logic of the nation (inclusive or exclusive) and a complementary liberal-democratic (inclusive) or illiberal logic (exclusive). External liberal constraints imposed by global markets and international institutions (Sassen 2012) create strongly liberalizing and converging tendencies in immigration policies, especially regarding labor immigration (Hollifield 2004). The classical assumption is that also domestic economic actors push for more expansive labor immigration (Freeman 1995). Domestic liberal constraints exerted by courts matter especially in relation to non-economic immigration (Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 2001; Hansen 2002) and also lead to liberalization and convergence (Joppke 1998). These liberalizing and

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[32] Goodman and Pepinsky (2021) have introduced a similar typology. To my knowledge, the first scholar to put forward a typology combining these two dimensions is Tichenor (2002: 36). In his analysis of American immigration politics in *Dividing Lines*, he uses similar labels for the four corners of the policy space and their supporting ideology: open-inclusive regimes are supported by cosmopolitans, closed-inclusive regimes by national egalitarians, open-exclusive regimes by free-market expansionist, and closed-exclusive regimes by classic exclusionists. His main argument is that "incongruous bedfellow coalitions" between various actors have sustained specific reforms (see also Hollifield 1992: 267).

converging tendencies are weaker and more malleable by potentially illiberal political forces in the realm of citizenship policies (Howard 2009). Because of their roots in conceptions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992), citizenship is also more path-dependent yet not fully inert (Koopmans et al. 2012). This constrains their cross-country convergence. Schmid (2020) observes these empirical implications. Due to their *distinct structural logics*, immigration regimes liberalize and converge over time much more strongly than citizenship regimes.

It is commonly assumed that immigration-related issues do not fully align with the classical divide between the left and the right (Perlmutter 1996; Breunig and Luedkte 2008). The left is divided between the "Old Left" concerned with the protection of domestic workers and the "New Left" striving for global social justice and international solidarity (Alonso and da Fonseca 2011: 868) as well as their concern for the preferences of ethnic minorities (Money 1999b). The right is divided between the "Old Right" concerned with their core business constituency and their demand for (cheap) labor and the "New Right" concerned with protecting native culture (Odmalm 2011; Schain 2008).

However, once we distinguish immigration from integration and citizenship, it becomes clear that immigration is much more likely to form a cross-cutting issue (Duncan and van Hecke 2008; Natter et al. 2020). Immigration has both economic (labor immigration) and non-economic components (family reunification and asylum). The conflict thus may be most virulent on the left where especially low-skilled labor immigrants can be both threatening for native works and of a broader humanistic concern, whereas the right may resolve the issue by simply favoring labor immigration, or at least certain forms thereof (Schultz et al. 2020: 7). By contrast, citizenship is clearly a cultural issue on which liberal and leftist forces have come to embrace inclusion based on universalistic values, whereas right-wing forces embrace exclusion based on particularistic values (Joppke 2003). Hence, not only the structural but also the *political logics* that apply to immigration and citizenship may be different.

This intuition is not supported by existing empirical studies. Previous studies show that, at least across Western Europe, this one-dimensional left-right opposition on both immigration and citizenship issues is reflected in party manifestos (Lutz 2021) and public debates (Helbling 2014; van der Brug et al. 2015; Kriesi et al. 2012). Carvalho and Ruedin (2018) emphasize that consistent stances on immigration and citizenship issues are especially pronounced on the left and positively associated with the salience they attribute to these issues in public discourse. This contradicts the idea that immigration should be an internally divisive issue especially on the left of the political spectrum.

Bringing us back to the idea of structurally distinct logics, Lutz (2021) shows that, even though parties' preferences on immigration and integration are strongly correlated, translation into policy outputs varies. He argues that because of the strong liberalizing tendencies in immigration policymaking, parties can deliver on integration and citizenship more easily than on immigration. Lutz also finds that the link between party promises and enacted policies is stronger when issue salience is high. However, he points to a difference between immigration and integration, as salience only moderates the former, but not the latter.

In the following, I argue that the politicization of immigration-related issues and nativist identity politics can create a common political logic across the two policy areas, thus overcoming both the potential structural and political differences in immigration and citizenship politics. Let me unpack this argument by first clarifying the notion of politicization I operate with.

5.3.2   POLITICIZATION AND IMMIGRATION-RELATED PARTY POLITICS

Building on an emerging consensus in the literature on European integration (see Hoeglinger 2016) and immigration (see Grande et al. 2019), Hutter and Kriesi (2021: 3) distinguish three specific dimensions that constitute politicization: issue salience, actor expansion, and actor polarization. An issue is salient when it is publicly visible. This can be grasped as the intensity of the coverage of the issue, or the number of claims made by political actors in the media (see van der Brug et al. 2015). It can also relate to the prioritization of an issue on the political agenda, or, more concretely, on the "party system agenda" in terms of the attention it is given in party manifestos (Abou-Chadi 2016: 2096). Regarding actor expansion and polarization, I argue that nativist parties are key in this area (Howard 2009, 2010, 2013; Goodman and Howard 2013; Morales et al. 2015: 1499). The politicization of immigration increases also with rising levels of electoral support for nativist parties.

I use the term *nativist* parties rather than, for instance, radical-right populist or nationalist parties because the term nativism better captures their distinctive stance on their core concern of protecting natives from foreign influence (Mudde 1999; Rydgren 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Ennser 2012). Nativism imagines the nation as a homogenous ethnocultural community of natives that exclusively populate the territory of a single state. Immigration corrodes and culturally threatens this community regarding ethnicity, race, or religion (Mudde 2007: 19), which is why nativist parties adopt anti-immigration as well as anti-immigrant positions with the aim to protect the native culture and prioritize the native population and their concerns above all else (Mudde 2007: 144).

Previous research shows how the salience of immigration-related issues and nativist politics are intertwined (Grande et al. 2019; Hutter and Kriesi 2021; see also Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019; Dennison 2020). However, nativist parties are certainly not the only kind of party that can make immigration issues salient and electorally important (see Mudde 2007; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014; van der Brug et al. 2015; Meyer and Rosenberger 2015; Dancygier and Margalit 2020). I therefore consider all relevant parties when operationalizing the issue salience of immigration. This conceptualization of politicization privileges supply-side factors, yet the demand-side is brought into the picture by covering the electoral success of nativist parties as the second key component of politicization, relating to actor expansion and polarization. Thus understood, salience and the electoral support for nativist parties jointly constitute the politicization of immigration-related issues.

Whether politicization and nativist identity politics lead to consistent restrictions in both immigration and citizenship regimes is not clear in the broader and more recent literature (Lutz 2019: 520). Regarding citizenship policies in particular, Howard (2009) has pointed out that nativists' electoral success can suppress liberalization in previously restrictive regimes. The restrictive effect on previously more inclusive regimes has also been noted (Goodman and Howard 2013; Howard 2013). Hansen and Clemens (2019) have shown that both vote shares and seat shares of nativist parties has generally lowered the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes across Europe. Koopmans and colleagues (2012) indicate the same for integration policies more broadly, while Stadlmair (2018) documents an effect of long-term nativist party seat shares for economic requirements more specifically. Solodoch and Sommer (2020) show that also for birthright citizenship regimes nativist parties matter for restrictive tendencies, while center-left and far-left parties help explain their liberalization when those parties are explicitly distinguished. Similarly, Graeber (2020a) shows that the competition of center-right parties with nativist parties is associated with restrictive changes in citizenship regimes, while for liberal changes the competition of center-left parties with far-left parties is key.

Focusing instead on liberal reforms in entry and stay regulations more broadly defined, Abou-Chadi (2016) finds that if a nativist party is present in parliament, such reforms are less likely. Furthermore, he shows that issue salience can block such reforms when electoral competition in a particular party system is high. Shin (2019) uses nativist parties' vote share as a control variable to explain immigration policy openness and finds small but significant and consistent negative effects. By contrast, Peters (2017: ch. 7) emphasizes the lack of explanatory power of nativist party influence. Another study by Peters (2015) even shows that right-leaning governments are more inclined to liberalize low-skilled immigration. Kolbe (2021) presents a similar finding for high-

skilled immigration programs. She also indicates more specifically that nativist party seat shares are marginally significant in predicting high-skill liberalizations. Meanwhile, a study by Bearce and Hart (2017) finds that right-wing governments and nativist party vote share are not significant in shaping labor immigration policies.

Few studies consider how nativist parties or issue salience relate to both immigration and integration or citizenship policies. Givens and Luedtke (2005) find that issue salience generally decreases both immigrant rights and immigration openness. By contrast, Lutz (2019) shows that when nativist parties enter government coalitions as partners of the mainstream-right, they are successful in restricting integration policies, but not immigration policies. Both studies therefore provide reasons to treat the two underlying dimensions separately.

Hence, while there is robust evidence that politicization and nativist politics has a restrictive effect on integration or citizenship policies, for immigration policies the findings are mixed, and sometimes nativist and other right-wing parties even emerge as a driver of certain policy liberalizations. Furthermore, politicization and the far-left can also play a role, especially in shaping citizenship regimes. These findings therefore provide a first pointer that we must look beyond the classical left-right divide to understand how immigration and citizenship politics may be connected.

5.3.3   THREE HYPOTHESES

The first hypothesis of the boundary politics framework is that immigration and citizenship boundary-making follow distinct logics only when immigration is not politicized. Immigration and citizenship regimes should not be correlated when politicization is lacking because in that context non-nativist parties do not have strong incentives to accommodate nativist parties and their concerns; low politicization means that both nativist parties have weak electoral support and that, concurrently, the immigration issue is not salient. Policy proposals attempting to change boundary regimes can still emerge, but as without politicization there is no strong cultural dimension of party politics with clear nativist and cosmopolitan poles in the party system, there is no pressure on immigration and citizenship to become systematically more congruent. In other words, when politicization is low, immigration and citizenship politics *lack a common logic of party politics*. As a result, immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness should not systematically correlate; all boundary regime combinations, congruent and incongruent, are possible. Hence the first hypothesis:

Non-Politicization Hypothesis

H1   *When immigration-related issues are not politicized, Immigration Regime Openness and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness are not correlated.*

The politicization of immigration fuses immigration and citizenship politics. It is the key ingredient to explain congruent policy combinations. However, this is not because politicization has a similar effect on both immigration and citizenship policies, but because under politicized conditions immigration and citizenship *share a common logic of party politics.* Boundary regimes are made more congruent by changing either immigration or citizenship, or both, accordingly. Alternatively, politicization can lead to the retention or retrenchment of already congruent regimes. I dub this dynamic *boundary politics:* When politicized, neither immigration nor citizenship politics is about the real or perceived impacts and costs of immigration – as the idea of *trade-off politics* would have it – but instead about the boundaries of nation-states and national communities and their identities as such (Bleich 2008; Adamson et al. 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2012; Goodman 2019). Having become destabilized and transformed in various dimensions in the wake of globalization, the contestation of boundaries is at the heart of the transformation of party politics unfolding since the 1990s (Kriesi et al. 2012; Hutter 2014). The politicization of immigration is a symptom of this dimension of party politics, and the symptom of this politicization is an alignment of, and a positive association between, immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness. Hence the second hypothesis:

Politicization Hypothesis

H2   *When immigration-related issues are politicized, Immigration Regime Openness and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness are positively correlated.*

The relevant underlying dimension that captures and unifies immigration-related party politics has been given various labels. Two are most prominent in the literature. Some refer to it as the "new politics dimension" to distinguish forces of the "Old Left" and "Old Right" from their "New Left" and "New Right" counterparts (Marks et al. 2006). The key abbreviation here is GAL-TAN: Green/Alternative/Libertarian versus Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist., which characterize the "new parties" on each pole. Showing how it matters not only for immigration but also for EU politics, Hooghe and Marks (2018; see also Hooghe et al. 2002) have elevated this dimension to the status of a new cleavage, the *transnational cleavage*. Others have labeled it as the *globalization cleavage* (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; Hutter and Kriesi 2019). For Kriesi and colleagues, this cleavage is not genuinely new but represents a transformation of politics in response to globalization, within an already two-dimensional space of economic and cultural issues. While

remaining agnostic as to whether this dimension of politics is new, and whether it meets all the criteria for a full-fledged cleavage (Bartolini 2005; Kriesi 2010), I propose that, regarding issues related to immigration, we can more specifically characterize the relevant political dimension dimension as an *identity divide*, because it is constituted by contrasting visions of *national identity* and how they relate to immigration (see Sobolewska and Ford 2020). For cosmopolitans (or those on the GAL end of the spectrum), inclusive identities can serve as the backbone of boundary regimes that combine liberal-democratic and liberal-constitutional logics with open market logics. For nativists (or those on the TAN end of the spectrum), exclusive identities can ground boundary regimes that operate with illiberal and closed market logics.[33]

I argue that it is the combination of the *politicization of immigration* and the *long-term legislative power of nativist parties* that marks the dominance of the nativist side of the identity divide in a particular political setting, making not only citizenship but also immigration regimes more exclusive and closed, either by inducing restrictive effects or by suppressing or reducing their structural liberalizing tendency. Along with the common logic of party politics in immigration and citizenship politics induced by politicization, constituted by issue salience and higher nativist vote shares, higher long-term nativist seat shares in legislatures lead to *nativist boundary politics* that induce also *a common restrictive logic of policymaking*. Both immigration and citizenship regimes should thus become more closed and exclusive as nativist power grows in politicized settings. I further propose that nativist boundary politics marks a more general tendency towards a closed-exclusive boundary regime in the underlying two-dimensional policy space not only in relative but also in absolute terms.

In terms of mechanisms, my argument mainly invokes *indirect contagion effects* of strong nativist parties (Schain 2006) that unfold over longer periods of time (Bale et al. 2010; Mudde 2013; Stadlmair 2018). Many studies focusing on position-taking in party platforms find evidence for such underlying movements in party systems, as nativist electoral success leads non-nativist parties and entire party systems to move their positions in a more nativist direction (van Spanje 2010; Han 2014; Abou-Chadi and Krause 2018, 2020; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019). In addition, more moderate center-right parties face tougher electoral competition from the nativist right especially when the cultural dimension of party politics is important (Pardos-Prado 2015). Nevertheless, my argument does not preclude the existence of *direct effects* as nativists can advance policy changes themselves, either as parties in parliament or as coalition partners in government (Schain 2006;

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[33] Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) confirm that exclusive national identities are an important correlate of "anti-immigration sentiments" (see also Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Goodman and Alarian 2019).

Lutz 2019). Indeed, the more powerful nativist parties become, the more likely it is to observe such direct effects. Bearing this in mind, the third hypothesis reads as follows:

Nativist Power Hypothesis

H3   *When immigration-related issues are politicized and nativists hold more long-term political power, immigration regimes are more closed, and citizenship regimes are more exclusive.*

Because of its symmetric and statistical nature, the third hypothesis implies that if nativists lack power, the cosmopolitan side of the identity divide will dominate immigration and citizenship boundary-making. This should be associated with boundary regimes that are more open-inclusive. Although I have introduced the GAL-TAN distinction, I do not have strong expectations which parties populate this cosmopolitan pole. Depending on the perspective we take on the underlying identity divide and its correlation with deeper cleavage structures, we may end up with different ideas about who the cosmopolitans really are (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Carvalho and Ruedin 2018; Solodoch and Sommer 2020; Lutz 2021). I will devote some attention to this issue in the case illustration of Belgium. Figure 12 summarizes the idea of boundary politics.

Figure 12   Boundary politics

Source   Original illustration.

5.4   RESEARCH DESIGN

5.4.1   CASE SELECTION

I select 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 as relevant cases. They include the EU member states forming the EU-15, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, and Japan, as well as the classical Western settler states – the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (the list of countries is presented in Table K5 in Appendix K). This leads to a total of 713 country-year observations. This selection balances a broad coverage across space and time and at the same time satisfies the criterion of sufficient unit homogeneity. During this period, the selected countries can be assumed to be attractive for immigrants, and they are all independent and liberal-democratic states whose adherence to the rule of law and whose relatively robust state apparatus mean that policies are effectively implemented.

This case selection also defines the scope of my argument. In terms of political context and geography, this scope does not go beyond the liberal-democratic and Western context. Adding cases beyond Europe allows us to explore variations across geographical regions as well as outside the context of EU member states. Analyzing the classical immigration nations, or settler states, in North America and Oceania allows us to see whether and how boundary politics, if present, differs from its European version. Often omitted in the existing literature, the cases of Japan and Iceland are chosen because they add further theoretically relevant contextual variation. Both are relatively homogenous in their ethnic make-up and are therefore especially useful for testing cultural versions of the trade-off hypothesis. Japan belongs to this "cognitive world region" (Adler 1997). This geographic variation is important because Kriesi and colleagues (2006, 2008, 2012) as well as others (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2018) characterize the *globalization cleavage* or related concepts as specific to Europe or even as limited to Northwestern Europe. Therefore, I shall also analyze whether non-European cases show dynamics of boundary politics.

Going back to the last decade of the Cold War allows me to go beyond the dominant focus on the "second epoch" (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 99) of international migration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Using this temporal horizon also allows us to analyze whether dynamics may change after the fall of the Iron Curtain, as it has been theorized as a "game-changing event" spurring the rise of globalization and upending the bipolar nature of the world (Joppke 2016: 345) that has sparked both an uptick in migration (van Mol and de Valk 2016) as well as in the politicization of immigration and the transformation of party politics more broadly (Kriesi et al. 2012). In addition, starting in 1980 and not earlier is sensible because after immigration-related

policies were "reset" in many countries in the wake of the Oil Crisis in the 1970s, and guestworker regimes were abandoned, Western democracies started moving from zero-immigration preferences to more open policies from 1980 onwards (Cornelius et al. 2014; Schmid 2020). The adaption of citizenship policies to the reality of increased immigration was also not substantial before 1980 in most countries (Howard 2009). While the coverage of CITRIX goes up to 2019 (Schmid 2021), IMPIC is only available until 2010.[34]

This brings us to the pragmatic aspect of case selection. To measure the policy components of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO), I employ data of the *Immigration Policies in Comparison Dataset* (IMPIC; Helbling et al. 2017). To measure the policy components of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI), I have created a dataset called *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX; see Schmid 2021), which is itself based on MIPEX (Solano and Huddleston 2020). Together these datasets overlap for the selected 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010.

5.4.2   OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY VARIABLES

In line with the concept specification, the measurement of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) covers the policy fields of labor immigration, family reunification, and asylum (Helbling et al 2017). I use the indicators regarding eligibility and further conditions to measure entry requirements, and the indicators measuring the security of status to measure conditions for stay associated with a specific entry permit. Based on the idea that the underpinning market logics and liberal-constitutional logics are complementary in shaping economic and non-economic immigration, Schmid (2020; see also Schmid and Helbling 2016) has shown that the resulting six policy components can be reduced to a single consistent statistical dimension.

The IMPIC indicators are coded with an ordinal restrictiveness scale from 0-1, using theoretical minima and maxima (Helbling et al. 2017: 89). 1 indicates maximum restrictiveness. To measure IRO, I have reversed this scale so that higher scores indicate more openness. The index used in this paper is derived from the arithmetic mean of equally weighted entry and stay conditions across the three policy fields of labor, family, and asylum. Like Schmid (2020), I apply a cubic transformation to clearly identify the important sources of variation at the open end of the spectrum. The resulting construct measures both the restrictiveness of regulations as well as their density. Higher scores on IRO primarily imply that immigration is less densely regulated and,

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[34] IMPIC is currently being updated. Future versions of this article will use the new version of IMPIC to expand the analysis to 2019. This will be crucial to further assess the boundary politics framework.

secondarily, indicates the level of openness of the existing regulations. More details and justifications are elaborated in Appendix F.

As specified above, the concept of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) covers four core policy components (see Schmid 2021; Appendix A for details). The first defines the strength of *ius soli*, which refers to *territorial birthright conditions* that regulate how easy it is for children of immigrants to obtain citizenship by being born on the territory of a receiving state. The other policy components concern the group of "ordinary" first-generation immigrants and their "ordinary" naturalization: *residence conditions* refer to requirements regarding residence in terms of duration, *renunciation conditions* refer to the degree to which states tolerate multiple citizenship, and *integration conditions* refers to immigrant performance in terms of language tests, citizenship tests, criminal record requirements, and economic requirements. The resulting index for CRI combines these four policy components with an arithmetic mean applying equal weights. This scale has been shown to be reliable and reflects a common statistical dimension (Schmid 2020, 2021).

Both the IRO and the CRI variables come in two versions. The first is a rescaled variant using a linear transformation, with 1 representing the empirical minimum and 100 representing the empirical maximum of IRO and CRI, respectively. The second is a z-standardization: a change of one unit reflects a change of one standard deviation. To ease interpretation, the z-version is used as an independent and the other version as the dependent variable in the regression analyses.

To gauge the issue salience of immigration-related issues in party manifestos, I use data from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP; Volkens et al. 2020). The CMP codes quasi-sentences that refer to specific topics. However, original CMP data do not include items directly referring to immigration and citizenship issues. I follow the approach of Alonso and da Fonseca (2011), who have created an indirect measure of immigration-related quasi-sentences, focusing on "multiculturalism", "national way of life", "law and order", and "underprivileged minority groups." Other studies have successfully used this measure (Abou-Chadi 2016; Vrânceanu 2019; Lutz 2021). The issue salience of immigration-related topics is defined as the average percentage of quasi-sentences coded as such in a manifesto. This is then averaged across the manifestos of relevant parties – defined as those that ended up getting a minimum of five percent of the votes – in the election for which the manifesto was prepared. More details are provided in Appendix I.

More recently, Dancygier and Margalit (2020) have put forward a new measure specifically capturing immigration.[35] However, their *Immigration in Party Manifestos* (IPM) Dataset is available only for 12 countries with complete coverage of elections between 1980 and 2010, and incomplete

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[35] See also Grande et al. (2019) for an alternative and novel approach.

coverage beyond. Moreover, the IPM data only covers the major center-left and center-right parties. I therefore opt for a pragmatic approach to measure salience in order to cover all elections and all parties across all countries in the sample, using the approximation by Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) across the manifestos of all relevant parties. This salience measure is strongly correlated with that of the IPM (r=0.61).

Nativist parties are defined as those that are right to the main center-right party as coded by the *Comparative Political Dataset* (CPDS; Armingeon et al. 2020). The far-right can be further divided into "radical-right parties" that defend an illiberal version of democracy and "extreme-right" parties that are anti-democratic (Mudde 2007: 31). To measure the electoral support for those parties, I add up the vote share of all radical-right and extreme-right parties. As indicated, we know that these parties have nativism at their core (Mudde 2007). Furthermore, adding up *vote shares* also better captures the reality in countries where nativist parties are fragmented (Knigge 1998: 259). The IMP dataset by Dancygier and Margalit (2020) also offer a measure of what they call anti-immigration parties. Across the overlapping 12 countries, their and my measure for nativist parties' vote shares and correlate strongly (r=0.81). To gauge *long-term nativist legislative power*, I add up nativist parties' *seat shares* and take the average score across the last ten years. Ten years amount to at least two legislative terms across the countries covered, which is both sufficiently proximate to capture potential influence as well as distant enough in time to capture cumulative long-term effects. Nativist parties' seat shares and the corresponding IMP variable also correlate strongly (r=0.79). This variable is not lagged because it already measures the average over a ten-year period. More details can be found in Appendices I and J.

The salience of immigration and the vote share of nativist parties are correlated weakly but positively across the whole sample (r=0.32). Since both dimensions jointly constitute politicization, I apply multiplicative aggregation (for details see Appendix I). I thus follow the approach in adjacent literatures on party politics (Hutter et al. 2016; Grande et al. 2019: 1450). The resulting continuous variable can be interpreted roughly as degree to which a party system is politicized on immigration-related issues in terms of a percentage. This variable is then transformed into a categorical measure. First, I create a dummy variable indicating when levels are above five percent, which is used a cut-off to identify significant politicization. Next, I create an ordinal variable indicating low levels (below 5 percent), medium levels (5 to 10 percent), and high levels (above 10 percent). This categorical variable is useful to ease interpretation and relax assumptions of linearity given the distribution is spiking close to zero followed by thin densities (Figure I1, Appendix I). It is useful to relax those assumptions especially for specifying multiplicative interactive models because they assume linearity not only for the key independent variable, but also

for the moderating effect itself (Hainmueller et al. 2019). The politicization variable is always lagged by one year to help guard against endogeneity.

5.4.3 METHODS AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

The data have a multilevel structure with country-year observations nested simultaneously in countries, years, and in legislative periods. To capture these properties, I employ cross-classified multilevel mixed-effects models to analyze both the correlation between IRO and CRI – and how it is moderated by levels of politicization – as well as for analyzing the effect of long-term nativist party power on IRO and CRI. Multilevel models are viable options to capture the structure of panel data (Gelman and Hill 2009). Garritzmann and Seng (2019) show that it is imperative to account for this cross-classified structure of panel data investigating effects of parties and other variables that vary across legislative periods alongside variables that vary across years and countries. For the main model specifications, I therefore follow their approach (for additional methodological considerations see Appendix L).

To account for time trends, all models include period fixed-effects for the following historical periods: the last decade of the Cold War until the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 (1980-1991), the ensuing decade until the attacks of 9/11 (1992-2001) and the subsequent era (2002-2010). I conduct separate analyses pooling all observations as well as for the subset of observations during the Post-Cold War era, because politicization was very limited before 1992, and the argument mainly applies to the dynamics of party politics as they have unfolded after the Cold War. As we will see, the role of historical context is key.

I explain my strategy to test the robustness of the results below in the relevant section. The main component of this strategy is that all models are re-run using random-effects specifications with panel-corrected and robust standard errors as well as Prais-Winsten estimators to correct for autocorrelation (these are shown in Appendix Q). Random effects are more suitable to capture the role of relative levels of IRO and CRI *between countries*, rather than policy changes *within countries*, and this modeling strategy is especially appropriate for policy data with low variation over time (Plümper et al. 2005). I complement these quantitative analyses with short case illustrations to probe the proposed mechanisms. I do so by drawing both on secondary literature and in some cases also on primary sources.

5.4.4 CONTROL VARIABLES

I briefly explain here what covariates are used; more details can be found in Appendix L. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix M, data sources in Appendix N. The most important time-invariant country-level differences in the context of this study are historical and geographical. I include dummies to identify major European colonial powers (Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, following the categorization by Howard 2009), Anglo-Saxon settler states, Nordic regime type (Janoski 2010), and Southern Europe.

For the models predicting IRO, I cover the following time-variant country-level control variables, which are all lagged one year. The percentage of the elderly population (above 65) is to account for demography (Lutz 2020), trade openness in terms of traded goods as percentage of GDP (which is logged to adjust its distribution) for economic globalization and firm lobbying pressures (Peters 2017), and the unemployment rate as a primary economic variable that shapes labor supply and demand and can attenuate economic grievances. I use an index to capture the political constraints in terms of veto points and judicial powers (Henisz 2000), and I add the stringency of control mechanisms of immigration policies – in terms of enforcement and the treatment of irregular migration – to account for this key yet separate policy environment in regulating immigration (Schmid and Helbling 2016; for details see Appendix K). Finally, I consider EU membership, which matters in the areas of immigration and immigrant integration in a myriad of ways beyond the mere adoption of Schengen, Dublin, and the freedom of movement for EU citizens (see e.g. Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2001; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). The measure of IRO covers only national-level legislation.

On the level of legislative periods, I control for the ideological orientation of the largest government party, defined as the government party that has the largest share of seats in the legislature of all government parties. I distinguish between left-wing, centrist, and right-wing parties, using the categorization by the CPDS. I control further for the disproportionality of the electoral system using the Gallagher index. This is to account for differences in both the electoral system and electoral outcomes that matter not only for party politics across various settings, but also explain differences in labor immigration regimes as more proportional systems limit the influence of special interests and client politics (Bearce and Hart 2017).

The models predicting CRI use a more limited set of control variables (see Appendix K). We generally have less variables at our disposal when it comes to explaining citizenship or immigrant integration rather than immigration regimes (Goodman 2015: 1993). The models assessing the effect of nativist party power on IRO and CRI, respectively, also use this

differentiated set of controls. In addition, since politicization is highly collinear with long-term nativist power, this variable is dropped from these models.

5.5   RESULTS

5.5.1   DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES AND CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

I start the empirical analysis by examining how IRO and CRI evolve across countries and time. Figure 13 also indicates the presence of significant politicization, defined as values exceeding five percent of combined issue salience and nativist party support (see Figure I1 in Appendix I showing the country trajectories in salience and nativist party support and the resulting level of politicization). Immigration regimes appear to be more dynamic. Citizenship regimes are sometimes fully inert – for instance in the USA. These differences in policy dynamics confirm classical assumptions that citizenship is path-dependent (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans et al. 2012), while especially labor immigration is exposed to more fast-paced market pressures (Peters 2017; Shin 2019; Schmid 2020). We also see that, if policies change, these changes appear to unfold in no clear or uniform temporal pattern. Significant changes in immigration regimes, which tend to change earlier, are usually not followed by significant changes in citizenship very soon thereafter. As the cases of Spain in the 1980s and Italy before and after the end of the Cold War show, there are at least several years in between. Sometimes, however, the changes come close to each other, as in Portugal in the 1990s or in Iceland and Denmark in the 2000s.

Figure 13 Country trajectories in CRI, IRO, and the presence of substantial politicization

In the Netherlands, immigration and citizenship became more restrictive simultaneously from the mid-1990s onwards. A common restrictive turn was especially marked in 2003. Observers agree that the surge in politicization effected by the remarkable electoral breakthrough and subsequent government participation of the nativist party List Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 election was relevant for these policy changes. Boosted by the 9/11 attacks, party leader Fortuyn engaged in nativist boundary politics by rolling together a diverse set of immigration-related topics under the heading of a single "foreigners issue" (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008: 404-5), and by emphasizing cultural identity concerns and the opposition to Islam (Versteeg 2012). Yet, there is also broad agreement in the literature that nativists mainly capitalized on past policy initiatives (Vink 2005: 149; Goodman 2014: 164, 172-4; van Heerden et al. 2014) as well as a shifting immigration debate that saw non-nativist mainstream parties adopt similar positions and levels of issue salience in the previous decade already (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008: 399; van Heerden et al. 2014). This is evidenced by the presence of politicization already during the 1990s (Figure 13). Thus, this case provides evidence for the Politicization Hypothesis.

In most other countries during most periods, immigration-related issues are not significantly politicized. This is primarily because the second aspect of politicization is missing: there is no nativist party with strong electoral support (see Appendix I). I count nine countries across which we can find no indication of substantial politicization. In three additional countries – Greece, Spain, and the UK – there is only a brief period of notable politicization during the period observed until 2010. While in the UK politicization begins towards 2010, in Greece and Spain it occurs at the beginning of the 1980s and might represent some residue from the autocratic past. Therefore, the Non-Politicization Hypothesis should apply to most observations, and we should expect no correlation between IRO and CRI across those observations.

Politicization tends to manifest at later stages. Figure 14 uses aggregate z-values (with a mean value of zero) to assess trends in relative variation. Both politicization and long-term nativist seat shares increased over time (see also Figure J4, Appendix J). While politicization crosses the aggregate mean during the mid-1990s, long-term nativist power supersedes this threshold shortly before 9/11. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand are typical cases for notable long-term nativist power emerging in a politicized setting (Figure J4, Appendix J). This is a first indication that the Politicization and Nativist Power Hypotheses are more applicable during recent historical periods.

Long-term nativist power is most pronounced in Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, especially after 9/11, sometimes exceeding the 20 percent threshold. Therefore, these countries are most-

likely cases for the Nativist Power Hypothesis. As the only case in which long-term nativist power preceded politicization, Italy reached substantial levels already during the 1980s because of the nationalist Movimento Sociale Italiano. The rise of the Lega Nord since the 1992 election, and the Alleanza Nazionale – the successor of the Movimento Sociale Italiano – since the 2001 election further cemented nativist power. I further discuss this case below.

Figure 14   Aggregate trends in IRO and CRI, and in politicization and nativist power

Figure 14a
IRO and CRI

Figure 14b
Politicization and nativist power

Notes   Figure 14a maps aggregate relative levels of CRI (solid gray) and IRO (dashed black) across time using z-scores (mean 0; standard deviation 1); Figure 14b maps aggregate relative levels in politicization (value is derived from geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience and electoral support for nativist parties) and long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Immigration regimes show a strong aggregate liberalizing trajectory from 1980 until the mid-1990s (Figure 14a). Afterwards the average levels of IRO have fluctuated but remained around a similar level until 2010. Citizenship regimes show liberalization until 1992, a first restrictive turn until 1999, then a liberalization boost until 2003, and then a second stronger restrictive turn and some fluctuation until 2010. A typical case for these patterns is Germany, which shows strong immigration liberalization after reunification in 1990, a strong citizenship liberalization in 2000, and subsequent restrictive turns in both immigration and citizenship. Overall, boundary regimes

have thus become more open-inclusive despite increasing politicization and nativist power in terms of their aggregate trends. However, the slowing of liberalization, the restrictive turns, and fluctuations in both dimensions also coincide with rising levels of politicization and long-term nativist power (Figure 14b). This is not inconsistent with the boundary politics framework.

Figure 15a shows that when immigration is not politicized, the pooled correlation is weak and statistically insignificant (dashed black line). When politicization is present, the correlation is positive and strong, and statistically significant (solid orange line). These findings corroborate the Non-Politicization and the Politicization Hypotheses. I calculate Spearman's rho because the underlying measurement level of IRO and CRI is ordinal, yet I also plot a parametric regression line that treats both measures as quasi-numeric. More detailed correlation analyses and visualizations across levels of politicization and historical periods can be found in Appendix K. The results support the boundary politics framework.

Figure 15b shows that the Nativist Power Hypothesis is corroborated by visual inspection, but less clearly so (the list of country abbreviations can be found in Table K5, Appendix K). Using the z-score mean value of zero to identify the thresholds for each quadrant in the policy space, most politicized cases with low levels of long-term nativist party seat share (indicated as blue squares with white country abbreviations) cluster in the open-inclusive quadrant. But such cases can also be found in the other quadrants. Most cases showing significant politicization and strong long-term nativist power over 10 percent (indicated as red circles with black country abbreviations) cluster in the open-exclusive quadrant. The findings qualify the idea that boundary regimes are more closed-exclusive not only in relative but also in absolute terms under these political conditions. While some observations are in the closed-exclusive corner, the dominant pattern among them is exclusive but semi-open. This is a first indication that nativists cannot fully suppress the structural tendency towards more open borders. More detailed correlation analyses and visualizations across levels of politicization and historical periods can be found in Appendix K (see Figure K6 using different thresholds for substantial nativist power and Figure K7 analyzing conditional means, Appendix K).

Figure 15   The role of politicization and the role of nativist power

Notes   Figure 15 plots relative levels of IRO (z-scores) against relative levels of CRI (z-scores); in Figure 25a the small black squares and the dashed black linear fit line represent observations falling below 5 percent of politicization (value is derived from geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience and electoral support for nativist parties); the orange dots and the solid orange linear fit line represent observations that surpass 5 percent of politicization; Figure 15b plots only observations that surpass 5 percent of politicization; blue squares are observations with values of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) below 10 percent; red dots are observations with values of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties above 10 percent; reference lines indicate means in z-scores of IRO and CRI; see Table K5 in Appendix K for the list of country abbreviations.

Italy is a crucial case for assessing the Nativist Power Hypothesis. As indicated above, given the high scores on long-term nativist power it is a most-likely case for a closed-exclusive boundary regime, yet it is less closed-exclusive when nativists are strong compared to when they were weak (compare the blue square on the bottom left and on the bottom middle to the red circles in the middle of the graph in Figure 15b). However, the case of Italy is still consistent with the Nativist Power Hypothesis. From 1992 onwards immigration was highly politicized (see also Geddes 2008: 351, 355-6) and two years later long-term nativist power also surpassed the 10 percent threshold and continued to rise continually (Figure J4, Appendix J). Concurrently, Italy's political and party system transformed in 1994 when the Second Republic was created, allowing more space for populism (Verbeek et al. 2018). From 1994 to 1997 immigration was restricted, but

in 1998 a center-left government passed a liberal reform. Only in 2002, during the first Berlusconi government from 2001 onwards, when also the Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord were part of the executive coalition, the landmark Bossi-Fini immigration law was passed (Geddes 2008). Spurred by 9/11, it strongly restricted immigration. Citizenship liberalization became an issue during the Prodi government, but its premature end and succession by the center-right coalition of Berlusconi in 2008 put an end to this project (Zincone and Basili 2013: 2). A subsequent mixed citizenship reform proposal by Fini – the leader of Alleanza Nazionale – was not passed (ibid.). Instead, the Berlusconi government introduced strict civic integration conditions for long-term stay in 2009 (ibid. 3; see also Goodman 2014: 55). This shows how citizenship remained relatively exclusive (see also Howard 2009), and how long-term stay was restricted, when nativist power was waning but scored still above the 10 percent threshold. These patterns found in Italy therefore support the Nativist Power Hypothesis. Yet, they also show how more mainstream conservative parties may play an important role, and how the resulting immigration regime is *semi-open* and not closed in absolute terms.

A few politicized cases with strong nativist power can be found in the open-inclusive quadrant. These are observations of Belgium, which from 1980 to 2010 has transformed from an incongruent open-exclusive boundary regime to an open-inclusive one. After two liberalizing reforms in citizenship – the 1984 Code of Belgian Nationality and a further reform in 1991 (see Janoski 2010: 182) – the so-called Quick Belgian Act in 2000 made Belgium's passport very easily and quickly accessible to immigrants, transforming the country into one of the most inclusive in Europe (see Foblets et al. 2013: 20-21). However, these successive liberalizations in citizenship policies have not triggered restrictive backlashes in the open immigration regime. Instead, especially the 2000 reform explicitly aligned openness with inclusiveness in a highly politicized context. The main explanation for this policy combination is the unique reaction of the fragmented political and the party system to the main nativist party, the Flemish party Vlaams Belang. After the electoral breakthrough in 1991 of its predecessor party Vlaams Blok, and because of the party's openly racist, anti-democratic, and separatist agenda as well as its Nazi past, the other political parties decided to permanently exclude it from executive power on all levels and kinds of government by establishing a *cordon sanitaire* (Erk 2005), effectively eliminating any electoral threat. This political exclusion has endured and, paired with key events leading to the positive politicization of immigration in the 1999 election (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002), has enabled the subsequent Prime Minister Verhofstadt to unite greens, socialists, and liberals in an unprecedented progressive government coalition, passing the Quick Belgian Act as one of their first legislative projects (Fitzmaurice 2004; Foblets et al. 2013: 20-2). In the 1999 elections, according to party manifesto data, Verhofstadt's

liberal party had even emerged as the issue leader on immigration (scoring 15 percent on issue salience). Besides, it scored highest on a GAL-TAN measure and, as in issue salience, was directly followed by the greens and the socialists (Bakker et al. 2011). Thus, progressive liberals and the far-left have joined forces in spearheading cosmopolitan boundary politics in Belgium. They continued to do so after the next elections led to a coalition with the socialists (and without the greens), making Belgium's immigration regime the most open in the sample in 2006 while retaining its high citizenship inclusiveness.

5.5.2 REGRESSION ANALYSES AND FURTHER CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

The main findings from the panel regression models are visualized in Figure 16. I focus on the results obtained from full models including all control variables (see the detailed regression outputs in Appendix P; robustness tests in Appendix Q and R). The results show that, first of all, there is no statistically significant effect of IRO on CRI (see model M1 Figure 16) and of CRI on IRO (see model M4 in Figure 16) below the 5 percent p-value threshold across all observations, and also for the period after the Cold War. In other words, there is no general significant association between CRI and IRO.

I now turn to the Non-Politicization Hypothesis using a separate analysis of non-politicized cases only. These non-politicized cases (which amount to 74 percent of all observations) show no significant relationship in either direction (M2/M5, Figure 16). Contrasting the previous models using all observations, there are also no marginally significant effects after the Cold War (M2b/M5b). Therefore, the hypothesis is supported by these models: there is no systematic statistical association between IRO and CRI when immigration is not politicized. This is consistent with the prevalent idea in the literature that IRO and CRI follow distinct logics but also shows that this holds specifically for these non-politicized cases, thus confirming the boundary politics framework.

New Zealand in the 1980s is a prime example of how very inclusive citizenship can be combined with very open immigration in a non-politicized setting. In the wake of a fundamental neo-liberal re-structuring of the economy and society started by a Labor government after the 1984 snap election, in 1986 immigration was liberalized radically, transforming the country from a loyal British colonial outpost with a racist Whites-only immigration policy to an independent multicultural nation with relatively open borders and inclusive citizenship. This political revolution was not affected by politicization: boundary politics was absent and citizenship did not backlash as a response to the paradigm-shifting immigration reform. Party manifestos and parliamentary

debates show that it was driven instead by a government that was itself pushed by the liberalizing market and constitutional logics of the liberal capitalist state in the context of international competition for skilled labor and the concurrent diffusion of liberal anti-racism norms and the human rights to humanitarian protection and family life (see e.g. the parliamentary records in Hansard Vol. 473, 1986). Inclusive citizenship was combined with more liberal immigration in an explicit effort to create a progressive multicultural society in a globalizing world.[36]

Figure 16 Regression analyses: models 1-11

Notes   Estimates indicate unstandardized regression coefficients obtained from mixed-effects multilevel models using restricted maximum likelihood (REML); thick line is the confidence intervals using the 90% threshold, thin ends show the 95% limit; all control variables added; details and full regression output in Appendix P; IRO and CRI as dependent variables scaled from 1-100; IRO and CRI as independent variables scaled as z-scores; nativist power measured as long-term nativist party seat share in 10% units (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties); politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties) dichotomized: not politicized <5%; politicized >=5%.

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[36] Kerry Burke, the Minister of Immigration at the time, introduced the Immigration Bill in August 1986. Calling the previous laws "outdated" and "inflexible," he explained that the Bill represents a "fundamental revision and reform of New Zealand's immigration law" (Hansard Vol. 473, 1986: 3925). Later in the debate he reiterated that point, specifying that "[n]o stone within the nation's immigration policy has been left unturned or not examined in the attempt to develop a modern 1980s approach" (ibid. 3941). This reinforces the diagnosis that this reform represented a paradigm shift specifically tailored to respond to new challenges in the context of globalization.

However, New Zealand also shows how subsequent politicization and nativist boundary politics can constrain open-inclusive boundary regimes. Dynamics of party politics changed when the first election after the adoption of proportional representation in 1993, and a high degree of politicization of immigration, swept a newly formed nativist party – Winston Peter's *New Zealand First* – into parliament in the 1996 election. After immigration was restricted, citizenship was also tightened in 2005. The citizenship reform can be seen as a part of the government program that materialized after the politicized elections in 2002. Albeit of liberal complexion, it aimed to "defend" national identity (Skilling 2010: 175). Parliamentary debates and electoral data suggest more concretely that a form of nativist ideological contagion and electoral competition contributed to the adoption of the reform (see Hansard Vol. 625, 2005: 20133).[37] Combined with substantial long-term nativist power, politicization in New Zealand after 9/11 therefore made the country less open-inclusive, albeit to a limited extent. This provides further qualitative evidence for the Nativist Power Hypothesis. It also shows that nativism can thrive and restructure immigration-related politics beyond Europe, although experts describe New Zealand First as a decidedly less aggressive party than its European counterparts.

I now subject the Politicization Hypothesis to a quantitative test. Models considering the politicized cases point to a statistically significant positive association in both directions, but only after the Cold War (M3b/M6b; these cover 21 percent of all observations). In terms of effect size, the coefficients for the Post-Cold War period indicate that, when IRO or CRI levels increase by one standard deviation, CRI or IRO increase by roughly five points on a 1-100 scale, respectively. This can be interpreted as a moderate association and lends support to the Politicization Hypothesis.

The case of Denmark is instructive for this finding. Strong restrictive policy changes in both dimensions coincided in 2002. These changes followed a surge in politicization in the "watershed" 2001 election (Skidmore-Hess 2003: 89). Not only did the nativist Danish People's Party gain 12 percent, but the issue was also salient across party manifestos, also those of the Liberals and the Conservative People's Party. The victorious Liberal Party then teamed up with the Conservatives to form the government, but their coalition relied on the Danish People's Party to get parliamentary majorities and the nativist party constantly pushed the government to pass restrictive immigration-related reforms (Mouritsen 2013: 103; Goodman 2014: 104, 109-11;

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[37] Responding to Pansy Wong (member of the conservative National Party) during a parliamentary debate, a member of the nativist party New Zealand First, Craig McNair said: "The National member laughs, but I remember her leaning over to me at the Government Administration Committee and saying: 'They are putting this in because of you guys.' So this legislation is a victory for New Zealand First." The transcript is available here.

Howard 2009: 101). It is telling, for instance, that the government swiftly established a new cabinet-level Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration affairs (Skidmore-Hess 2003: 95). Consequently, especially family reunification but also asylum laws were tightened, and longer residence, civic integration conditions and further requirements were placed between immigrants and both the access to permanent residence and the Danish passport (Goodman 2014: 110-1). This positive correlation of IRO and CRI provides further evidence for the Politicization Hypothesis.

Two further restrictive citizenship reforms followed in 2004 and 2005. After the nativist party could confirm its electoral success in the 2005 elections, it again acted as the majority supplier for the center-right coalition – a strategy that proved successful (Christiansen 2016; Christiansen et al. 2019). The subsequent citizenship restrictions (Goodman 2014: 112) coincided with strong nativist power surpassing 10 percent of the long-term seat share. However, immigration conditions were somewhat relaxed at the same time, mainly in family reunification and labor immigration, making Denmark's boundary regime extraordinarily exclusive but also semi-open overall in 2010 (see also the red circles on the bottom middle in Figure 15a). Still, one observer concludes that the Danish People's Party "has turned the tolerant, welcoming and open-minded Denmark into one of the most chauvinistic countries in Europe" (Blanc-Noël 2019: 73). These findings support the qualified Nativist Power Hypothesis as explaining semi-openness rather than full closure in immigration.

The Nativist Power Hypothesis also fares well in quantitative tests (see the right side of Figure 16). While higher long-term nativist seat shares are marginally significant in predicting lower levels of CRI when using all observations, the effect becomes statistically significant and considerable in size after the Cold War (M7/8, Figure 16). However, these findings partly contradict the hypothesis insofar as, after the Cold War, it applies also to cases that are not politicized. The effect size is even larger when using all observations in the Post-Cold War period. Therefore, the Nativist Power Hypothesis applies to CRI in more general terms than expected by the idea of boundary politics.

By contrast, and consistent with the boundary politics framework, the Nativist Power Hypothesis applies to IRO specifically when immigration is politicized after the Cold War (M10a/b, Figure 16). Only in the model that considers politicized cases during that period can we see a statistically significant effect (M10b). This effect is also substantial in size. Thus, unlike CRI, IRO follows a restrictive logic only under conditions where stronger long-term nativist power is embedded into politicized settings. This finding highlights the different nature of citizenship and immigration regimes and show that, while citizenship regimes are more restrictive when nativists

are stronger independent of politicization, it takes both politicization and nativist power to suppress or at least limit liberalization in immigration regimes (Figure K7, Appendix K).

As theory tells us that economic immigration may follow a different logic escaping the restrictionism of nativist and other right-leaning parties, I run additional models to test whether this conditional effect can be explained by a special logic that applies to labor immigration only. The models show that, in politicized settings, there is a negative effect of more nativist power on openness in labor immigration independent of historical period (M11a/b). These findings thus lend support to the idea that nativist forces, in politicized settings after the Cold War, can limit the liberalization in labor immigration. In other words, nativists appear to suppress the liberal constraints inherent in the market logic of capitalism and the competition for immigrant labor and talent in a globalizing world. Instead, right-wing politics is consistent and strong enough to overcome the strong economic constraints when combined with nativism. These results therefore further corroborate the Nativist Power Hypothesis.

I now test the Non-Politicization Hypothesis and the Politicization Hypothesis by using interaction terms. Recall that for this purpose, I have constructed a politicization variable with three levels to relax assumptions of linearity for the interaction term itself. Medium politicization is defined as surpassing 5 percent, and high politicization is defined as surpassing 10 percent. Figure 17 shows four marginal effect plots. On the top, we see how the effect of IRO on CRI is moderated by levels of politicization. The interaction terms show a statistically significant relationship only for high levels of politicization (confidence intervals are added to the significant slopes only) – both for all periods (p=0.000; M11a) seen on the left, and for the Post-Cold War period (p=0.003; M11b) seen on the right. Thus, immigration regimes have a positive effect on citizenship regimes only when immigration is highly politicized. The effect size is large when considering the whole spectrum of variation from -2 to 2 standard deviations in IRO; it amounts to roughly 40 points on the 1-100 CRI scale in both models. These findings thus support the Politicization Hypothesis but also show that high levels of politicization are needed to uncover a robust and strong moderating effect of IRO on CRI. When politicization is on a medium level, the results show weak positive effects, but they are not statistically significant. This qualifies the Politicization Hypothesis.

These interactive models also suggest that there is some asymmetry. While for the effect of IRO on CRI that there is only a statistically significant difference between low and medium levels of politicization, on the one hand, and high levels of politicization, on the other hand, the effect of CRI on IRO is not moderated by levels of politicization in the same way. Therefore, there is no robust evidence that the moderating role of politicization works in both directions. Instead,

immigration regimes appear to matter for citizenship regimes when politicization is high, while citizenship regimes do not matter for immigration regimes across different levels of politicization.

Figure 17   Interactive regression analyses: models 11-12

Notes   Graphs show marginal effects of IRO and CRI on CRI and IRO, respectively, moderated by levels of politicization levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%; estimates are obtained from mixed-effects multilevel models using restricted maximum likelihood (REML); all control variables added; details and full regression output in Appendix P; IRO and CRI as dependent variables scaled from 1-100; IRO and CRI as independent variables scaled as z-scores.

Regarding the Non-Politicization Hypothesis, whereas in the Post-Cold War period we see a null effect of IRO on CRI in cases with low politicization (M11b), we can observe a weak negative effect when considering all observations (M11a). The latter finding is confirmed by the negative slope of the effect of CRI on IRO in the bottom left graph for non-politicized cases (M12b). After the Cold War, the graph shows a weak positive effect of CRI on IRO independent of politicization, as shown on the bottom right (M12b). These mixed results and statistically insignificant differences and relationships, together with the result of the disaggregated analyses

above, reinforce the support for the Non-Politicization Hypothesis. When immigration is not politicized, IRO and CRI are not systematically correlated.

5.5.3 ROBUSTNESS TESTS

To probe the robustness of these results, I first test the Non-Politicization Hypothesis and the Politicization Hypothesis using an interaction term with a continuous measure of politicization instead of its ordinal version. The hypotheses pass this additional test, but again only in the direction from IRO to CRI (Table R7, Appendix R). Additional visualizations of these interactions show that a significant effect of IRO on CRI emerges around a threshold of 5 percent of politicization; it is slightly higher for the whole sample and slightly lower for the cases after the Cold War (see Figures O1-2, Appendix O). This finding supports the decision of treating this threshold as a cut-off point of substantial politicization in relation to the boundary politics framework. The visualizations also confirm the asymmetric effect of IRO on CR (see Figures O3-4, Appendix O)I. It also reminds us that various ways of modeling interactions can yield different results. In this case the difference is between the ordinal version of the politicization variable and its continuous counterpart; only the latter indicates a significant effect of IRO on CRI for medium levels of politicization. Before we have seen that separate disaggregated models showed a significant effect also of CRI on IRO in politicized settings, thus making the finding of asymmetry not fully robust.

Next, all models are re-run using an alternative random-effects approach combining Prais-Winsten estimation to correct for autocorrelation with robust and panel-corrected standard errors (Appendix Q). The tests show that most results are very similar, further supporting the boundary politics framework. For the models using all observations, I have also run additional models using correlated panels instead of heteroskedastic panels (which are used for estimating robust standard errors). This specification needs all observations to account for the fact that countries' immigration and citizenship regimes can be correlated, thus correcting for processes of international diffusion. I do not report these results as they are virtually identical with the models shown in Appendix Q. This should further bolster our confidence in the boundary politics framework.

There is one important exception to this conclusion. Whereas the mixed-effects models showed a small and insignificant negative association between IRO and CRI in non-politicized settings, the Non-Politicization Hypothesis is falsified by the random-effects models covering all historical periods. There is a statistically significant but small negative effect of IRO on CRI, and vice-versa (M2c in Table Q1 and M5c in Table Q2, Appendix Q). This is also what drives a

marginally significant (p<0.1) but weak negative association between IRO and CRI more generally (M1c in Table Q1 and M4c in Table Q2, Appendix Q). However, these effects become statistically insignificant, and the Non-Politicization Hypothesis is supported, when considering only the observations after the Cold War (M2d in Table Q1 and M5d in Table Q2, Appendix Q). This again shows the temporal limits of the boundary politics framework.

To further test whether the Non-Politicization Hypothesis applies more generally, I run additional random-effects models using robust and cluster-corrected standard errors at the country level, which is alternative way to account both for cross-sectional clustering and autocorrelation (Reed and Ye 2011). These models confirm the robustness of the results from the mixed-effects models and, more specifically, do not allow rejecting the Non-Politicization Hypothesis (see M2e in Table R1 and M5e in Table R2 in Appendix R).

5.6   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

How are the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship associated? This problem has bothered political theorists for decades. Some of them start by explicitly assuming that there is a trade-off between immigration openness and immigrant rights and citizenship. Neo-liberal utilitarians tend to resolve the dilemma by emphasizing openness over rights (e.g. Chang 2002), while liberal communitarians emphasize inclusive citizenship and the right to border control (but not border closure *per se*; e.g. Walzer 1983: ch. 2). Cosmopolitans maintain that there is no strong dilemma: inclusive citizenship is thought to be compatible with open borders (e.g. Carens 2013).

Against this background, in this paper, I have set out to theorize and empirically assess the association between immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness. While previous empirical research has yielded mixed findings (Ruhs and Martin 2008; Ruhs 2013; Ruhs 2018; Bearce and Hart 2018; Natter et al. 2020), I have highlighted the context-dependent nature of this association in democratic settings both in terms of the correlation between policies across cases and specific combinations of policies within certain cases. There is no general association between the two policy areas, also no inherent trade-off between them, thus contradicting existing key studies (Ruhs 2013; Natter et al. 2020). Relatively open-inclusive regimes can also be observed, and they are even to be expected in certain political contexts. This may console liberal cosmopolitans, though of course no empirical observation will come close to their envisioned level of general openness to immigration. It also complicates the empirical basis on which neo-liberal utilitarians found their normative position, and it shows more generally that closed borders are not

a necessary condition for inclusive citizenship. While separate nations can exist only with borders by definition – the starting point invoked by Reagan and Trump – having relatively open borders is compatible with the continued existence of nations as well as those nations with inclusive citizenship regimes.

The analysis shows that the first important contextual variable is the level of politicization of immigration-related issues in terms of its combined salience and the electoral support for nativist parties as key actors for whom these issues are the core concern. Politicization does not explain a common restrictive policy trajectory in immigration and citizenship regimes, as is often assumed. Instead, it moderates the association between immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness. When immigration is not politicized, there is no systematic association between the two policy areas because they lack a common logic of party politics and follow distinct logics instead. As indicated by the politicization variable, this Non-Politicization Hypothesis applies to roughly 75 percent of the 713 observations across 23 Western democracies from 1980-2010. Thus, it constitutes the main finding of this study. The fact that in most cases there is no significant correlation reconciles contrasting findings in the literature that find certain negative (Ruhs 2013; Ruhs 2018; Natter et al. 2020) or positive correlations (Bearce and Hart 2018) between related aspects of immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness across different sets of cases. They are also in line with much of the literature in immigration-related party politics, which emphasizes the distinct logics in the two areas (Perlmutter 1996; Odmalm 2011; Breunig and Luedkte 2008; Schain 2008; Duncan and van Hecke 2008; Natter et al. 2020; Lutz 2019, 2021).

Based on the literature, I have assumed that the distinct logics can be either of political nature, creating cross-cutting cleavages across established partisan conflicts, or they can be structural, manifesting in the form of strong liberal constraints that have a strong international and economic dimension and apply to immigration but not to citizenship. My analysis shows that the *distinct political logics* in immigration and citizenship politics can be overcome, as the two become part of a common logic of party politics when immigration-related issues become politicized. I have dubbed this dynamic *boundary politics* because this line of conflict is not about the costs and benefits of immigration but about the nature of national boundaries regarding immigration, and about the construction and the evolution of national identities in relation to immigration in the context of globalization as such. In this way, politicization creates a salient cultural dimension of party politics that unifies citizenship and immigration politics (see Kriesi et al. 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018). The analysis has demonstrated that the main observable implication of this hypothesis can be confirmed but also must be qualified: immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness correlate positively along this common dimension of party politics when immigration

is politicized, but only during the Post-Cold War era. This confirms the "game-changing" (Joppke 2016: 345) nature of the demise of the bipolar world for political dynamics related to globalization and migration.

I conclude that the end of the Cold War a temporal threshold for the validity of the boundary politics framework. This also puts into perspective the study by Natter and colleagues (2020), who cover democratic cases back to 1970, and who have found a negative correlation between openness in immigration and immigrant rights. We should investigate further whether this negative correlation is driven by cases during the Cold War, and whether therefore the immigration-citizenship association may be conditional upon time more broadly. The fact that only some cases are positively correlated after the end of the Cold War can also potentially explain previous findings of increasingly positive correlations across historical periods (Schmid 2020) as well as positive correlations for labor immigration policies and immigrant rights more broadly (Bearce and Hart 2018) during the "second epoch" (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005: 99) of international migration after the world ceased to be split into two blocks.

This paper also estimates the number of cases that show a positive correlation: the Politicization Hypothesis applies only to roughly 25 percent of all observations (and to 35 percent after the Cold War). As the evidence is strongest for high levels of politicization after the Cold War, the Politicization Hypothesis applies most specifically to only 20 percent of observations. The most robust finding further points to an *asymmetric effect* of levels of immigration openness on levels of citizenship inclusiveness when immigration is highly politicized. Especially relatively low levels of openness in immigration are associated with low levels of inclusiveness in citizenship in those settings where nativists enjoy much electoral support and immigration-related issue salience is high. Meanwhile, citizenship inclusiveness has no robust effect on immigration openness regardless of politicization. Furthermore, from a cleavage theory perspective, it is striking that most countries showing substantial politicization are located in Northwestern Europe. Italy and New Zealand are the only important exceptions. This shows that especially Kriesi and colleagues (2006, 2008, 2012) are right to characterize the globalization cleavage as a feature that is mostly present in party systems across the most prosperous part of Europe. Expanded analyses are needed to assess whether the intuition that boundary politics must have become more widespread after 2010 are true.

The Nativist Power Hypothesis proposes that, in politicized contexts, the degree of long-term nativist power in terms of the average seat share across the previous decade is negatively correlated with immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness, respectively. The empirical investigation supports but also qualifies this idea. First, citizenship is more exclusive

when nativists are strong, also in non-politicized settings. This shows that citizenship is more responsive to nativist power than theorized. Second, immigration is more closed but only in relative terms. In settings that combine politicization and strong nativist power boundary regimes are *exclusive but semi-open* in absolute terms. This suggests that nativists, even when well-established in a party system, cannot fully suppress the liberalizing tendencies in immigration policymaking. Hence, the *distinct structural logics* in immigration and citizenship cannot be completely overcome.

Yet, as nativist power can still explain relatively lower levels in immigration openness, the findings suggest that nativists can successfully fight against liberal constraints and limit their impact. In her account on migration policy theory, Boswell (2007: 96) has paraphrased Wendt's (1992) dictum that in international relations "anarchy is what states make of it" by arguing that in immigration policymaking "the liberal constraint is what states make of it." My finding shows that *the liberal constraints in regulating immigration and citizenship are what political parties make of it*. When immigration-related issues are politicized, cosmopolitan forces can enact the liberal constraint by forming relatively open and inclusive boundary regimes. However, when nativists become strong alongside a more general politicization, while they can fully suppress or even do away with the liberal-democratic imperative of inclusive citizenship, they can only limit the constraints inducing a liberal trajectory in immigration regimes. Hence, they can politically constrain the structural constraints but not break free from them.

The finding that nativist boundary politics is associated with exclusive but semi-open boundary regimes echoes diagnoses in the very recent literature. In *Neo-Liberal Nationalism*, Joppke (2021a) argues that, on the one hand, immigration policies have become dualistic, allowing long-term entry and settlement only to highly educated workers or potent investors, and their families, while fending off low-skilled immigration and asylum seekers. On the other hand, the logic of citizenship regimes has shifted from being a liberal entitlement to a neo-liberal privilege that has to be earned especially by those at the bottom of the immigration pyramid. The specific policy combination that Joppke emphasizes is also what is highlighted in adjacent demographic research as the "Market Model." This policy configuration is constituted by limited and selective entry and often temporary stay combined with lower naturalization rates (Boucher and Gest 2018). The contrasting open-inclusive "Liberal Model" is waning, if it has ever existed, so the argument goes. In line with Joppke's expectation that the "Market Model" is associated both with neo-liberalism and nationalist politics, my analysis shows that we can pinpoint regimes resembling the "Market Model" by using the variables of politicization and long-term nativist power. However, I also show that across liberal democracies the open-inclusive "Liberal Model" is not dead and often explicitly politically constructed in politicized settings and especially those also lacking strong nativist power.

Relatively open-inclusive cases that show these features make up about 14 percent of all cases. Meanwhile, "neo-liberal nativist" cases that show exclusive and semi-open regimes in politicized settings with strong long-term nativist power, make up roughly 10 percent of all cases. Across most cases that lack substantial politicization all boundary regime constellations are observable (see also Schmid 2020). However, these findings are qualified by the temporal focus of this analysis. Expanded studies with the latest policy data beyond 2010 will be necessary as soon as they are available.

While many studies have shown that nativist parties have restrictive effects or suppress liberalizing change especially in citizenship and immigrant rights (Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2012; Goodman and Howard 2013; Howard 2013; Stadlmair 2018; Hansen and Clemens 2019; Graeber 2020a; Solodoch and Sommer 2020), the effects on immigration policies have been less clear (Peters 2015, 2017; Abou-Chadi 2016; Bearce and Hart 2017; Lutz 2019; Kolbe 2021). This paper ties these literatures together by showing that the exclusive but semi-open boundary regime may constitute the "winning formula" of immigration-related nativist boundary politics. Previous diagnoses of such "winning formulas" in terms of nativist electoral success have emphasized either the neo-liberal economic standpoint of certain nativist parties (Kitschelt 1995) or the more recent centrist economic position (de Lange 2007). The fact that long-term nativist power can suppress labor immigration openness suggests that nativist have indeed become less neo-liberal and clientelist over time. However, this exclusive but semi-open policy output may also be conditional upon the fact that until 2010 nativists have never been more than junior coalition partners in democratic governments. It may be the specific interaction with the mainstream right that can account for this boundary regime. Yet, the semi-openness of immigration may also help nativists keep the issue on the agenda so that they can continue to demand restrictions for the purposes of electoral competition. Thus, they could retain it also for strategic purposes.

Further research is needed to provide process tracing evidence that tests the mechanisms underpinning the boundary politics framework. Based on the idea that specifically in politicized contexts, long-term nativist power – through the mobilization of national identities and mechanisms of electoral competition that may work through various case-specific configurations and pathways – induces restrictive tendencies in both immigration and citizenship regimes, which otherwise defy a common logic, the case illustrations in this paper have therefore focused mostly on the Politicization and the Nativist Power Hypotheses to illuminate this specific link. They have shown that common logics in immigration and citizenship politics are limited even under the specific condition of politicized immigration and strong nativist power. Process tracing may even show that in certain cases semi-open borders are traded for more exclusive citizenship. This

warrants further investigation alongside more rigorous process tracing of additional cases to test the mechanisms underlying the Non-Politicization Hypothesis. What this paper has made clear is that politics, and especially *boundary politics*, as well as its absence, matters for our understanding of the context-dependent statistical association between immigration and citizenship regimes.

6

From trade-off to boundary politics

Conclusion

6.1   TOWARDS FULLY SOLVING THE PUZZLE

Do inclusive societies need closed borders? This is the puzzle with which this dissertation has started. It is engrained in a normative debate spanning several decades. Different normative theories rely on different empirical assumptions when addressing this puzzle. I have taken several steps back and then made three steps forward towards identifying a theoretically coherent and empirically robust answer, one in each paper of this dissertation, proceeding from conceptual, theoretical, methodological, and empirical groundwork to more concrete arguments and empirical tests. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the insights emerging from these steps, discuss their ramifications for both our empirical understanding and the normative debate on the association of immigration and citizenship politics and policymaking. In section 6.2, I show how my dissertation advances the methodological literature on index building. In section 6.3, I discuss what my findings imply for various broader empirical debates on the topic, followed by what they might mean for relevant normative debates in section 6.4. In the following, I explore avenues for future research in section 6.5, focusing specifically on how the boundary politics framework needs to be tested further by using process-tracing case studies to consolidate the empirical answer to the puzzle.

6.2   ADVANCING THE METHODOLOGICAL LITERATURE

Before discussing how this dissertation may inform empirical and normative debates, I shortly describe how the construction of the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX) advances the literature on index building. In constructing and elaborating CITRIX, I have decided not to reinvent the citizenship index wheel, but to reassemble it by building on existing indices in order to foster the progressive cumulation of knowledge (Helbling 2013; Goodman 2015: 1913). Goodman (ibid. 1909) has noted that in the field of immigrant integration and citizenship, "the entrepreneurial spirit of developing and applying unique indicators has generally outpaced a concurrent conversation on methodology." I have joined this conversation by introducing the idea of *confirmatory dimensionality testing*, which provides us with a modified way of thinking about concept formation and aggregation. I have followed Goertz (2006, 2020), who has proposed a three-level approach to conceptualization in the social sciences. The constitutive dimensions of a concept are on the second dimension of a basic-level concept, and they are operationalized on the third level. This intermediary level is usually omitted in traditional factor-analytic or latent variable approaches. Graeber (2020b) provides an example for this approach in the realm of measuring citizenship policies. Like Goertz, I have argued that the second level of the concept is where causally relevant dimensions reside, and that dimensionality testing should be applied at that level.

I have argued further that index building should rely on deductive theory and ontology rather than statistics to form concepts and measures. Especially aggregation is a task that should not be outsourced to latent variable models. However, dimensionality testing is still crucial to assess the consistency of the proposed second-level dimensions of a concept. If we apply dimensionality testing in this way, so I have argued, we can balance both theoretical and empirical concerns in building robust policy indices that can be used in causal analysis.

6.3   ADVANCING EMPIRICAL LITERATURES

I will now indicate how this dissertation advances related empirical literatures. I start with the dynamics of citizenship and immigration regimes, move on to their policy combinations in typological spaces, and then discuss the boundary politics framework and its consequences for our understanding of the links between immigration and citizenship politics and policymaking.

6.3.1   THE DYNAMICS OF CITIZENSHIP REGIMES

I have argued in the first paper of this dissertation that there are two empirical lessons we can learn from CITRIX. The first is that citizenship policies have become both more and less liberal at the same time. From 1980 to 2019, across the 23 democracies studied here, integration conditions – language tests, citizenship tests, and economic and criminal record requirements – have moved into a restrictive direction, while territorial birthright, residence, and renunciation conditions have liberalized. The interplay between these two dimensions leads to what I have called *stagnated liberalization* especially after 2010. Before, the integration restrictions – and a simultaneous slowing of liberalization in the other policy components – led to *two restrictive integration turns* in what otherwise has been a process of liberalization, culminating in 2003.

While stagnated liberalization has been noted elsewhere in the empirical literature (Koopmans et al 2012; see also de Haas et al. 2018), the finding of a restrictive turn already during the 1990s is novel. Overall, the analysis also shows that liberalization is more limited than many have assumed at an earlier stage (e.g. Joppke 2010). However, rather than showing a comprehensive restrictive turn after 2010 (as proposed by Joppke 2021a, 2021b), CITRIX demonstrates that the new quality of citizenship regimes in the last decade emerged from a *parallel development*: citizenship has become more easily and quickly available for both first- and further-generation immigrants, but the retrenchment of integration conditions have made it both culturally illiberal in relation to integration testing, securitized in relation to criminal record requirements, and economically neo-

liberal in terms of financial requirements. This concurs with other recent studies and diagnoses (Bassel et al. 2020; Graeber 2020b).

However, my statistical analyses have qualified this aggregate finding, showing that *across* countries, integration conditions are strongly positively correlated with the other policy components (as indicated by categorical principal component analyses). This means that countries that have laxer/stricter integration requirements also have easier/more difficult access through territorial birthright, shorter/longer residence conditions, and more/less room for multiple citizenship. I have suggested in Chapter 4 that this one-dimensionality in citizenship emerges because of common and complementary *liberal/illiberal-democratic* and *inclusive/exclusive identity logics*. The results in Chapter 3 show that the implication of this theory of complementary structural logics underpinning citizenship regimes apply specifically to the period after 9/11, whereas before integration conditions correlated negatively with the other policy components. This highlights the special character of integration conditions that has been mentioned in much of the literature (e.g. Goodman 2010)

Chapters 3 and 4 show that citizenship regimes have moved from being non-convergent or very weakly convergent until 2010 to more strongly convergent until 2019. The spaces for policy evolution, while still constrained by past trajectories, appear to have become more flexible, and policies have become more similar across the past four decades. Together with the aggregate trend analysis, this suggests that countries have converged upon policies with more integration conditions while liberalizing other policy components. However, this aggregate pattern *over time* is qualified by the dimensionality analysis that models the correlation mainly between policies *across* countries. Taken together, citizenship regimes have thus become *both more convergent over time and more coherent across countries*. These findings significantly advance the empirical literature on this topic. Especially the finding of long-term convergence contrasts with classical assumptions of strong path-dependence in the literature (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans et al. 2012).

6.3.2 THE DYNAMICS OF IMMIGRATION REGIMES

As Chapter 4 has shown, until 2010, *stagnated liberalization* describes the pattern we see in immigration regime openness after 1996. Other studies have noted this deceleration in the liberalization of immigration regimes (de Haas et al. 2018). Before there was a strong liberalizing trajectory from 1980 onwards. Furthermore, we could observe a strong converging tendency of immigration regimes until 2010. I have argued that this mainly results from strong external and especially economic constraints, combined with both international and domestic liberal-

constitutional constraints. This view features prominently also in both the classical literature (e.g. Hollifield 1992, 2004; Sassen 1996a, 1999b, 2012; Joppke 1998, 2001) and more recent empirical analyses (Lutz 2019, 2021; Schultz et al. 2020). As I discuss below, Chapter 5 has highlighted additionally that even strong nativist parties cannot suppress these liberalizing tendencies.

However, it is unclear whether this trend, especially the liberalizing tendency, has prevailed beyond 2010. Although they show broad liberalization relating to most categories of immigrants, de Haas and colleagues (2018) have emphasized the increasingly selective nature of immigration regimes. Using IMPIC data, Helbling and Kalkum (2018) emphasize liberalization in all policy fields but not in control mechanisms. More recent data from the IMPIC project, once available, will enable testing recent broad-brushed diagnoses emphasizing the neo-liberalization of immigration regimes, which "court" the highly skilled and investors while "fending off" the low-skilled migrants and refugees at the "bottom" of the immigration pyramid (e.g. Joppke 2021a).

What is clear from Chapter 4 of this dissertation is that immigration regimes and their components – entry and stay regulations in labor immigration, family reunification, and asylum – are *more coherent* than often assumed. This specification of *Immigration Regime Openness* (IRO) receives statistical support, as these policy components can be reduced to the same statistical dimension. This contradicts the view that there is a strong tension between economic liberalism and political liberalism (Hollifield 1992, 2004), and instead confirms that the *market logic of capitalism* and the *constitutional logic of the liberal state* go together in constituting immigration regimes. Moreover, I have shown that this dimension is distinct and, overall, not strongly correlated with *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (IRO). Thus, the two dimensions can be combined into a two-dimensional policy space. I turn to this aspect now.

6.3.3   THE NATIONAL BOUNDARY REGIME TYPOLOGY

The National Boundary Regime Typology has found a parallel conception in the literature while this dissertation was written. Goodman and Pepinsky (2021) aim to explain the political mechanics of the regime of "embedded liberalism" after the Second World War, under which "governments intervened in free markets to compensate for the losses from global trade and international market volatility" (ibid. 411). They argue that the policy combination of "Exclusionary Openness" – corresponding to my conception of open-exclusive boundary regimes – was key in sustaining embedded liberalism alongside other necessary components such as capital controls. Restricting the political and social rights of labor immigrants allowed states to combine open immigration regimes with generous welfare regimes. As international and domestic liberal pressures and

constraints to recognize immigrants' personhood and human rights mounted, those who had been admitted as "guest workers" were granted more and more "citizenship rights for non-citizens" (Guiraudon 1998) and they ended up staying permanently along with their families in the receiving countries. Boundary regimes have become more open-inclusive in the process. This analytical narrative mirrors the one told by the liberal paradox and its gradual resolution.

The analysis of trends in policy combinations in Chapter 4 in this dissertation confirms this tendency. Relatively open-inclusive regimes have indeed become more common, while especially closed-exclusive policy combinations have become less frequent. Therefore, most of the time, one can have both: relatively open borders and relatively inclusive citizenship. This contradicts the main claim of the trade-off assumption and shows that the "Liberal Model" is not dead. However, open-exclusive regimes akin to the "Market Model" are still numerous until 2010, while the closed-inclusive regime– as the stylized ideal type derived from liberal communitarianism – is least prevalent overall, and ever less frequent over time. The main move from 1980 to 2010 has been in an early surge of immigration openness and a later weaker liberalization in citizenship, after which, from 1996 and 2003 onwards, respectively, both immigration and citizenship have fluctuated and stagnated. These results confirm the theory of distinct logics and what it implies for the evolution of boundary regimes over time. Because of a lack of data, however, it is again unclear what has happened in terms of aggregate trends in immigration regimes after 2010. At least we know from the CITRIX 2.0 dataset that citizenship regimes have become not only *more restrictive* in integration conditions but also *less restrictive* regarding other conditions.

6.3.4 ASSESSING THE BOUNDARY POLITICS FRAMEWORK

How are the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship associated? The third paper of this dissertation, in Chapter 5, finally addressed this key puzzle theoretically and empirically. The empirical analysis shows that most observations across 731 country-years – about 75 percent of them – are not marked by substantial politicization. In these cases, as expected by the boundary politics framework and its Non-Politicization Hypothesis, immigration regimes and citizenship regimes follow distinct logics and are not systematically correlated. When immigration is politicized, however, immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness correlate positively, as they become part of the same new cultural dimension of party politics, but they only do so after the Cold War. This is in accordance with the Politicization Hypothesis, but also shows its temporal limits. Finally, boundary regimes are more exclusive whenever nativist parties have been strong but only semi-open even if nativist parties are strong in politicized settings, also only

after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This shows that nativists cannot fully suppress the liberal constraints in immigration regimes, while citizenship regimes are more responsive to nativist power. This finding therefore qualifies the Nativist Power Hypothesis and points to the persistence of deeper distinct structural logics in the two policy areas.

The latter finding can be further illustrated by the fact that the correlation between immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness does not appear to run in both directions, which further qualifies the Politicization Hypothesis. Where the strong structural constraints in immigration regime making can be suppressed by a combination of politicization and long-term nativist power after the Cold War, such border closure is indicative of a broader nativist approach that also is likely to create more exclusive citizenship regimes. By contrast, more exclusive citizenship regimes alone should not be associated with more closed immigration regimes in the same way. As only the latter are exposed to strong liberal constraints, a restrictive bent in citizenship policy alone is less likely to spill over to immigration politics. For this reason, it makes sense to assume that, in politicized settings, immigration regime openness is a better predictor of citizenship regime inclusiveness than the other way around. Another way to make sense of the asymmetry in the relationship between immigration and citizenship regimes especially under highly politicized conditions is that territorial admission is logically prior to and necessary for citizenship inclusion for ordinary long-term immigrants with no previous co-ethic ties to a receiving country. In this way, full border closure allows countries to fend off any cultural or other kind of change potentially induced by immigration. This is why nativists like Trump – and normative theorists like Walzer – are concerned with the *primacy of border control.*

Furthermore, *nativist boundary politics* has a flipside: *cosmopolitan boundary politics*. When nativists do not wield much long-term political power in politicized settings, more open-inclusive regimes are even more likely. Enacting and embracing the liberal state and its constraints, cosmopolitan-minded actors can resolve the "liberal paradox" (Hollifield 1992, 2004) and create an overarching "immigration-integration nexus" (Meyers 2004; Boucher and Gest 2018: 12) in which more open borders and inclusive citizenship are accommodated. This is remarkable because classical literature assumes that the politicization of immigration alone can explain restrictions in immigration (e.g. Freeman 1995) and in immigrant rights (e.g. Guiraudon 1998), or more generally (e.g. Hollifield 1998; Hollifield and Wong 2015).

Showing the political consequences of a dominant cosmopolitan pole along the underlying *identity divide*, this finding is also relevant for the literature investigating the broader transformation of party politics across the past decades. Showing further that this identity divide and thus the connection between immigration and citizenship politics emerges mainly in

(Northwestern) European democracies, my empirical analysis also shows that, except for New Zealand, it is in fact not the classical settler states that have linked these two policy areas more closely (as assumed by Kraler 2006: 39). Instead, because of the much stronger support for genuine nativist parties, and especially in multi-party systems, the identity divide and its consequences have come to bear most clearly in Europe, at least until 2010. This is in line with the established literature on party politics and cleavage theory (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2018). Yet, the specific actors who perform cosmopolitan boundary politics still need to be identified further. As I have shown in Chapter 5, the concept of *Green-Alternative-Libertarian* parties (e.g. Marks et al. 2006) can be applied to Belgium after the 1999 election. However, is not clear whether that holds also in other countries. If it indeed holds for Europe only, this would also help explain why in non-European countries like the United States "strange bedfellows" (Hollifield 1992: 267; see also Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 1999, 2006) rather than ideologically aligned parties along a clear and salient nativist-cosmopolitan axis have collaborated to pass various immigration-related reforms.

6.4   INFORMING NORMATIVE THEORY

I now turn to how this dissertation is relevant for debates in normative political theory. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I have shown that there are three ideal-typical clusters of normative positions that resolve the underlying problem about the proper mix of immigration policies and citizenship policies differently. As can be gauged by the labels I have attached to them, they are rooted in different values and conceptions of justice. Emphasizing first and foremost the principle of self-determination, *liberal communitarians* propose that democratic communities should make citizenship inclusive for those they let enter and settle on their territory and to regulate immigration accordingly. Providing reasons why immigration may have to be restricted to achieve both the goal of inclusive democratic citizenship as well as self-determination, the ideal-typical boundary regime corresponding to this position is closed-inclusive. However, this assumption is implicit as the main concern is not border closure but self-determination. Starting instead from the strong and explicit empirical assumption that the openness of borders and inclusive rights and access to citizenship cannot be maximized at the same time, *neo-liberal utilitarians* resolve the dilemma in favor of more open borders in terms of entry while limiting stay and immigrant rights. Crucially, *temporary migrants* must not be given permanent residence which in turn would give them access to inclusive citizenship. Finally, *liberal cosmopolitans* hold that open borders and inclusive citizenship are compatible and can be simultaneously pursued as political goals.

The validity of normative claims based on empirics critically depends on the validity of these empirics. What this empirical yardstick does not and cannot tell us, however, is what the kind of normative commitment or starting point we should adopt – if we choose to do so – in evaluating the relevant phenomena. Our initial values and core moral concerns can shape normative conclusions in decisive ways (Bertram 2010). By contrast, normative claims that make empirical assumptions do not depend on these assumptions to the same degree and in the same way that normative claims based on empirical analyses rely on the results of these analyses (Carens 2019). Normative claims proper inhabit a world of their own, especially if they are crafted with ideal-theoretical tools.

Rather than prescribing a normative solution considering the empirical results, my aim in the following sections is to show how different normative commitments and starting points are supported or complicated by the specific factors I identify as drivers of the correlation between, and the combination of, immigration and citizenship regimes. This is to expose normative theory "to the full force of critique from explanatory theory and empirically grounded research that analyse the application context for normative ideas" (Bauböck 2008: 59). Normative theorists can decide for themselves what to make of this critique.

One point applies to all normative positions: I have shown that the empirically prevalent pattern in the sample is that immigration is not politicized, and that, as a result, immigration regimes and citizenship regimes follow distinct logics and are thus not significantly correlated. This means that all kinds of boundary regimes find empirical approximations when immigration is not politicized, which allows theorists to operate without a strong general empirical constraint.

6.4.1   SUPPORT AND SURPRISE: LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIANISM

The liberal-communitarian position starts from the conventional view that states have a moral right to border control. As we have seen, it does not argue for closure *per se*. Even completely open borders – if they are deliberately open, self-determined by a national community – do not conflict with the more fundamental notion of *discretionary border control* that arguments like that of Walzer (1983: ch. 2) is meant to defend. Open borders also do not abolish borders in their more fundamental function of demarcating political authority. Internal territorial borders are ubiquitous in any state, but most of them (except perhaps borders of national parks or indigenous reservations) do not function as restrictions on movement but as markers of political jurisdictions, most often comprising a multilevel structure from the local to the national (see Bauböck 2009: 10). Open borders are thus not the same thing as *no borders* (Sager 2020: 13). Also, the notion of *community*

makes little sense without boundaries that demarcate communities. Thus, the first point to be made about the liberal-communitarian position is that *we live in a Walzerian world*. States have the right to border control, and empirically all states use it to impose at least some policing measures and immigration restrictions.

Instead, what may be troubling for liberal communitarians is that there are strong liberal constraints working against the imposition of closed borders in liberal states. This is troubling because it means that self-determination is undermined. This reminds us of critiques of globalization both from the left and from the right. Some on the left would tell us that economic openness should be limited, and instead states should protect their labor markets, while some on the right would question international commitments regarding family reunification and asylum. It further reminds us of Rodrik's (2012) globalization trilemma: we cannot have self-determination, democracy, and open transnational markets in a globalized world at the same time. The only way to preserve a liberal-communitarian position is if the national community in question perceives of itself as an open immigration country – or a country founded by immigrants – and therefore embraces relatively open borders as well as open markets. If this is the genuine preference of most citizens of that democratic community, then the openness of borders for all categories of immigrants can be accommodated with inclusive citizenship, democracy, and self-determination also from a liberal communitarianism position. From that perspective, then, it is also not so troubling that closed-inclusive regimes are empirically least prevalent from 1980 to 2010 across the sample used in this dissertation.

Yet, it is also possible that the empirical reality of relatively open-inclusive boundary regimes, rather than the normative ideal of completely open borders, is still in line with what communitarians would require in terms of democratically legitimated closure in specific states. Theorists such as David Miller (2016) also acknowledge that certain amounts of labor immigration are inevitable and necessary. Instead, what matters for Miller is that the selection criteria are informed by a democratic debate and stand up to public scrutiny. Therefore, as long as the "structurally necessary immigration" in a *migration state* (Hollifield 2004) has public support, democracies can find a way out of Rodrik's trilemma.

Politicization and nativist boundary politics complicate this picture. If borders are relatively closed or semi-open in a politicized setting, this dissertation has shown that this makes it likely that citizenship regimes will be exclusive. According to the liberal-communitarian position, this would be most troubling, because it requires inclusive citizenship as a necessary condition for democracy. Liberal communitarians, especially those of more classical liberal complexion, should therefore be *opposed mainly to nativist boundary politics*, and, perhaps surprisingly, not to cosmopolitan

boundary politics, at least if the latter falls within the empirically acceptable bounds of openness under conditions of discretionary border control.

6.4.2   FALSIFICATION AND EXPLANATION: NEO-LIBERAL-UTILITARIANISM

Based on an empirical analysis showing that the Gulf autocracies do more to alleviate economic inequality on a global scale by embracing the openness-rights trade-off, Weyl (2018: F32; see also Milanovic 2016) attacks allegedly aloof political democratic theorists with a radical version of the neo-liberal utilitarian position:

> If we really face this trade-off, philosophers and political theorists cannot adopt their usual position of detached superiority, prescribing ideal situations and criticising fallible humans for not living up to these ideas. They are, or hope to be, responsible for the very moral ideals that limit the ability of OECD countries to follow a path like the [Gulf autocracies].

We have seen in Chapter 1 that also Ruhs (2018) finds that openness-rights trade-offs are most pronounced in autocracies. To reiterate, Ruhs (2013) argues that, in order to ensure openness, rights restrictions are legitimate when there is empirical evidence for an openness-rights trade-off (i.e. when correlations are statistically significant). However, Ruhs' (2013, 2017) moderate approach highlights the importance of core civil rights and political freedoms. As indicated, he proposes that a "firewall" (Ruhs 2013: 172) should be built around these rights. The upshot of this approach is that we can assume that liberal democracies will have no problem following this approach; the core feature of these political regimes are firewalls protecting these basic rights. The normative debate will then be about which other rights should be restricted in those democracies that still show trade-offs. By contrast, in autocratic regimes, introducing civil rights and political freedoms would not only contradict their principles of governance, but – according to the trade-off assumption – it would also strongly disincentivize dictators from letting immigrants work in their states.

Therefore, if some fundamental democratic rights are part of the policy solution, the question is what contextual conditions further drive rights and openness in democratic settings. The contextual analysis of Ruhs (2018) suggests that welfare regimes matter: there is negative correlation between openness and rights only in liberal market economies, but not in coordinated market economies and mixed institutional settings. This suggest that, for instance, even social democracies like Sweden can indeed combine relatively open borders with extensive rights. As indicated in Chapter 1, however, the position and analysis of Ruhs applies specifically to temporary labor immigration programs, and to immigrant rights rather than citizenship. This is why I have

asked: Does the trade-off idea and its potential resolution also apply to long-term immigration and citizenship?

My empirical analysis shows that the idea that there is a general or inherent trade-off between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship can be discarded, and that relatively open-inclusive regimes are possible and even likely under certain conditions. Therefore, the most fundamental idea of neo-liberal utilitarianism, as applied to this empirical puzzle, is falsified. Instead, the boundary politics framework explains how some countries come to adopt the more open-exclusive regimes that this position defends. Especially the finding that borders are semi-open under conditions of nativist boundary politics also suggests that part of this policy combination lies in restricting stay and making some immigration temporary. Neo-liberal utilitarians should therefore have reasons to support nativists.

This conclusion should again be surprising and disturbing for neo-liberal utilitarians. whose goal is to promote openness for immigration, though mostly in temporary forms, at the expense of citizenship inclusiveness. Nativists are motivated by entirely different concerns. Their priority is to limit access to citizenship in order to preserve the exclusiveness of national identity, not to open the country to immigration, which they merely accept conditionally when they do not wield sufficient power to also curb immigration.

6.4.3   WEAK CONFIRMATION: LIBERAL-COSMOPOLITANISM

The point of ideal theory is that one can set aside nasty empirical constraints. In this way, a radical argument for open borders is in no way contradicted by my empirical analysis, even though no empirical case features this policy. Hence, the idealistic argument of open borders following from the intrinsic value of the freedom of movement in a world of similarly affluent states remains untouched. The "remedial argument" (Bauböck 2009) about the alleviation of global injustices is non-ideal and even relies on the assumption that welfare across nation-states is deeply unequal. As relatively open borders are possible, and because they can be combined with relatively inclusive citizenship, this argument is also not contradicted by my empirical analysis. Even more, if we take the "remedial only" argument as our basis for the open borders argument, we see that it is more about admission claims for special groups of immigrants rather than a full-fledged argument for the freedom of movement (ibid. 5). This may justify borders that are not fully open to all. When bearing this in mind, the problem that there is always a gap between the absolute level of completely open borders and its more closed empirical versions becomes less virulent.

Taken together, my empirical analysis suggests that the explicit assumption that open borders and inclusive citizenship are compatible is weakly confirmed. Moreover, the boundary politics framework explains relatively open-inclusive regimes. It will be consoling for cosmopolitan theorists that even under conditions of politicization the liberal constraints applying especially to immigration regimes are hard to overcome for governments that are ideologically committed to border closure. This is why, together with the surprising support the position gets from liberal communitarianism, liberal cosmopolitanism emerges as the stance that is least troubled or complicated by this dissertation.

6.4.4 CONSTERNATION AND CELEBRATION: LESSONS FOR NATIVISTS

By contrast, nativists who want to curb immigration openness much more radically may be consternated. They seem particularly powerless in cases when there is a *cordon sanitaire*, as in Belgium, which has transformed into an open-inclusive regime over time. Nativists can, however, at least celebrate that they are able to limit, albeit not fully suppress, the openness of borders. As indicated in Chapter 5, the semi-openness of borders we observe when nativists are strong may even help them in continually invoking that there are simply too many immigrants and that they have too many rights. Nativists can also be reassured that especially citizenship can be molded into a version compatible with their illiberal conception of democracy (cf. Adamson et al. 2011: 846). Especially the phase after 2010, and the restrictive trajectory of integration conditions more generally, shows how in many cases some form of illiberalism[38] has crept into democratic citizenship. Nativists may still be disappointed that even under conditions of high politicization exclusive citizenship does not spill over to more closed immigration regimes. However, this diagnosis hinges on the fact until 2010 nativists had not come to occupy full government power on their own in the cases studied here.

6.4.5 POLITICS AND POLITY IMPLICATIONS INSTEAD OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS

I have suggested various forms of boundary politics that normative theorists of different stripes should support. As we have seen, for liberal cosmopolitans, the issue is settled most quickly; they should support cosmopolitan boundary politics and embrace the liberal constraints in both immigration and citizenship. I have argued that, somewhat surprisingly, because of the focus on inclusive citizenship, liberal communitarians should also support cosmopolitan actors and

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[38] However, note that among normative theorists it is also debated whether measures such as citizenship tests are indeed illiberal (see Bauböck and Joppke 2011; see also Orgad 2015).

cosmopolitan boundary politics more broadly. Meanwhile, because of the focus on self-determination, the strong liberal constraints in immigration policymaking may still concern communitarians if popular opinion in a democratic setting opposes more open borders.

I have then argued that nativist boundary politics may be embraced by neo-liberal utilitarians. A coalition between nativists and neo-liberals might be elusive, however, because their ideological priorities are essentially different: exclusive nationhood matters most for nativists, while more open immigration is at the core of the neo-liberal utilitarian position. For this reason, it is probably difficult to find actors such as firms and employer federations siding with nativists. The example of Switzerland shows how even business elites within nativist parties are in favor of taking part in the freedom of movement with the EU (Armingeon and Lutz 2019). This shows how immigration can even cross-cut nativist parties, also in a politicized setting such as Switzerland, and it reminds us why open-exclusive boundary regimes can be interpreted as a manifestation of the liberal paradox.

I have thus proposed "politics implications" instead of "policy implications." A further step lies in discussing "polity implications." The stagnated liberalization in citizenship regimes, and the restrictive trajectory in integration conditions injecting citizenship with certain illiberal elements more generally, should worry normative theorists that call themselves democratic. As Blatter and colleagues (2017) have shown, we can identify an "overlapping consensus" among democratic theorists that inclusive citizenship for long-term immigrants is a necessary condition for democracy. They have also demonstrated that many democracies fall short of this ideal. Democracies would thus be undermined if OECD countries were to follow, for instance, the Gulf autocracies in combining open immigration policies with no rights and no pathway to citizenship for immigrants, as radical neo-liberal utilitarians propose (Weyl 2018; Milanovic 2016). This is why, regarding temporary immigration, Ruhs (2017) "core rights approach" is appealing.

Other democratic theorists have argued further that, while states can claim power over border control because they are independent states, democratic states specifically should not only have inclusive citizenship but also embrace free international movement for democratic reasons (Bauböck 2020; see also Bauböck 2009). Democracies "are justified in exercising [immigration control] powers only if and insofar as this is necessary to secure the conditions for their internal self-government" (ibid. 365; see also Bauböck 1997 for a similar argument related to citizenship, social justice, and the sustainability of welfare states). Bauböck (2020) even suggests that, because there is a deeper political conflict between open and closed conceptions of democracy along the lines of the globalization cleavage, "choosing closure over openness may put the future of democracy itself at risk and should thus not be regarded as an issue of democratic self-

determination" (ibid. 360). This shows how the underlying *identity divide* in immigration and citizenship politics touches upon the very core of what it means to be a democracy in a globalized world that features international migration as one of its main characteristics.

6.5   FUTURE RESEARCH

In the following, I identify several areas for future research. The first area concerns the temporal coverage of data. As we have seen, the data on immigration regimes is only available until 2010 (Helbling et al. 2017). However, the IMPIC dataset is currently being expanded. Updated trend analyses will allow for a more comprehensive descriptive assessment, particularly regarding the issue of whether the "Liberal Model" has given way to the "Market Model" (Boucher and Gest 2018; see also Joppke 2021a). These trend analyses also need to be made more complete by analyzing policy convergence using additional methods such as "beta convergence" (Plümper and Schneider 2009) and by modeling the policy data as a function of temporal variables. Furthermore, this expanded data and broader descriptive basis serves to further test the boundary politics framework. We can then assess to what degree we see a "new politics of immigration" (Dauvergne 2016) also in settler states, and whether settler states "no longer look much like settler states at all" (Boucher and Gest 2018: 5) because of the increasing prevalence of temporary migration.

Second, alongside this expansion of the temporal horizon, we need process-tracing case studies to rigorously test the mechanisms proposed by the boundary politics framework. Do distinct logics under conditions of low politcization indeed account for the different trajectories and the statistical independence of immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness also within countries over time? Are these logics mainly structural or do they relate to party politics? Through what specific pathways does politicization translate into positive correlations between immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness, and through what specific pathways does long-term nativist party power in politicized settings lead to semi-open but exclusive regimes? *How* and *how strongly or explicitly* are policy links made, and are those explicit links really associated with politicization? Does such a purposeful policy alignment produce greater societal stability, and do open-inclusive boundary regimes undermine this stability in the long run? Can an *identity divide* be observed? And who are the actors performing cosmopolitan boundary politics? Can they be identified as parties that correspond to the label *Green-Alternative-Libertarian*? And what role do other parties play?

The literature concerned specifically with the openness-inclusiveness puzzle so far has not provided extensive case studies using rigorous methods of process-tracing. Ruhs (2013) has

taken some steps towards this goal. For instance, he documents the awareness of policymakers about the fiscal effects of immigration and the tension between the number of admissions and expansive social rights in the 1990s and 2000s in the US (ibid. 111-2). Similar tensions and purposeful social rights restrictions resulting from the opening of labor markets to EU migrants from Eastern Europe can be observed in the UK and Ireland (ibid. 112-4). In designing new temporary labor migration programs for low-skilled workers in Canada and Australia, policymakers also restricted different rights, especially regarding employment, family reunification, as well as the access to permanent residence (ibid. 115-8). These and additional case studies in Ruhs (2013) are valuable to further test his argument.

In Chapter 5, I have also used illustrative case studies to probe the mechanisms driving boundary politics. Future research can build on this work to further test the framework. One possibility would be to contrast New Zealand and Belgium. This is because they both transformed into more open-inclusive regimes and agree on variables that may be further key correlates of cosmopolitan boundary politics. Crucially, both countries have proportional representation. The fact that New Zealand has adopted proportional representation only during the 1990s makes this case even more suitable to study how the electoral system can create more electoral support for nativist parties. The second similarity is that these nations do not have homogenous cultures. New Zealand is bicultural: the indigenous Maori have different rights than non-Maori. Belgium is multinational, and some forces in the Flemish part even have a separatist nation-building project. These qualitative variations may affect how the identity logic of the nation unfolds. Thus, they are key to understanding the nature of cosmopolitan boundary politics as a form of identity politics. Otherwise, these cases vary on many variables. Most importantly, New Zealand is a settler state and former colony with a unitary structure and a liberal welfare state, Belgium a former colonial power with a federal structure and a hybrid but non-liberal welfare state. This means that, more broadly, the two countries are *most different systems*.

A similar strategy could be applied to contrast the *most different systems* of Austria and Denmark, which otherwise agree on the crucial ingredients of nativist boundary politics. Recent literature on multi-method research argues that comparative strategies focusing on most different systems are especially suitable for the purposes of generalization (Goertz 2017: 82). If the mechanism works in different systems, the scope of the argument is greater. The pair of Belgium and New Zealand could be contrasted further with Canada, which is *most similar* to New Zealand. It is an Anglo-Saxon settler state that has also abandoned a previously racist immigration system, and it has a buffer for its immigration in the USA. This is similar to the role Australia has for Zealand. However, Canada lacks substantial politicization and strong long-term nativist power. If

the boundary politics framework is valid, then we should observe distinct logics in immigration and citizenship politics in Canada. The pair of Austria and Denmark could be contrasted further with Germany, which is *most similar* to Austria but lacks substantial politicization and strong long-term nativist power, at least until 2010. Germany is important to then study the onset of politicization during the refugee crisis in 2015. This brings us back to the key aspect of temporal expansion. Has boundary politics manifested more clearly as a result of politicization during the past decade?

A final issue is the closer analysis of relatively closed-exclusive regimes using a trade-off lens. As already pointed out in the introductory chapter, the combination of exclusive citizenship and closed borders neither militates against the trade-off idea nor directly confirms it. Yet, it may be seen also an evasive strategy to minimize the putative costs associated with both openness and rights or citizenship. In this vein, Goodman and Pepinsky (2021) discuss the relatively closed-exclusive model of in Japan as an alternative to open-inclusive regimes in resolving the inherent "tension of exclusionary openness" (ibid. 426). The asymmetric relationship between immigration regime openness and citizenship regime inclusiveness under conditions of high politicization may also be significant here. Does the limited liberalization in immigration regimes spill over to exclusive citizenship but not vice-versa because exclusive citizenship alone already evades the trade-off? Again, we will only know the answer to questions like this when we pay closer attention to specific cases.

Hence, considerable work remains to be done in this field to fully solve the openness-inclusiveness puzzle in boundary regime-making. By creating and validating a new dataset, by conceptualizing and testing a new typological policy space using additional existing data, by making careful descriptive analyses, and by proposing and subsequently applying the novel, systematic, and context-sensitive *boundary politics framework*, in this dissertation I have made key methodological, conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions that provide a solid and comprehensive basis to do so.

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Appendix

Do Inclusive Societies Need Closed Borders?

PhD Dissertation

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A   DETAILED CODING SCHEMES OF CITRIX 2.0

All codes reflect the date of enforcement rather than the date of the adoption of some policy (if the two differ). More specifically, the focus is on laws that are in force on *December 31* of each year. This is because the sources that CITRIX is based on – most notably MIPEX and DEMIG – record policies and changes to them in this way, and because other index building projects in the field have done the same, namely IMPIC[39]. This means that the data lends itself more readily to analyses that focus on effects of citizenship policies rather than causes of citizenship policies. To investigate causes, it would make more sense to match the coding with the moment of policy adoption rather than its implementation. I envision an alternative version of CITRIX for this purpose in the future.

Table A1   Birthright conditions for second-generation immigrants

MIPEX		CITRIX 2.0	
Birthright citizenship for second generation Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents?		Indicator name: **iussoli2_v2**	
100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)	100	Automatic at birth – unconditional
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth	67	Automatic at birth, but attached to conditions related to the parents' residence and/or status
0	Naturalization procedure (facilitated or not)	33	Upon simple application or declaration after birth (may be tied to additional conditions such as status of parents or residence or criminal record conditions)
		0	Naturalization procedure (facilitated or not)

The first policy component of CITRIX measures birthright conditions regarding second-generation immigrants and third-generation immigrants, respectively (see Tables A1 and A2). The law regarding second generation immigrants uses an adapted four-point scale that allows for a differentiation of unconditional and conditional forms of *ius soli* (see Table A1 on the left). This distinction is important because the switch from unconditional to conditional *ius soli* is not only relevant theoretically but has happened in various instances empirically.

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[39] http://www.impic-project.eu/

The law regarding third generation immigrations is scored on the original three-point MIPEX scale (Table A2). It captures what is called *double ius soli*, as it requires birth in the territory for both parents and children. A further distinction between unconditional and conditional regimes, while it may appear relevant in theory, is obsolete in the practice of most states.

Table A2   Birthright conditions for third-generation immigrants

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "birthright citizenship for third generation"
Indicator name: **iussoli3**
Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents at least one of whom was already born on the territory?

100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth
0	Naturalization procedure (facilitated or not)

The second policy component is the residence condition. It is measured in terms of the residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalization. The number of years is not divided into the ordinal three-point scale that underlies the MIPEX coding (see Table A3 on the left). Instead, to avoid arbitrary cut-off points and to refine the indicator, I record the exact number of years and then normalize the data by linearly re-scaling the range of variation to an interval from 0 to 100 (see Table A3 on the right). 0 is the empirical maximum (15 years in Germany e.g. in 1980), and 100 is the theoretical maximum of zero years.

Table A3   Residence conditions for ordinary naturalization

MIPEX		**CITRIX 2.0**	
Residence period			
How many years of residence are required for ordinary naturalization?		Indicator name: **residur_v2**	
100	After ≤ 5 years of total residence	X	Exact number of years residur_raw
50	After > 5 < 10 years of total residence		
0	After ≥ 10 years of total residence	Normalization=	((X-max)/(0-max))*100

The third policy component of CITRIX are renunciation conditions in terms of the toleration of dual citizenship in naturalization and captures whether first generation immigrants are required to renounce another citizenship when naturalizing. It is coded a three-point scale that

combines and recategorizes two three-point MIPEX scales by discriminating major from minor exceptions of all kind (see Table A4).

Table A4   Renunciation conditions in CITRIX

Indicator name: **dualcit_v2**

Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalization for first generation immigrants?

100	No requirement for anyone
50	Yes, but with exemptions for multiple categories of migrants regarding their residence or marital status and origin
	(this typically involves both of the following migrants: refugees as well as migrants with citizenship from multiple countries or partners or spouses of nationals)
0	Yes, with or without minor exceptions
	(the most common minor exceptions are: (1) either refugeehood OR citizenship of specific countries, and (2) cases in which the country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship (impossibility) AND/OR cases in which the country of origin sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation (costs))

I opt for this method because the MIPEX scales are problematic. One problem that the two MIPEX scales are not mutually exclusive (see Table A5). A country that only exempts persons from renouncing because it is impossible to do so will have a score of 50 on both indicators because of that exemption. This is what the MIPEX wording implies. I contend that it is more useful to build the exemptions into a single scale.

Table A5   Renunciation conditions in MIPEX

MIPEX

Renunciation requirement		**Renunciation exemptions**	
Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalization?		Types of exemptions allowed	
100	No requirement	100	Both (A) refugees and/or stateless persons and (B) on grounds of accessibility (cost, distance, impossibility)
50	Requirement exists before naturalization, but with exceptions (when country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship or sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation)	50	Only (A) or (B)
0	Requirement exists	0	Neither (A) or (B), though other minor exemptions may exist

The fourth policy component of CITRIX measures integration conditions, namely language tests, citizenship tests, and economic as well as criminal record requirements. The three-point MIPEX scale for language tests is refined so that no requirement is the maximum (Table A6). The second most inclusive category adds informal general requirements to the existing MIPEX scheme. The MIPEX scale for citizenship tests correctly records no test or voluntary information as maximum inclusion. But it does not record a general informal requirement for civic knowledge or "citizenship skills". I add this possibility by expanding the scale to four points (Table A7). Economic (Table A8) as well as criminal record requirements (Table A9) are coded on the original MIPEX three-point scales. They are well-suited to capture the relevant variation.

Table A6   Language tests

MIPEX		CITRIX 2.0	
Naturalization language level			
Is there a test, interview, a course, or an informal requirement that requires or leads to a certain level of language skills?		Indicator name: **langtest_v2**	
100	No requirement OR level A1 or less set as standard	100	No requirement
50	Yes, A2 set as standard	67	Yes, general but informal requirement without an explicit standard; may be assessed in an interview OR level A1 or less set as standard
0	Yes, B1 or higher set as standard	33	Yes, A2 set as standard
		0	Yes, B1 or higher set as standard

Table A7 Citizenship tests

MIPEX		CITRIX 2.0	
Integration form			
Is there a test, interview or a course of that requires a certain level of integration?		Indicator name: **cittest_v2**	
100	No requirement OR voluntary provision of information	100	No requirement
50	Requirement to complete a course without a test	67	Yes, general but informal requirement of civic knowledge or "citizenship skills" (a vague informal "assimilation" requirement is not considered)
0	Requirement to pass a formal integration test	33	Requirement to complete a course without a test
		0	Requirement to pass a formal integration test

Table A8 Economic requirements

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "economic resources"

Indicator name: **ecoreq_v2**

Is there an economic resources requirement?

100	No requirement
50	Minimum income (e.g. acknowledged level of poverty threshold)
0	Additional requirements (e.g. employment, stable and sufficient resources, higher levels of income)

Table A9 Criminal record conditions

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "criminal record"

Indicator name: **crimreq_v2**

Is there a criminal record requirement?

100	No requirement OR only crimes with sentences of imprisonment for min. five years OR use of qualifying period instead of refusal
50	Crimes with sentences of imprisonment for less than five years
0	For other offences (e.g. misdemeanors, minor offenses, pending criminal procedure)

B AGGREGATE AND DISAGGREGATE COUNTRY TRAJECTORIES

Figure B1 Aggregate CITRIX trajectories across countries 1980-2019

Figure B2 Birthright conditions and residence conditions across countries 1980-2019

Figure B3 Renunciation conditions and integration conditions across countries 1980-2019

renunciation conditions

integration conditions

C   CONSTRUCTION OF CITRIX 1.0 AND VALIDITY TESTS

MEASUREMENT AND AGGREGATION

As mentioned in the article, the conceptualisation of CITRIX focuses on *four essential components* of citizenship regimes as they relate to the acquisition of nationality by immigrants and their children: (1) the strength of *jus soli*; (2) the residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation; (3) the toleration of dual citizenship in naturalisation; and (4) further naturalisation requirements, namely language and citizenship tests as well as economic and criminal record conditions. The less restrictive these policies, the higher the level of *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness* (CRI) – and the higher the score on the *Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index* (CITRIX).

Rather than reinventing the wheel, CITRIX develops an existing set of indicators. It conceptually builds on and temporally expands selected indicators measuring the *Access to Nationality* that feature in the *Migration and Integration Policy Index* (MIPEX; Huddleston and Niessen 2011). In the following, I specify the measurement and aggregation, showing whether, how, and why CITIRX differs from MIPEX.

The first policy component of CITRIX measures the *strength of jus soli*, regarding second generation immigrants and third generation immigrants, respectively (see Tables C1 and C2). The law regarding second generation immigrants uses an adapted 4-point scale that allows for a differentiation of unconditional and conditional forms of *jus soli*. This distinction is important because the switch from unconditional to conditional *jus soli* is not only relevant theoretically but has happened in various instances empirically.

Table C1   The strength of *jus soli* for second generation immigrants

MIPEX		CITRIX	
Birthright citizenship for second generation Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents?		**Indicator name: jussoli2**	
100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)	100	Automatic at birth – unconditional
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth	67	Attached to conditions related to the parents' residence and/or status
0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)	33	Upon simple application or declaration after birth
		0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)

The law regarding third generation immigrations is scored on the original 3-point MIPEX scale (Table C2). It captures what is called *double jus soli*, as it requires birth in the territory for both parents and children. A further distinction between unconditional and conditional regimes, while it may appear relevant in theory, is obsolete in the practice of most states.

Table C2   The strength of *jus soli* for third generation immigrants

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "birthright for third generation"

Indicator name: jussoli3

Can citizenship be acquired by children born on the territory to non-national parents at least one of whom was already born on the territory?

100	Automatic at birth (may be conditional upon parents' status)
50	Upon simple application or declaration after birth
0	Naturalisation procedure (facilitated or not)

The two sub-components measuring provisions for second and third generations are aggregated using a weighted arithmetic mean. I allot a double weight for the second-generation indicator, while the third-generation indicator receives a single weight. This is because granting automatic birthright citizenship to the second generation is more liberal than allowing it only for third generation immigrants. Indeed, in cases where a country allows second generation immigrants to acquire citizenship unconditionally at birth, the third-generation indicator is set to the maximum because the former implies the latter.

To measure the second policy component of CITRIX – the *residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation* – the number of years is not divided into the ordinal 3-point scale that underlies the MIPEX coding (see Table C3). Instead, aided by the data from Fitzgerald et al. (2014). I recorded the exact number of years and then normalize the data by linearly re-scaling the range of empirical variation to an interval from 0 to 100 (see Table C3). 0 indicates the most exclusive provision. that is. the empirical maximum of years required 100 (e.g. 15 years in Germany in 1987-1999). 100 indicates the most inclusive provision, that is, the empirical minimum of years required (e.g. 2 years in Australia 1984-2010). This allows for a more fine-grained measurement.

Table C3   The residence duration requirement for ordinary naturalisation

MIPEX		CITRIX	
Residence period			
How many years of residence are required for ordinary naturalisation?		**Indicator name: residur**	
100	After ≤ 5 years of total residence	X	Exact number of years
50	After > 5 < 10 years of total residence		
0	After ≥ 10 years of total residence	Normalisation = ((X-max)/(min-max))*100	

The third policy component of CITRIX is the *toleration of dual citizenship in naturalisation* and captures whether first generation immigrants are required to renounce another citizenship when naturalising. It is coded a 3-point scale that combines and recategorises two 3-point MIPEX scales by discriminating major from minor exceptions of all kind (see Table C5). One problem with the two MIPEX scales is that they are not mutually exclusive (see Table C4). A country that only exempts persons from renouncing because it is impossible to do so will have a score of 50 on both indicators because of that exemption. This is what the MIPEX wording implies, I contend that it is more useful to build the exemptions into a single scale. The resulting coding scheme goes into much detail, but the logic is straightforward: The impossibility to renounce citizenship and the cost to do so are matters that are not in the power of destination countries. Hence, these two aspects should constitute minor exemptions that almost any democratic country would seem to be inclined to make (most indeed do). Refugeehood as well as holding a citizenship of a certain countries should count as other minor exceptions. However, if the latter are combined, we can speak of major exceptions. Finally, statelessness is not covered the CITRIX wording because stateless persons have no citizenship to renounce.

Table C4 The toleration of multiple citizenship in MIPEX

MIPEX

a. Renunciation requirement Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalisation?		b. Renunciation exemptions	
100	No requirement	100	Both (A) refugees and/or stateless persons and (B) on grounds of accessibility (cost. distance. impossibility)
50	Requirement exists before naturalisation. but with exceptions (when country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship or sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation)	50	Only (A) or (B)
0	Requirement exists	0	Neither (A) or (B). though other minor exemptions may exist

Table C5   The toleration of multiple citizenship in CITRIX

Indicator name: dualcit

Is there a requirement to renounce foreign nationality before naturalisation for first generation immigrants?

100	No requirement for anyone
50	Yes. but with exemptions for multiple categories of migrants regarding their status and origin (this typically involves both of the following migrants: refugees as well as migrants with citizenship from more than one specific countries)
0	Yes. with or without minor exceptions (all minor exceptions are: (1) either refugeehood OR citizenship of specific countries. and (2) cases in which the country of origin does not allow renunciation of citizenship (impossibility) AND/OR cases in which the country of origin sets unreasonably high fees for renunciation (costs))

The fourth policy component of CITRIX measures *further naturalisation conditions*, namely language tests. Citizenship tests, and economic as well as criminal record requirements (see Tables C6, C7, C8, and C9). These four sub-components are each coded on the original MIPEX 3-point scales. They all appear well-suited to capture relevant variation. The only addition I make, regarding language tests, is to code as 100 cases that potentially involve a discretionary language assessment as part of an interview. Such a discretionary practice seems highly exclusive, but the coding is justified from a pragmatic perspective: Especially in the past, authorities have exercised discretion in language assessments, but it is very difficult to ascertain when exactly this was the case. Hence, the indicator measuring language tests is more about the explicit adoption of this aspect in a standardised way. Finally. the aggregation of these four policy sub-components uses an arithmetic mean applying equal weights – no single item is more important than the others.

Table C6   Language tests

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "language level"

Indicator name: langtest

Is there a test. interview or a course that requires or leads to a certain level of language skills?

100	Yes. level A1 or less set as standard OR no assessment OR interview with no explicit standard
50	Yes. A2 set as standard
0	Yes. B1 or higher set as standard

Table C7   Citizenship tests

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "integration

form"

Indicator name: cittest

Is there a test. interview or a course of that requires a certain level of integration?

100	No requirement OR voluntary provision of information
50	Requirement to complete a course without a test
0	Requirement to pass an integration test

Table C8   Economic requirements

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "economic resources"

Indicator name: ecoreq

Is there an economic resources requirement?

100	No requirement
50	Minimum income (e.g. acknowledged level of poverty threshold)
0	Additional requirements (e.g. employment. stable and sufficient resources. higher levels of income)

Table C9 Criminal record conditions

CITRIX scale is identical to MIPEX indicator "criminal record"

Indicator name: crimreq

Is there a criminal record requirement?

100	No requirement OR only crimes with sentences of imprisonment for more than or equal to five years OR use of qualifying period instead of refusal
50	Crimes with sentences of imprisonment for less than five years
0	For other offences (e.g. misdemeanors. minor offenses. pending criminal procedure)

AGGREGATION

The policy components are aggregated with an arithmetic mean applying equal weights (Table C10). This is because no component is substantively more important than the others.

Table C10 CITRIX aggregation formula

```
CITRIX =
        (((2*jussoli2+1*jussoli3)/3) +
          residur +
          dualcit +
         (langtest+cittest+ecoreq+crimreq)/4) / 4
```

DATA COLLECTION

To collect the data, I took the coding of Stadlmair (2017) as a starting point.[40] Stadlmair covers all MIPEX indicators on the access to nationality for nine EU member states from 1995 to 2014. After reducing and refining the indicators to the selection introduced below, I checked the data by validating them against the policy changes documented in the DEMIG database (de Haas et al., 2015). Having validated the data of Stadlmair, I used DEMIG to identify policy changes in these countries before 1995. To ascertain the nature of changes, in addition to DEMIG, I drew on the resources by the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT[41]) as well as the information provided in Howard (2009). For the residence duration requirement, I mainly relied on the indicators by Fitzgerald and colleagues (2014), which cover 21 of the 23 countries in the CITRIX sample. In fact, as one can see below, given the existence of this data on residence. I decided to record the exact residence duration requirement rather than an ordinal reduction of it. as is done in MIPEX. This information enabled me to code all indicators for the nine EU countries covered by Stadlmair (2017) back in time to 1980. Hence, the strategy of triangulating these different data sources – DEMIG for changes and substance, and GLOBALCIT, Howard (2009) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) for substance – proved successful. On this basis, taking the MIPEX 2007-2014 data as a starting point, I applied the same strategy to the other countries in the sample.

CONVERGENT VALIDITY

Using all possible overlapping cases. CITRIX is highly correlated with several alternative indices (Table C11).[42] All correlation coefficients (Spearman's rho because the data are ordinal) also have very low p-values. The sub-components measuring integration testing (language and citizenship tests) are also highly correlated with the civic integration index (CIVIX) as reported in Goodman (2014, p. 55). The correlations with BNI (Janoski, 2010) and CIVIX are negative because they are oriented towards measuring higher levels of restrictions rather than inclusiveness. These tests demonstrate the convergent validity of CITRIX.

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[40] I am grateful to Jeremias Stadlmair, who has kindly shared his data. The creation of CITRIX would have been much more resource-intensive without his support.

[41] www.globalcit.eu

[42] The complete BNI, and the details of its measurement, are not publicly available. I used the available data as indicated in Janoski (2010: 40), which leads to 55 overlapping observations.

Table C11 Correlations of CITRIX with other indices

Index	N of overlapping cases	Spearman's rho	p-value
MIPEX Access to Nationality	162	0.75	0.000
Fitzgerald et al. aggregated	620	0.83	0.000
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI)	30	0.84	0.000
Barrier to Nationality Index (BNI)	55	-0.73	0.000
CIVIX	30	-0.73	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table C12 displays the summary statistics. and Figure C1 shows a histogram of CITRIX scores. The data show that there is very significant variation across cases in all policy components as well as on the aggregate CITRIX. However. almost 15 percent of the observations cluster at the upper end of the spectrum. around the value of 80. This is. at least in part. a result of the overall liberalizing tendency in citizenship policies over time.

Table C12 Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min-Max
Strength of jus soli	805	46.36	36.74	0-100
Residence duration	805	64.01	22.19	0-100
Dual citizenship	805	65.03	40.64	0-100
Further requirements	805	58.56	31.89	0-100
CITRIX	805	58.49	21.39	5.78-98.08

Figure C1 Histogram of aggregate CITRIX scores with Kernel density estimate

D   THE INTRICACIES OF MEASURING IMMIGRATION REGIMES

The conceptualisation and operationalisation of immigration regimes used in this article serves to identify general tendencies in the openness of borders using a country-year approach. It is important to note that this approach cannot be used to trace more differentiated conceptions that are based on the assumption that across most receiving countries (culturally similar) high-skilled labour migrants are preferred, while for (culturally dissimilar) low-skilled ones as well as wide circles of family migrants and asylum seekers higher barriers are erected (Hollifield 2004: 902; Shachar and Hirschl 2014: 236). This has to do with the nature of labour immigration policies: they do not only vary cross-nationally but also intra-nationally, and the architecture of the intra-national variation is not fully congruent across countries and years (see e.g. Ruhs 2013; Beine et al. 2016). Not all countries target specific categories of labour immigrants in the same way; some countries at some points in time may have specific policies on low-skilled labour immigrants while not having specific ones on high-skilled immigrants, whereas others may have the opposite configuration and still others only have unspecific ones or any combination of the above (Ruhs 2013). It is therefore practically impossible to disaggregate labour immigration policies the same way for every country-year.

Alternative quantitative approaches either require shifting the unit of analysis or focusing specifically on a single sub-group of immigrants. The former is advocated by Beine and colleagues (2016), who focus on separate "entry tracks" – for instance, a track for high-skilled migrants entering for work purposes. If another country does not offer this track, this would not be a problem but a relevant substantive finding. Ruhs (2013) shifts the unit of analysis to separate labour immigration programs that can be (but need not be) specific to some labour immigration category. This allows him to map important differences across labour immigration programs rather than countries. Finally, the DEMIG database takes the isolated "policy change" (de Haas et al. 2015) as its unit of analysis, without tracking the absolute level of restrictiveness. Using this approach, one can also isolate policy changes targeted only at one group of immigrants.

Peters (2017) resolves the problem by focusing only on "low-skilled immigration." However, as states do not have policies that are specifically and only targeted at low-skill immigrants in a uniform way across country-years, Peters assumes that policy-makers use a multitude of restrictions to control the number of low-skill immigrants. These are, for instance, based on nationality, universality of skill level, or then come in the form of recruitment measures and quotas. In addition, Peters considers family reunification and asylum and refugee policies (as well as access to citizenship. immigrant rights. and enforcement) as further instruments that are

used to regulate low-skill immigration. To measure the concept of *Immigration Policy Openness*, Peters estimates a latent variable by extracting the first component of an unrotated solution of a standard principal component analysis (PCA). This variable is meant to capture how hard it is for low-skilled immigrants to enter a country in a given year.

The more general approach used in this article accommodates the variegated architectures of immigration regimes by enveloping intra-national and cross-national variation through an averaging strategy. Hence, I conceptualise labour immigration policies as targeting any kind of skill level across different entry tracks as well as unspecific entry tracks with conditions for entry and stay that apply to all – whatever the configuration of some country in some year may be. For this reason, this article cannot challenge – and indeed does not have the purpose to challenge – the view that the openness towards high-skilled migrants is negatively correlated with the openness towards low-skilled migrants and refugees.

E   FURTHER CATPCA TESTS

As indicated in the main text. further CATPCA tests support the validity of the two-dimensional solution. Below these additional tests are reported but not further discussed, I start with five dimensions because one can theorise that (1) labour migration policies, (2) family reunification policies, and (3) asylum policies, (4) further naturalisation requirements and the (5) other components of citizenship policies each form a distinct dimension.

The tests show that when extracting solutions with more than two dimensions, the unrotated solution shows the same pattern for the two first dimensions: they describe consistent and independent dimensions of IRO and CRI. This indicates that the two-dimensional model reflects the most natural and parsimonious description of the data. Furthermore, a one-dimensional model only accounts for about 33 percent of the variance and shows some low and one reverse loading. This indicates both an unacceptable level of statistical reduction as well as a partial inconsistency with the composite underlying concept of the *porousness* rather than *restrictiveness* of national boundary regimes.

Table E1   CATPCA – Five-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3	Dim 4	Dim 5
Labor entry	**.781**	-.192	-.002	.578	-.132
Labor stay	**.782**	-.186	-.005	.579	-.129
Family entry	**.806**	.063	.365	-.253	.379
Family stay	**.815**	.098	.354	-.239	.369
Asylum entry	**.613**	.185	-.497	-.293	-.448
Asylum stay	**.679**	.305	-.372	-.431	-.224
Strength of *jus soli*	-.183	**.870**	-.187	.242	.074
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.015	**.811**	.374	.093	-.087
Multiple citizenship toleration	.054	**.553**	-.561	.250	.457
Further naturalisation requirements	-.029	**.508**	.649	.040	-.420
Eigenvalue	3.410	2.172	1.555	1.194	.963
Cronbach's alpha	.785	.600	.397	.180	-.043

Notes   N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes; variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold.

Table E2   CATPCA – Four-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3	Dim 4
Labor entry	**.761**	-.227	-.080	**.582**
Labor stay	**.772**	-.205	-.026	**.582**
Family entry	**.824**	.087	-.325	-.254
Family stay	**.829**	.106	-.321	-.249
Asylum entry	**.647**	.151	**.502**	-.282
Asylum stay	**.670**	.305	.393	-.404
Strength of *jus soli*	-.165	**.863**	.209	.256
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.003	**.816**	-.362	.086
Multiple citizenship toleration	.063	**.539**	.571	.319
Further naturalisation requirements	-.038	**.542**	-.646	.007
Eigenvalue	3.442	2.225	1.540	1.222
Cronbach's alpha	.788	.612	.390	.202

Notes   N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes; variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold.

Table E3   CATPCA – Three-dimensional unrotated solution

Variables	Dim IRO	Dim CRI	Dim 3
Labor entry	**.811**	-.182	-.062
Labor stay	**.814**	-.172	-.075
Family entry	**.788**	.102	.408
Family stay	**.793**	.131	.403
Asylum entry	**.714**	.064	-.363
Asylum stay	**.726**	.262	-.336
Strength of *jus soli*	-.147	**.869**	-.311
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	-.015	**.829**	.317
Multiple citizenship toleration	.062	**.540**	**-.620**
Further naturalisation requirements	-.048	**.549**	**.610**
Eigenvalue	3.635	2.198	1.535
Cronbach's alpha	.805	.605	.387

Notes   N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes; variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold.

Table E4   CATPCA – One-dimensional solution

Variables	Single Dimension
Labor entry	**.576**
Labor stay	-.454
Family entry	-.223
Family stay	**-.569**
Asylum entry	-.416
Asylum stay	**-.686**
Strength of *jus soli*	**-.785**
Residence duration requirement (reversed)	**-.683**
Multiple citizenship toleration	**-.586**
Further naturalisation requirements	-.495
Eigenvalue	3.226
Cronbach's alpha	.767
Explained variance	32.255

Notes   N=713 country-years; principal component analysis for categorical data (CATPCA) using selected policy components measuring the openness of immigration regimes according to IMPIC (Helbling et al., 2017) and the policy components of CITRIX (original dataset based on temporal expansion of selected items from MIPEX and based on the data by Stadlmair (2017) and Fitzgerald et al. (2014) and DEMIG and GLOBALCIT) measuring the inclusiveness of citizenship regimes; variable principal normalisation; solution with VARIMAX rotation and Kaiser normalisation; entries are component loadings and model parameters; component loadings > 0.5 bold.

F   CONSTRUCTING AN IMMIGRATION REGIME OPENNESS INDEX

In the following, I justify the decision that to measure IRO it is best to use the cubed version of the arithmetic mean of the IMPIC scores on labour immigration, family reunification, and asylum seeker and refugee policies regarding entry and stay. The first reason is that the object scores retrieved from the CATPCA show very low variance (Figure F1). In addition, as is the case with any multi-dimensional solution of any kind of PCA, the dimension measuring IRO is "contaminated" with the lower component loadings of the other dimensions. The greater these loadings, the greater the "contamination". Hence, this measure of IRO also features small parts of citizenship policies, which is not what we want to capture when trying to measure IRO.

Figure F1 CATPCA object scores of the IRO dimension

The next option is the equally weighted artithmetic mean of the six policy components. It assumes that the policies can compensate each other in their openness. However, also the arithmetic mean shows relatively low variance and is highly skewed; the observations cluster at the upper end (Figure F2).

Figure F2 IRO measurement via non-transformed arithmetic mean

I now turn to the IMPIC coding logic to further justify the scale construction. 50 is an important threshold because it indicates the presence of a legal provision on the IMPIC scale (Figure F3). The original scale is from 0 indicating no legal provision or maximum openness to 0.5 a liberal legal provision to 1 indicating no policy or maximum restrictiveness. The example of residence requirements for family reunification shows how this works. If there is an explicit family reunification policy but it lacks any residence requirements the score is 0. 0.5 is assigned to a liberal policy option. and the other scores indicate greater restrictiveness up until the point where there is no explicit family reunification policy, which is a score of 1 and implies that there are no legal openings beyond those which are administered in a discretionary way for this category of immigrants.

Figure F3 Example for IMPIC coding: Residence requirement for family reunification

Values	Label
0	No
0.5	Yes, less or equal 12 months; Yes, unspecified
0.6	Yes, 13–24 months
0.7	Yes, 25–48 months
0.8	Yes, 49–60 months
0.9	Yes, more than 60 months or permanent residence
1	No family reunification policy

Source   Bjerre et al. (2017: 52), indicator [S_a01]

This means that an aggregate score above 50 on the reversed and transformed scale that I use – where 100 is maximum openness – indicates that numerous variables comprised by the six policy components have a score of 100 rather than 50 or below. It is essential to capture this feature of the data. Even more. it must be captured in much greater detail – we need to discriminate more clearly the cases that have no legal provision for entry and stay conditions across all indicators. One way to do this is to square the measure for IRO (Figure F4).

Figure F4 IRO measurement via squared arithmetic mean

Immigration Regime Openness ::: arithmetic mean, squared

With this scale construction, we come closer to discriminating more clearly the important variation at the upper end of the scale, while not ignoring the variation that exists beyond the threshold of the presence of a legal provision. However. a cubed transformation does an even better job (Figure F5). Now there are two clusters. The firsts tends toward 0 and thus declares comparable the levels of IRO in states that have a discretionary policy without an official law and those that have very restrictive laws. Yet, there still is variation among this cluster that the index can capture. The second cluster captures in detail the most significant variation caused by very liberal policies on varying numbers of indicators. In addition, a statistical test shows that a cubed version is not significantly skewed anymore (not shown). This is why I choose to operationalise IRO with the arithmetic mean of the six policy components that is then cubed (and rescaled using a division of 10'000). In the analyses, I rescaled this measure again so that 0 is the minimum openness and 100 the maximum openness observed in the data.

Figure F5 IRO measurement via cubed arithmetic mean

Immigration Regime Openness ::: arithmetic mean, cubed

G CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLE QUANTIFICATIONS

	Labor entry	Labor stay	Family entry	Family stay	Asylum eligibility	Asylum stay	Strength of *jus soli*	Residence duration	Multiple citizenship	Further conditions
Labor entry	1.000	.995	.432	.448	.442	.398	−.235	−.101	−.030	−.096
Labor stay	.995	1.000	.437	.459	.455	.415	−.203	−.084	.002	−.086
Family entry	.432	.437	1.000	.962	.373	.469	−.168	.109	−.009	.084
Family stay	.448	.459	.962	1.000	.375	.494	−.082	.173	.080	.087
Asylum entry	.442	.455	.373	.375	1.000	.806	−.099	−.078	.023	−.099
Asylum stay	.398	.415	.469	.494	.806	1.000	−.011	.094	.113	−.051
Residence duration	−.235	−.203	−.168	−.082	−.099	−.011	1.000	.599	.539	.356
Multiple citizenship	−.101	−.084	.109	.173	−.078	.094	.599	1.000	.252	.532
Strength of *jus soli*	−.030	.002	−.009	.080	.023	.113	.539	.252	1.000	.053
Further conditions	−.096	−.086	.084	.087	−.099	−.051	.356	.532	.053	1.000

N=731 country-years; entries are Pearson correlation coefficients of transformed variable quantifications retrieved by the CATPCA shown in the article.

Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness

Immigration Regime Openness

I MEASURING POLITICIZATION

Politicization features both issue salience and nativist party support as its constitutive components. I use data from the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP; Volkens et al. 2020) to gauge the issue salience of immigration-related issues in party manifestos. I follow the approach of Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) in defining what quasi-sentences are related to immigration. To measure nativist vote shares, I consider parties that are to the right of the main center-right party as coded by the *Comparative Political Dataset* (CPDS; Armingeon et al. 2020). Figure I1 shows the country trajectories in issue salience and nativist party support as well as the resulting ordinal level of politicization, Figure I2 shows the histograms of issue salience and nativist party support, and Figure I3 shows a scatterplot and the low correlation of the salience of immigration-related issues and the vote share of nativist parties.

Figure I1   Country trajectories in issue salience, nativist party support, and politicization

Notes   On the left y-axis, shaded gray areas indicate levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.; on the right y-axis, the solid gray line indicates the mean of issue salience (average of percentages of quasi-sentences mentioning issues related to immigration across party manifestos of parties winning more than 5 percent of the vote); also on the right y-axis, the dashed black line indicates the nativist party vote shares (derived from addition of vote share of parties to the right of conservative parties in the CPDS data).

Figure I2 Histograms of issue salience and nativist party support

Notes   In the top graph, bars indicate percentages of quasi-sentences mentioning issues related to immigration (derived from the average of these percentages across party manifestos of parties winning more than 5 percent of the vote); in the bottom graph, bars indicate percentages of nativist party vote shares (derived from addition of vote share of parties to the right of conservative parties in the CPDS data); unit of analysis is country-year observation even though these variables vary across legislative terms.

Figure I3 Scatterplot of issue salience and nativist party support

Notes   The scatterplot shows levels of issue salience (average of percentages of quasi-sentences mentioning issues related to immigration across party manifestos of parties winning more than 5 percent of the vote) on the x-axis against percentages of nativist party vote shares (derived from addition of vote share of parties to the right of conservative parties in the CPDS data) on the y-axis; solid black line is a linear fit; Pearson's r correlation is 0.32.; unit of analysis is country-year observation even though these variables vary across legislative terms.

Immigration-related issue salience and nativist party electoral support jointly constitute the politicization of immigration. The low correlation confirms that the two dimensions are separate. Therefore, we must apply multiplicative aggregation. However, as both variables have a true zero-point, the multiplication of original values would be too restrictive. We might encounter a party system as in the United States where immigration can still be politicized by issue attention of the two major mainstream parties alone, and these parties may contain nativist factions. I therefore add one percentage-point to each variable before multiplying them. Therefore, nativist vote shares are assumed to equal 1 in systems where there are no nativist parties. In case of the USA, this means that if Democrats and Republicans devote five percent of their manifestos to immigration issues in an election, the resulting score from the multiplication will be five instead of zero. I then take the square root. This yields the geometric mean (in the example of the US election this would be 2.24), which is a compromise between the arithmetic mean assuming strong substitutability (which would yield 3) and the multiplication with a linear re-scaling (dividing by the possible maximum 100) that assumes non-substantiality (which would yield 0.05). It implies both interaction between salience and nativist support but limits their mutual substitutability (see Goertz 2006, 2020). To get a measure with the minimum being zero rather than one (which is the minimum possible value using this aggregation procedure, because one means zero on both salience and nativist support), I deduct one point in the end again to get a more intuitive measure. We can perceive of the resulting aggregate in a simplified way as the percentage of immigration-related politicization in an election. This variable also correlates strongly ($r=0.82$) with the equivalent measure that can be derived from the IMP dataset by Dancygier and Margalit (2020).

J   Politicization and long-term nativist power

The following graphs show the distribution of the politicization and nativist power variables. The histograms in Figure J1 show that most observations exhibit low politicization and low long-term nativist power. The distribution of ordinal levels of politicization and nativist power in a categorical form across historical periods in Figures J2 and J3 show that both variables increase over time. The country trajectories in levels of politicization and long-term nativist party seat shares are shown in Figure J4. A scatterplot of the two variables in Figure J5 shows that the two variables correlate positively and strongly (r=0.76) and reveal a set-relationship. A level beyond 8 percent in politicization is necessary to observe long-term nativist power exceeding the 10 percent threshold.

Figure J1   Histograms of levels of politicization and long-term nativist party seat shares

Notes   In the top graph, bars indicate percentages of levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; in the bottom graph, bars indicate percentages of levels of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) on bottom graph.

Figure J2   Levels of politicization across historical periods

Notes   Bars indicate percentages of observations across historical periods and levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Figure J3   Nativist power across historical periods

Notes   Bars indicate percentages of observations across historical periods and levels of nativist power (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) in a dichotomized form, using 5% as the cut-off point.

Figure J4   Levels of politicization and nativist power across countries and time

Notes   The solid gray line indicates levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election; the dashed black line indicates level of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Figure J5   Scatterplot of levels of politicization and nativist power

Notes   Scatterplot shows levels of politicization on the x-axis (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties) against long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) on the y-axis; solid black line is a linear fit; Pearson's r correlation is 0.76; x-line at 8 and y-line at ten show a set relation: levels beyond 8 in politicization are a necessary condition for levels beyond 10 in long-term nativist power.

K   CORRELATION ANALYSES AND VISUALIZATIONS

This section of the Appendix presents correlation analyses and more detailed visualizations to evaluate the three hypotheses of the boundary politics framework. I start with analyzing the Non-Politicization and the Politicization Hypotheses and then move on to the Nativist Power Hypothesis.

A pooled correlation analysis shows a low but positive and significant correlation between IRO and CRI, both for the whole sample and after the Cold War (Table K1). The correlation is lower when politicization is low. By contrast, when politicization is at a medium or high level, the correlation is positive and becomes much stronger. Yet, there is no clear difference between the Post-Cold War era and before. This has to do with the fact that during the Cold War we can see no case with high politicization and only few with medium politicization (see Figure J2, Appendix J). These findings are further visualized in Figures K1, K2, and K3. They lend support to the boundary politics framework but also show how the Politicization Hypothesis must be qualified in terms of temporal scope and the asymmetry of the correlation between IRO and CRI.

Table K1   Pooled IRO-CRI correlations across politicization and historical period

| | *Historical Period* | |
	Pooled	Post-Cold War
Pooled	0.17	0.21
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	713	437
Politicization		
Low	0.07	0.03
p-value	0.122	0.659
N	525	280
Medium	**0.67**	**0.65**
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	100	69
High	**0.61**	**0.61**
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	88	88

Notes   Entries are Spearman correlation coefficients between IRO and CRI, p-values, and N = the number of observations; coefficients over 0.4 are bold; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Figure K1 How IRO predicts CRI across levels of politicization

Notes   Scatterplot shows relative levels of IRO (z-scores) against relative levels of CRI (z-scores) across levels of politicization; the small black squares and the dashed black linear fit line represent observations falling below 5 percent in politicization (low level; value is derived from geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience and electoral support for nativist parties); the blue dots and the solid blue linear fit line represent observations that are above 5 percent but below 10 percent in politicization (medium level); the orange dots and the solid orange linear fit line represent observations that are above 10 percent in politicization (high level).

Figure K2 IRO predicting CRI across politicization and time

Notes   Scatterplots show relative levels of IRO (z-scores) against relative levels of CRI (z-scores); the solid black lines are linear fits using IRO as the predictor; the dashed lines are derived from a *lowess* smoother to gauge the adequacy of the linear assumption; CW stands for Cold War; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election; not politicized<5%; politicized>=5%; high politicization>=10%.

Figure K3 CRI predicting IRO across politicization and time

Further pooled correlation analyses show that long-term nativist power is strongly negatively correlated with IRO and CRI, respectively, but only when immigration is politicized, and for IRO only after the Cold War (Tables K2 and K3). The negative effect of nativist power on IRO is particularly conditional upon political and temporal context; the pooled correlations, and those in non-politicized settings, even point into the positive direction. These findings are further visualized in Figure K4. They lend support to the boundary politics framework but also highlight again its limited temporal scope. In addition, Figure N4 suggests a certain fuzzy set-relation: a high level of long-term nativist power appears to be sufficient for low levels of CRI. This echoes the assumption of Howard (2009). Figure K4 shows that the Nativist Power Hypothesis is further corroborated by visual inspection. I discuss in section the paper how the deviant cases of Belgium (section 5.5.1) and New Zealand (section 5.5.1), as indicated in Figure N4a, can be explained. Figure N4b shows that that boundary regimes remain semi-open and not fully closed even when operationalizing nativist power as very strong (>15%).

Table K2   Nativist power and IRO: correlations across politicization and time

| | *Historical Period* | |
	Pooled	Post-Cold War
Pooled	0.26	0.25
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	713	437
Politicization		
Low	0.16	0.19
p-value	0.000	0.002
N	525	280
Non-Low	−0.29	**−0.48**
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	188	157

Notes   Entries are Spearman correlation coefficients between long-term cumulative seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) and IRO; p-values and N = the number of observations are indicated as well; coefficients over 0.4 are bold; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Table K3   Nativist power and CRI: correlations across politicization and time

| | *Historical Period* | |
	Pooled	Post-Cold War
Pooled	−0.17	−0.14
p-value	0.000	0.004
N	713	437
Politicization		
Low	−0.15	0.01
p-value	0.001	0.002
N	525	280
Non-Low	**−0.40**	**−0.56**
p-value	0.000	0.000
N	188	157

Notes   Entries are Spearman correlation coefficients between long-term cumulative seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) and CRI; p-values and N = the number of observations are indicated as well; coefficients over 0.4 are bold; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Figure K4 Nativist power predicting IRO and CRI across politicization and time

Notes   Scatterplots show relative levels of CRI (z-scores) and relative levels of IRO (z-scores) against the long-term cumulative seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties); the solid black lines are linear fits; CW stands for Cold War; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election; not politicized<5%; politicized>=5%.

Figure K5 Long-term nativist power and its role for policy combinations

Figure K5a
Role of nativist power >5%

Figure K5b
Role of nativist power >15%

Notes   The scatterplots show relative levels of IRO (z-scores) on the x-axis against relative levels of CRI (z-scores) on the y-axis for observations that surpass 5 percent of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); in the left graph (Figure K51) blue squares are observations with values of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) below 5 percent; red circles are observations with values of long-term seat shares of all nativist parties above 5 percent; in the right graph (Figure K5b) the threshold for dichotomizing nativist power is 15 percent; reference lines indicate means in z-scores of IRO and CRI; the list of country abbreviations can be found in Table K5 below.

Table K5   List of countries and abbreviations

Country	Abbreviation	Country	Abbreviation
Austria	at	Ireland	ie
Australia	au	Iceland	is
Belgium	be	Italy	it
Canada	ca	Japan	jp
Switzerland	ch	Luxembourg	lu
Germany	de	Netherlands	nl
Denmark	dk	Norway	no
Spain	es	New Zealand	nz
Finland	fi	Portugal	pt
France	fr	Sweden	se
Great Britain	gb	USA	us
Greece	gr		

The finding that nativist power cannot fully stifle the liberal tendencies in immigration openness is further illustrated in Figure K6. It shows violin plots with median values and shaded areas indicating the distribution of observations. Figure K6a shows that very strong nativist power – seen on the right – can only limit an aggregate liberalization from Post-1992 to Post 9/11. Even more, when compared to the median values of observations with lower nativist power on the left, the difference in the median across these two historical periods show that in the cases with strong nativists there is some liberalization. The shaded areas on the right also indicate outliers towards the upper end of the IRO scale; these are observations of Belgium. Figure K6b shows that strong nativist power can keep the median levels in citizenship inclusiveness after the Cold War at levels similar to those before the fall of the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, the distribution on the right tells us that there is a divergence in CRI in cases that have strong nativists, as the variation of these observations increases after 9/11. Belgium is again one of the outliers towards the upper end of the CRI scale.

Figure K6 IRO and CRI across historical periods and nativist power: conditional means

Notes   Violin plots show conditional distributions of IRO n Figure K7a and CRI in Figure JKb (diamonds indicate median values) across both levels of nativist power (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties) in a dichotomized form, using 10% as the cut-off point, and across historical periods, for observations that surpass 5 percent of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); there are no observations with strong nativist power during the Cold War.

L   REGRESSION METHODOLOGY

MODELING STRATEGY

My panel data modeling strategy has aimed to capture the cross-classified and multilevel structure of country-year observations, as they are nested in countries, years, and legislative periods. I have complemented this mixed-effects approach with a random-effects and Prais-Winsten estimation approach to check the robustness of the results. I thus refrain from using country (and year) fixed-effects. Since such two-way fixed-effects are a common feature of most panel regression models, I shortly outline here the reasons for this decision.

The most important reason for using mixed-effects and random-effects is to ensure a correspondence between the theory to be tested and the model (Plümper et al. 2005). Relative levels of IRO and CRI matter substantively for the argument that is being tested; I am interested not only in changes within countries but even more so the differences between them. The boundary politics framework specifically implies that, on the one hand, different IRO-CRI combinations across politicized and non-politicized settings should lead to varying IRO-CRI correlations, and on the other hand, different IRO-CRI combinations in politicized settings can be explained by levels of nativist party power. The crucial ingredient of between-country variation would be suppressed by country fixed-effects. I go more into the direction of fixed-effects with the mixed-effects models, while the random-effects models better capture relative levels.

The second reason for not using country fixed-effects concerns is that IRO and CRI show insufficient within-country variation over time. This reveals something substantively important about the association between IRO and CRI: there is no uniform and dynamic "policy feedback" at work. This lack of variation is also why I do not use auto-distributed lag models or error correction models. These two approaches are the methodologically most valid and sophisticated options for modeling dynamic panel data (Boef and Keele 2008), and they contradict the recommendations given by Beck and Katz (1995; but see also Beck and Katz 2011).

The last reason is purely technical. Most panel regression methods in political economy and political science – often called time-series cross-sectional methods (TSCS) in this context – follow the seminal article by Beck and Katz (1995). Their main recommendation is to use a lagged dependent variable and control for unobservable confounders by adding country fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Because it is has proliferated so widely this has become known as the "de facto Beck and Katz standard" (Plümper et al. 2005). More recent research shows that panel regression

models following this standard are not as sound and unproblematic as their widespread and naïve usage suggests (Plümper and Troeger 2019; see also Bellemare 2017; Hill et al. 2020). Especially the two-way fixed-effects model combining spatial and temporal fixed-effects yield coefficients that make no substantive sense; the country fixed-effect reduces correlations to within-country associations and the year fixed-effect to within-year associations, making the combination of the two nonsensical in terms of substantive meaning. Beck and Katz (2011) also caution against using their template blindly without considering the implications of the theory and the empirical properties of the data. As indicated, besides making sure there is a link between theory and modeling, the properties of the data are why I opt for the mixed-effects and random-effects models instead.

SOME ADDITIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CONTROL VARIABLE SELECTION

As noted in the article, the most important time-invariant country-level differences in the context of this study are historical and geographical. Following Howard (2009), Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands are categorized as major European colonial powers. Spain and Portugal are instead categorized, along with Italy and Greece, as Southern European countries. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA are distinguished as Anglo-Saxon settler states. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have a Nordic regime type. These variables are chosen because they reflect the most pertinent differences related to immigration. They also relate to differences in welfare states. I do not include a dummy to identify liberal welfare regimes, as they are collinear especially with the category of settler states. Creating a dummy for conservative welfare regimes would imply that liberal regimes are the reference category (when at the same time considering Nordic regimes as the most important social-democratic regimes), which is again not feasible because of its collinearity with settler states.

The models with CRI as the dependent variable do not cover immigration control mechanisms, electoral disproportionality, the percentage of the elderly population, and trade openness. This is because they are not considered in the literature as important alternative explanatory variables or confounders.

The variable of immigration control mechanisms refers to policy instruments that monitor the enforcement of immigration regulations and include also measures targeted at irregular migrants (such as regularization programs; see Bjerre et al. 2016: 10). While each policy field of labor, family reunification, and asylum has its own regulations, control mechanisms cover all policy fields, and they also include elements that refer to irregular immigrants. Control mechanisms do

not establish entry tracks and rights to immigrate and stay. Thus, they are conceptually different, and they also form a separate statistical dimension (Schmid and Helbling 2016).

The level of immigration – in terms of rates, flows, or migrant stocks – is deliberately not included in any model, because it is endogenous to IRO, even if it is lagged (Peters 2017: 213). There is also evidence that CRI impacts immigrant flows (Fitzgerald et al. 2014), potentially making immigration levels a "collider" (Gerring 2012: 297) that could distort the estimate of the IRO-CRI association. Finally, complete demographic immigration data for the whole sample of this study is not available.

M   SUMMARY STATISTICS

Table M1 Summary statistics for all historical periods, numeric and dummy variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All models election-variant					
Level of politicization	713	3.84	4.28	0	18.43
Long-term nativist seat share in %	713	.22	.53	0	2.78
All models year-variant					
Political constraints	713	.48	.09	.21	.72
Unemployment rate	713	6.85	3.58	.21	22
EU member	713	.57	.5	0	1
All models time-invariant dummies					
Settler state	713	.17	.38	0	1
Major colonial power	713	.17	.38	0	1
Southern Europe	713	.17	.38	0	1
Nordic regime type	713	.22	.41	0	1
IRO models only: policy, election, other					
Immigration control mechanisms	713	0	1	−3.07	2.32
Disproportionality index	713	5.82	5.11	.49	24.61
Elderly population in %	713	14.28	2.42	8.95	22.64
Trade openness in % GDP, logged	713	4.13	.54	2.77	5.84

Table M2 Summary statistics for Post-Cold War period, numeric and dummy variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
All models election-variant					
Level of politicization	437	5.01	4.92	0	18.43
Long-term nativist seat share in %	437	.32	.65	0	2.78
All models year-variant					
Political constraints	437	.49	.09	.21	.72
Unemployment rate	437	7.06	3.32	1.9	22
EU member	437	.63	.48	0	1
All models time-invariant dummies					
Settler state	437	.17	.38	0	1
Major colonial power	437	.17	.38	0	1
Southern Europe	437	.17	.38	0	1
Nordic regime type	437	.22	.41	0	1
IRO models only: policy, election, other					
Immigration control mechanisms	437	.38	.77	−1.17	2.32
Disproportionality index	437	5.88	5.18	.61	24.61
Elderly population in %	437	15.08	2.33	10.79	22.64
Trade openness in % GDP, logged	437	4.2	.55	2.77	5.84

Table M3 Summary statistics for all historical periods, categorical variables

Variable	N	
Presence of politicization		
Not politicized (<5%)	525	73.6%
Politicized (>5%)	188	26.4%
Level of politicization		
Low (<5%)	525	73.6%
Medium (5-10%)	100	14.0%
High (>10%)	88	12.3%
Largest government party		
Right	304	42.6%
Center	97	13.6%
Left	312	43.8%

Table M4 Summary statistics for Post-Cold War period, categorical variables

Variable	N	
Presence of politicization		
Not politicized (<5%)	280	64.1%
Politicized (>5%)	157	35.9%
Level of politicization		
Low (<5%)	280	64.1%
Medium (5-10%)	69	15.8%
High (>10%)	88	20.1%
Largest government party		
Right	187	42.8%
Center	58	13.3%
Left	192	43.9%

N   DATA FOR VARIABLES BEYOND IRO AND CRI

Table N1 Variables, construction, and source: politicization and nativist power

Variable	Construction	Source
Level of politicization	Geometric mean with relaxed assumption for zero-point = square root of [issue salience plus 1] * [nativist vote share plus 1] and then minus 1 in the end	Issue salience: CMP Comparative Manifesto Project Volkens et al. (2020)
	Issue salience = average percentage of statements in party manifestos related to immigration (as defined by Alonso and da Fonseca 2011) of all parties receiving more than 5 percent of the vote	Nativist vote share: CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020)
	Nativist vote share = cumulative vote shares of all right-wing parties as defined by CPDS	**variables** right1 right2 right3 right4 right5
Long-term nativist seat share in %	Average seat share of parties defined as right-wing across the past 10 years	CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020) **variables** sright1 sright2 sright3 sright4 sright5

Table N2 Variables, construction, and source: time-variant variables

Political constraints	Original variable Index constructed by Henisz (2000)	QoG OECD Dataset Quality of Government panel data (Teorell et al. 2021) **variable** h_polcon5
EU membership	Original variable	CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020) **variable** eu_member
Immigration control mechanisms	z-standardization of the original variable	IMPIC Immigration Policies in Comparsion Helbling et al. (2017) **variable** AvgS_Cont
Elderly population	Original variable Percent of the population aged over 65	CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020) **variable** elder
Trade openness in % GDP	Logged original variable Percent of GDP constituted by trade	QoG OECD Dataset Quality of Government panel data (Teorell et al. 2021) **variable** wdi_trade
Unemployment rate	Original variable	CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020) **variable** unemp

Table N3   Variables, construction, and source: election-variant variables

Largest government party	Ideological orientation of the government party that has the largest share of seats in the legislature of all government parties	CPDS
		Comparative Political Dataset
		Armingeon et al. (2020)
		
		variables
		`gov_left1`
		`gov_left2`
		`gov_cent1`
		`gov_cent2`
		`gov_right1`
		`gov_right2`

Disproportionality	Original variable Gallagher index for the disproportionality of elections results	CPDS Comparative Political Dataset Armingeon et al. (2020) variable dis_gall

Table M4   Variables, construction, and source: time-invariant variables

Settler state	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA	General knowledge
Major colonial power	Belgium, France, Great Britain, Netherlands	Countries defined as "Haves" rather than "Have-Beens" (Portugal and Spain) and "Have-Nots" according to Howard (2009: 48-9), who draws on Townsend (1941)
Southern Europe	Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain	General knowledge
Nordic regime type	Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden	General knowledge

O   FURTHER VISUALIZATIONS OF INTERACTION TERMS

Additional visualizations of the interaction terms show that a significant effect of IRO on CRI emerges around a threshold of 5 percent of politicization; it is slightly higher for the whole sample and slightly lower for the cases after the Cold War (see Figures O1-2). This finding supports the decision of treating this threshold as a cut-off point of substantial politicization in relation to the boundary politics framework. The visualizations also confirm the asymmetric effect of IRO on CRI (see Figures O3-4).

Figure O1 Marginal effects of IRO on CRI by politicization, all periods

Notes   Plot shows how the effect of IRO (z-scores) on CRI (on the y-axis) changes with levels of politicization (on the x-axis) for all historical periods; dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election.

Figure O2 Marginal effects of IRO on CRI by politicization, Post-Cold War

Notes   Plot shows shows how the effect of IRO (z-scores) on CRI (on the y-axis) changes with levels of politicization (on the x-axis) for the Post-Cold War period; dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election.

Figure O3 Marginal effects of CRI on IRO by politicization, all periods

Notes   Plot shows how the effect of CRI (z-scores) on IRO (on the y-axis) changes with levels of politicization (on the x-axis) for all historical periods; dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election.

Figure O4 Marginal effects of CRI on IRO by politicization, Post-Cold War

Notes   Plot shows how the effect of IRO (z-scores) on CRI (on the y-axis) changes with levels of politicization (on the x-axis) for the Post-Cold War period; dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals; levels of politicization are derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties; politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in an election.

P   REGRESSION MODELS: MIXED-EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS

Table P1   Mixed-effects models 1-3

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
DV: CRI 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: IRO z-score	-0.43	1.94+	-0.65	0.64	1.43	4.51**
	(0.57)	(1.09)	(0.59)	(1.33)	(1.43)	(1.73)
Politicization	-0.17	-0.44**	-0.2	-0.28	-0.14	-0.19
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.38)	(0.60)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Government (Right)						
Center	-3.46***	-3.38**	-3.84***	-3.98*	-0.75	-0.16
	(0.86)	(1.22)	(0.98)	(1.65)	(1.76)	(1.59)
Left	0.74	0.98	0.76	1.34	1.41	1.34
	(0.62)	(0.88)	(0.76)	(1.39)	(1.01)	(0.95)
Constraints	1.66	-2.4	0.72	0.14	-0.98	-3.75
	(5.14)	(7.09)	(8.24)	(18.53)	(5.86)	(5.66)
Unemployment rate	0.04	0.1	0.02	0.11	0.65	0.15
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.42)
EU membership	0.33	0.33	0.92	0.44	-1.88	-0.56
	(1.71)	(2.57)	(1.99)	(3.76)	(3.33)	(3.14)
Settler state	50.39***	45.36***	53.59***	42.21**	55.25***	52.89***
	(11.75)	(11.20)	(12.54)	(13.72)	(14.39)	(14.84)
Colonial power	35.76**	35.31**	35.73**	31.38+	47.22***	45.61***
	(11.75)	(11.16)	(12.62)	(16.34)	(12.59)	(12.94)
Southern Europe	11.4	11.19	9.81	4.98	14.76	26.94
	(11.72)	(11.14)	(12.62)	(14.30)	(13.46)	(17.95)
Nordic	10.5	8.15	12.99	4.66	30.22*	28.38*
	(10.99)	(10.40)	(11.73)	(12.59)	(13.31)	(13.67)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F).

Table P2 Mixed-effects models 4-6

	Model 4a	Model 4b	Model 5a	Model 5b	Model 6a	Model 6b
DV: IRO 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: CRI z-score	**-1.66**	**2.42+**	**-2.82**	**0.77**	**3.62**	**6.78****
	(1.57)	**(1.38)**	**(1.92)**	**(1.68)**	**(2.36)**	**(2.25)**
Politicization	0.17	0.08	0.8	1.01+	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Government (Right)						
Center	2.44+	1.99	3.35+	3.77*	-1.27	-0.95
	(1.43)	(1.34)	(1.71)	(1.71)	(2.73)	(2.12)
Left	2.47*	1.68+	3.97**	4.10**	-0.16	-1.53
	(1.03)	(0.98)	(1.31)	(1.42)	(1.53)	(1.33)
Constraints	7.49	4.78	3.72	-17.4	17.51*	10.01
	(8.46)	(8.10)	(13.93)	(20.40)	(8.63)	(7.73)
Unemployment rate	-0.1	-0.3	-0.11	-0.43	0.73	0.28
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.62)	(0.54)
EU membership	0.78	-0.41	0.26	-1.93	6.56	-0.03
	(2.89)	(2.84)	(3.69)	(3.92)	(4.39)	(3.75)
Settler state	24.38*	16.55	24.63+	24.22	22.5	22.22+
	(11.07)	(12.60)	(12.88)	(16.51)	(19.33)	(13.45)
Colonial power	27.70**	17.57	35.05**	26.18	-8.25	-3.72
	(10.44)	(12.25)	(12.25)	(19.32)	(16.60)	(11.42)
Southern Europe	-0.11	-1.12	0.42	4.92	-24.56	-19.68
	(10.36)	(12.31)	(12.12)	(16.82)	(17.96)	(16.04)
Nordic	11.81	12.12	14.56	18.07	-5.48	-0.86
	(9.53)	(11.27)	(10.87)	(14.75)	(17.05)	(11.51)
Immigration control	5.80***	2.29*	7.11***	1.88	4.11+	-0.1
	(1.21)	(1.17)	(1.46)	(1.42)	(2.19)	(2.31)
Disproportionality	0.11	0	0.16	-0.38	0.17	-0.09
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Percent elderly	1.41*	0.56	1.64*	-0.15	1.82	3.88*
	(0.71)	(0.74)	(0.77)	(0.91)	(1.53)	(1.51)
Trade openness	-2.2	-5.65	-1.04	-5.02	-7.37	5.07
	(3.95)	(3.96)	(4.65)	(4.95)	(8.12)	(6.37)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix B) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix F).

Table P3 Mixed-effects models 7-8

	Model 7a	Model 7b	Model 8a	Model 8b
DV: CRI 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: Nativist power 10%	**-2.06**	**-8.98*****	**-2.92**	**-5.31***
	(1.64)	**(2.19)**	**(2.08)**	**(2.12)**
Government (Right)				
Center	-3.45***	-3.17**	-0.7	-0.35
	(0.86)	(1.21)	(1.73)	(1.59)
Left	0.74	1.13	1.46	1.33
	(0.62)	(0.87)	(0.99)	(0.95)
Constraints	1.83	-1.14	0.28	-0.58
	(5.14)	(7.03)	(5.81)	(5.70)
Unemployment rate	0.05	0.15	0.65	0.24
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.41)	(0.41)
EU membership	0.77	1.97	-0.24	1.58
	(1.70)	(2.55)	(3.37)	(3.16)
Settler state	49.92***	44.82***	54.25***	51.09**
	(11.72)	(10.79)	(15.11)	(15.82)
Colonial power	34.46**	32.76**	43.65**	38.85**
	(11.71)	(10.74)	(13.46)	(14.06)
Southern Europe	11.26	10.15	12.02	24.8
	(11.69)	(10.75)	(14.08)	(18.99)
Nordic	9.98	6.39	27.02+	22.48
	(10.96)	(10.05)	(14.20)	(14.79)
N	713	437	188	157
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV is long-term nativist seat share of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Table P4   Mixed-effects models 9-11

DV: IRO 1-100	Model 9a	Model 9b	Model 10a	Model 10b	Model 11a	Model 11b
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW	Labor immigration only	
					Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: Nativist power 10%	**1.63**	**-1.75**	**-2.72**	**-6.02***	**-4.09*****	**-3.51****
	(2.89)	**(2.71)**	**(2.45)**	**(2.41)**	**(1.15)**	**(1.23)**
Government (Right)						
Center	2.63+	1.61	-1.1	-1.77	-0.77	-0.73
	(1.41)	(1.33)	(2.53)	(2.17)	(0.90)	(0.85)
Left	2.40*	1.71+	-1.31	-1.2	0.5	-0.12
	(1.02)	(0.99)	(1.47)	(1.35)	(0.53)	(0.54)
Constraints	7.36	5.21	9.44	9.25	-7.06*	-7.78*
	(8.48)	(8.13)	(8.43)	(7.88)	(3.10)	(3.17)
Unemployment rate	-0.12	-0.3	0.06	0.62	0.41	0.44+
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.28)	(0.23)
EU membership	0.35	-0.52	6.83+	0.83	1.42	1.93
	(2.86)	(2.82)	(4.13)	(3.72)	(1.70)	(1.63)
Settler state	20.61+	21.05+	37.73*	34.21**	1.11	5.5
	(10.77)	(12.32)	(15.72)	(12.73)	(17.23)	(6.12)
Colonial power	26.09*	20.76+	2.46	-0.61	1.29	3.6
	(10.46)	(12.11)	(13.90)	(11.30)	(14.63)	(5.44)
Southern Europe	-0.99	0.34	-9.77	-14.44	6.99	9.74
	(10.55)	(12.29)	(15.23)	(16.06)	(17.96)	(7.54)
Nordic	11.18	12.39	0.81	-2.16	2.92	2.01
	(9.75)	(11.32)	(14.61)	(11.88)	(15.41)	(5.76)
Immigration control	5.91***	2.19+	2.53	-0.8	0.56	0.89
	(1.21)	(1.17)	(2.09)	(2.34)	(0.86)	(0.95)
Disproportionality	0.12	0	-0.04	-0.11	-0.03	-0.13
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Percent elderly	1.35+	0.64	3.11*	4.92**	-1.18	-0.08
	(0.72)	(0.76)	(1.49)	(1.57)	(0.81)	(0.73)
Trade openness	-2.84	-4.42	3.47	9.66	6.42	4.55
	(3.97)	(3.95)	(7.34)	(6.59)	(5.17)	(2.90)
N	713	437	188	157	188	157
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses, obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; model 11 considers only labor immigration, scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV is long-term nativist seat share of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Table O5   Mixed-effects models 12-13

	Model 12a	Model 12b	Model 13a	Model 13b
	DV: CRI 1-100		**DV: IRO 1-100**	
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	All Periods	Post-Cold War
IRO z-score	−1.09+	0.42		
CRI z-score			−2.72	1.87
Politicization (reference: low)				
Medium politicization	−2.06	−4.98	4.48	−2.26
High politicization	−6.21*	−13.29***	2.99	−0.51
Interaction (reference: IRO/CRI * Low pol.)				
Interaction: IRO * Medium politicization	3.25*	3.22		
	(1.53)	(2.95)		
Interaction: IRO * High politicization	9.28***	8.66**		
	(2.44)	(3.00)		
Interaction: CRI * Medium politicization			4.66	2.42
			(3.01)	(3.43)
Interaction: CRI * High politicization			3.99	2.09
			(3.56)	(3.27)
Government (Right)				
Center	−3.24***	−2.93*	2.35	1.85
Left	0.84	1.22	2.44*	1.61
Constraints	−1.23	−5.54	6.84	5.13
Unemployment rate	0.04	0.09	−0.12	−0.31
EU membership	0.59	1.02	0.48	−0.66
Settler state	49.87***	45.32***	23.85*	15.99
Colonial power	35.10**	35.70***	25.75*	17.23
Southern Europe	11.95	11.59	−0.26	−1.59
Nordic	10.82	9.02	10.98	11.44
Immigration control			5.76***	2.29+
Disproportionality			0.13	0.01
Percent elderly			1.38+	0.58
Trade openness			−1.87	−5.32
N	713	437	713	437
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses (most are omitted to fit the Table on a single page), obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; key IV is interaction term of IRO and CRI, respectively, with levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Table O7 Mixed-effects models 14-15

	Model 14a	Model 14b	Model 15a	Model 15b
	DV: CRI 1-100		**DV: IRO 1-100**	
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	All Periods	Post-Cold War
IRO z-score	0.68	2.27*		
CRI z-score			−1.5	2.39+
Politicization z-score	−2.25*	−6.07***	2.24	0.5
Interaction: IRO * politicization	**2.68***	**3.02****		
	(0.75)	**(1.03)**		
Interaction: CRI * politicization			**2.01**	**0.72**
			(1.26)	**(1.18)**
Government (Right)				
Center	−3.31***	−3.01*	2.33	1.88
Left	0.82	1.21	2.37*	1.63+
Constraints	−0.4	−5.23	6.9	4.64
Unemployment rate	0.05	0.07	−0.1	−0.3
EU membership	0.71	1.17	0.76	−0.52
Settler state	49.83***	44.41***	24.00*	16.18
Colonial power	35.18**	35.72***	25.68*	16.65
Southern Europe	11.59	10.38	−0.43	−1.41
Nordic	10.28	7.41	11.76	11.87
Immigration control			5.64***	2.25+
Disproportionality			0.12	0.01
Percent elderly			1.33+	0.57
Trade openness			−1.92	−5.39
N	713	437	713	437
Country RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Election RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year RE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses (most are omitted to fit the Table on a single page), obtained from mixed-effects REML multilevel models; only fixed part is shown; constant not shown; country-year observations nested in and cross-classified across countries, elections, and years; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; key IV is interaction term of IRO and CRI, respectively, with levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system.

Q   REGRESSION MODELS: RANDOM-EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS

Table Q1   Random-effects models 1-3

	Model 1c	Model 1d	Model 2c	Model 2d	Model 3c	Model 3d
DV: CRI 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: IRO z-score	−1.30+	−0.75	−1.59*	−1.64	1.74	5.18**
	(0.67)	(1.08)	(0.70)	(1.41)	(1.28)	(1.68)
Politicization	−0.27*	−0.32*	−0.09	−0.01	−0.31+	−0.51**
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.43)	(0.72)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Government (Right)						
Center	−1.69+	−0.65	−1.98+	−1.32	−0.67	0.12
	(0.88)	(1.14)	(1.04)	(1.49)	(1.90)	(2.38)
Left	−0.05	−0.06	−0.25	−1.07	1.1	2.01
	(0.63)	(0.85)	(0.76)	(1.29)	(1.09)	(1.38)
Constraints	−5.12	−2.91	−12.63	−25.69+	−5.41	−5.8
	(4.11)	(3.61)	(7.74)	(14.82)	(4.67)	(4.86)
Unemployment rate	0.26	0.27	0.21	0.21	0.87+	1.81**
	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.50)	(0.59)
EU membership	3.82*	4.16	5.43*	8.42*	−2.61	−7.47+
	(1.87)	(3.00)	(2.15)	(4.22)	(3.82)	(4.29)
Settler state	52.37***	49.15***	50.74***	46.12***	55.23***	47.11***
	(3.63)	(5.05)	(3.89)	(6.42)	(7.59)	(5.59)
Colonial power	35.32***	36.90***	32.34***	32.48***	47.19***	42.21***
	(3.90)	(4.95)	(4.95)	(6.00)	(4.77)	(4.62)
Southern Europe	10.28*	11.79*	7.94	4.15	16.91***	22.54***
	(4.30)	(5.87)	(5.12)	(7.23)	(4.95)	(4.60)
Nordic	12.00**	10.48+	12.80**	10.33+	28.58***	23.22***
	(3.69)	(5.38)	(4.04)	(6.18)	(6.32)	(5.71)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
R squared	0.45	0.51	0.51	0.56	0.76	0.82
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F).

Table Q2   Random-effects models 4-6

	Model 4c	Model 4d	Model 5c	Model 5d	Model 6c	Model 6d
DV: IRO 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: CRI z-score	**-2.56+**	**-0.59**	**-3.68***	**-1.6**	**4.85***	**5.12****
	(1.55)	**(1.51)**	**(1.65)**	**(1.82)**	**(2.11)**	**(1.62)**
Politicization	0.09	0.13	0.55	0.31	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.67)	(0.50)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Government (Right)						
Center	0.75	-0.3	1.55	1.32	-5.99+	-4.92*
	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.29)	(1.52)	(3.21)	(2.48)
Left	1.34	0.35	2.22	2.3	-3.46*	-3.89*
	(1.08)	(1.19)	(1.47)	(1.82)	(1.74)	(1.87)
Constraints	10.57	4.27	14.64	8.3	13.93	9.09
	(7.90)	(7.65)	(16.69)	(27.20)	(10.20)	(9.47)
Unemployment rate	-0.34	-0.31	-0.34	-0.29	0.19	0.71
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.73)	(0.62)
EU membership	-1.77	-1.06	-1.26	0.76	-5.67	-8.43*
	(2.75)	(2.08)	(3.21)	(2.86)	(4.46)	(3.38)
Settler state	30.41***	31.37***	35.85***	38.85***	29.41***	20.63***
	(8.82)	(6.79)	(9.82)	(6.60)	(8.51)	(5.81)
Colonial power	31.30***	23.98***	38.89***	29.30***	10.63	9.67+
	(4.98)	(4.89)	(6.13)	(6.80)	(7.14)	(5.08)
Southern Europe	2.77	-1.35	4.85	3.69	-0.25	-4.49
	(6.46)	(7.69)	(7.19)	(8.46)	(7.17)	(6.40)
Nordic	13.66**	15.06***	16.40**	20.52***	7.19	8.96**
	(5.02)	(4.45)	(5.54)	(4.54)	(5.34)	(3.45)
Immigration control	2.64*	-1.09	3.36**	-1.48	1.5	-2.52
	(1.09)	(1.28)	(1.29)	(1.56)	(2.37)	(2.45)
Disproportionality	-0.04	-0.3	0.02	-0.4	-0.09	-0.19
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.30)
Percent elderly	3.25***	3.22***	3.09***	2.97***	2.22	2.69*
	(0.71)	(0.82)	(0.78)	(0.88)	(1.47)	(1.35)
Trade openness	0.73	-1.22	2.59	-0.97	16.75***	17.98***
	(2.76)	(2.62)	(3.18)	(2.94)	(5.04)	(4.70)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
R squared	0.11	0.39	0.19	0.48	0.63	0.76
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A).

Table Q3   Random-effects models 7-8

	Model 7c	Model 7d	Model 8c	Model 8d
DV: CRI 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: Nativist power 10%	-6.62***	-7.06***	-2.96	-6.49**
	(1.92)	(1.80)	(2.26)	(2.17)
Government (Right)				
Center	-1.68+	-0.49	-0.72	0.33
	(0.88)	(1.11)	(1.83)	(1.77)
Left	-0.08	-0.01	1.1	1.07
	(0.62)	(0.82)	(1.07)	(1.01)
Constraints	-5.44	-3.1	-4.67	-2.52
	(4.09)	(3.55)	(4.44)	(3.38)
Unemployment rate	0.24	0.24	0.8	1.00*
	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.51)	(0.51)
EU membership	4.02*	3.79	-0.65	-2.49
	(1.85)	(2.94)	(3.83)	(3.89)
Settler state	49.99***	45.93***	56.11***	49.11***
	(3.79)	(5.64)	(7.83)	(7.95)
Colonial power	32.19***	34.09***	45.06***	38.48***
	(4.12)	(5.39)	(5.83)	(6.05)
Southern Europe	10.06*	11.83+	15.02**	24.12***
	(4.42)	(6.26)	(5.25)	(4.94)
Nordic	9.79*	7.86	27.30***	21.06**
	(3.85)	(5.91)	(7.36)	(7.23)
N	713	437	188	157
R squared	0.44	0.5	0.75	0.79
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV is long-term nativist seat share of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Table Q4   Random-effects models 9-11

DV: IRO 1-100	Model 9c	Model 9d	Model 10c	Model 10d	Model 11c	Model 11d
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW	Labor immigration only	
					Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: Nativist power 10%	**2.89**	**2.03**	**−5.55***	**−7.89*****	**−4.24**	**−4.05****
	(3.07)	**(2.56)**	**(2.27)**	**(1.86)**	**(2.58)**	**(1.42)**
Government (Right)						
Center	0.94	−0.29	−7.94*	−5.66*	−3.14	−0.3
	(1.10)	(1.09)	(3.08)	(2.39)	(2.10)	(1.50)
Left	1.36	0.35	−5.53**	−3.62+	−0.2	0.62
	(1.08)	(1.20)	(1.81)	(1.88)	(1.63)	(0.88)
Constraints	11.55	4.42	5.59	3.11	−5.81	−3.61
	(7.93)	(7.64)	(9.99)	(9.45)	(11.33)	(4.59)
Unemployment rate	−0.36	−0.33	−0.18	1.38*	−0.07	1.02**
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.66)	(0.60)	(0.69)	(0.33)
EU membership	−2.23	−1.08	−3.98	−9.32***	7.50*	3.93**
	(2.71)	(2.07)	(3.88)	(2.78)	(3.63)	(1.44)
Settler state	25.48**	30.03***	43.46***	29.24***	21.03***	5.55+
	(8.04)	(6.41)	(5.91)	(5.05)	(6.36)	(3.22)
Colonial power	28.61***	23.70***	16.85**	7.91+	1.53	−1.28
	(4.59)	(4.35)	(5.43)	(4.79)	(4.59)	(2.85)
Southern Europe	1.58	−1.77	7.57	1.61	−9.99	2.78
	(6.32)	(7.86)	(6.46)	(6.29)	(8.19)	(3.34)
Nordic	13.04**	15.30***	7.57	2.28	−7.87	−3.51
	(4.94)	(4.57)	(5.02)	(3.98)	(4.80)	(2.59)
Immigration control	2.73*	−1.02	0.86	−1.64	2.69	0.64
	(1.09)	(1.27)	(2.36)	(2.58)	(2.70)	(1.11)
Disproportionality	−0.04	−0.27	−0.15	−0.24	−0.11	−0.01
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.13)
Percent elderly	3.19***	3.07***	4.08**	3.70**	3.75*	0.62
	(0.72)	(0.86)	(1.25)	(1.29)	(1.60)	(0.66)
Trade openness	0.13	−1.78	22.29***	25.31***	0.69	4.41+
	(2.70)	(2.64)	(4.61)	(4.80)	(4.45)	(2.41)
N	713	437	188	157	188	157
R squared	0.11	0.38	0.69	0.76	0.56	0.89
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; model 11 considers only labor immigration, scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV is long-term nativist seat share of all nativist parties (average across the past 10 years of parties to the right of conservative parties).

Table Q5 Random-effects models 12-13

	Model 12c	Model 12d	Model 13c	Model 13d
	DV: CRI 1-100		**DV: IRO 1-100**	
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	All Periods	Post-Cold War
IRO z-score	−1.90**	−2.63*		
CRI z-score			−2.92+	−1.02
Politicization (reference: low)				
Medium politicization	−2.22+	−4.39*	1.07	1.31
High politicization	−3.41*	−7.97***	3.24	4.13*
Interaction (reference: IRO/CRI * Low pol.)				
Interaction: IRO * Medium politicization	**1.75+**	**3.67***		
	(0.90)	**(1.60)**		
Interaction: IRO * High politicization	**4.60****	**7.91****		
	(1.58)	**(1.86)**		
Interaction: CRI * Medium politicization			**0.59**	**0.19**
			(1.94)	**(2.25)**
Interaction: CRI * High politicization			**1.28**	**0.79**
			(2.87)	**(2.45)**
Government (Right)				
Center	−1.67+	−1.06	0.66	−0.45
Left	−0.06	−0.28	1.26	0.37
Constraints	−7.40+	−8.85*	10.44	5.83
Unemployment rate	0.29	0.36	−0.32	−0.26
EU membership	4.56*	6.99*	−1.87	−1.54
Settler state	52.79***	51.20***	30.98***	33.46***
Colonial power	35.14***	36.48***	30.88***	23.89***
Southern Europe	10.32*	10.05*	2.86	−0.89
Nordic	12.70***	12.00**	13.61**	15.21***
Immigration control			2.63*	−1.26
Disproportionality			−0.05	−0.35
Percent elderly			3.25***	3.52***
Trade openness			0.99	−0.12
N	713	437	713	437
R squared	0.47	0.57	0.12	0.42
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, + $p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses (most are omitted to fit the Table on a single page), obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; key IV is interaction term of IRO and CRI, respectively, with levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system; low politicization <5%; medium politicization 5-10%; high politicization >=10%.

Table Q6   Random-effects models 14-15

	Model 14c	Model 14d	Model 15c	Model 15d
	DV: CRI 1-100		**DV: IRO 1-100**	
	All Periods	Post-Cold War	All Periods	Post-Cold War
IRO z-score	-0.95	-0.75		
	(0.69)	(1.10)		
CRI z-score			-2.52	-0.54
			(1.55)	(1.51)
Politicization z-score	-1.49*	-3.06***	1.38	1.67*
	(0.62)	(0.78)	(1.07)	(0.83)
Interaction: IRO * politicization	**1.24***	**2.45***		
	(0.58)	**(0.71)**		
Interaction: CRI * politicization			**0.79**	**0.6**
			(1.11)	**(0.83)**
Government (Right)				
Center	-1.62+	-0.74	0.67	-0.44
Left	0	-0.09	1.28	0.25
Constraints	-7.06+	-7.71+	9.8	3.84
Unemployment rate	0.27	0.31	-0.32	-0.28
EU membership	4.52*	6.35*	-1.77	-1.12
Settler state	52.58***	50.19***	30.23***	31.18***
Colonial power	35.04***	36.21***	30.45***	22.71***
Southern Europe	10.15*	10.19*	2.58	-1.54
Nordic	12.26***	11.00*	13.76**	15.13***
Immigration control			2.62*	-1.07
Disproportionality			-0.04	-0.3
Percent elderly			3.19***	3.18***
Trade openness			0.71	-1.2
N	713	437	713	437
R squared	0.46	0.56	0.11	0.4
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes   *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses (most are omitted to fit the Table on a single page), obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; key IV is interaction term of IRO and CRI, respectively, with levels of politicization (value is derived from the geometric mean of immigration-related issue salience in party manifestos parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote and electoral support for all nativist parties); politicization can be interpreted as the degree to which immigration is contested in a party system.

R REGRESSION MODELS: ALTERNATIVE RANDOM-EFFECTS SPECIFICATIONS

Table R1   Cluster-corrected random-effects models 1-3

	Model 1e	Model 1f	Model 2e	Model 2f	Model 3e	Model 3f
DV: CRI 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: IRO z-score	0.38	2.97	0.38	1.58	7.17	12.19*
	(0.99)	(1.85)	(0.88)	(1.73)	(4.64)	(4.83)
Politicization	−0.26	−0.96**	−0.59	−1.34	−0.84+	−1.02*
	(0.54)	(0.34)	(0.97)	(1.58)	(0.50)	(0.44)
Government (Right)						
Center	−9.05**	−7.46+	−6.99*	−6.44	−6.72	−2.62
	(3.00)	(4.53)	(3.46)	(5.56)	(5.03)	(4.69)
Left	−0.94	0.52	−0.53	0.42	6.82	5.99
	(1.47)	(2.18)	(1.80)	(3.06)	(4.35)	(4.50)
Constraints	0.06	−3.39	17.35	3.07	−22.04	−20.35
	(9.58)	(8.36)	(14.64)	(31.57)	(16.90)	(16.39)
Unemployment rate	0.51	0.29	0.32	0.35	3.50***	3.23***
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(1.01)	(0.97)
EU membership	1.58	4.75	3.52	5.43	−10.45*	−8.65**
	(3.88)	(4.72)	(3.11)	(5.62)	(4.08)	(3.17)
Settler state	50.22***	46.69***	55.59***	45.62***	39.22***	35.94***
	(10.46)	(9.92)	(12.27)	(13.79)	(10.32)	(10.78)
Colonial power	34.70***	33.36**	33.46**	29.03*	36.51***	31.67***
	(9.87)	(10.17)	(11.64)	(13.18)	(6.40)	(6.47)
Southern Europe	8.61	7.33	8.7	2.39	8.85	14.67**
	(13.57)	(13.21)	(15.51)	(17.69)	(5.66)	(4.61)
Nordic	9.69	6.34	12.18	4.54	16.90*	14.35*
	(10.05)	(9.74)	(10.49)	(11.96)	(7.86)	(6.76)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
Cluster-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using cluster-corrected standard errors; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F).

Table R2   Cluster-corrected random-effects models 4-6

	Model 4e	Model 4f	Model 5e	Model 5f	Model 6e	Model 6f
DV: IRO 1-100	All Periods	Post-Cold War	Non-pol. all periods	Non-pol. Post-CW	Politicized all periods	Politicized Post-CW
IV: CRI z-score	0.14	5.04	0.36	2.51	5.44*	5.06*
	(3.08)	(3.54)	(4.12)	(4.60)	(2.52)	(2.25)
Politicization	0.12	-0.07	2.26	1.27	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.53)	(0.35)	(1.75)	(1.27)	(0.39)	(0.29)
Government (Right)						
Center	5.38	4.81	8.51*	10.48+	-14.63*	-6.54+
	(3.36)	(3.90)	(4.24)	(6.21)	(6.03)	(3.39)
Left	0.75	1.67	3.83	7.34	-6.01*	-3.70+
	(3.41)	(3.38)	(4.68)	(4.64)	(3.05)	(1.89)
Constraints	-15.15	-0.76	-19.37	15.7	32.58**	16.12+
	(25.18)	(15.44)	(28.03)	(38.57)	(10.79)	(9.20)
Unemployment rate	0.51	-0.14	0.45	-0.25	0.11	0.51
	(0.68)	(0.52)	(0.60)	(0.54)	(1.18)	(0.75)
EU membership	4.21	0.02	1.74	-1.41	-5.07	-10.30***
	(4.60)	(3.10)	(5.79)	(4.37)	(5.74)	(1.21)
Settler state	23.66	11.51	20.46	22.77	23.69+	19.76+
	(14.96)	(16.66)	(18.99)	(18.99)	(13.68)	(10.68)
Colonial power	26.71+	13.79	31.33+	23.77	3.17	7.79
	(14.22)	(15.66)	(17.38)	(17.43)	(6.90)	(4.92)
Southern Europe	-4.09	-2.82	-5.88	2.71	-1.64	-3.4
	(8.97)	(12.05)	(10.94)	(13.69)	(6.57)	(3.63)
Nordic	10.62	9.56	11.55	12.88	7.3	10.67*
	(12.07)	(13.50)	(12.56)	(12.35)	(7.05)	(4.78)
Immigration control	7.84*	4.81	9.12**	4.06	-2.86	-4.24
	(3.47)	(3.03)	(3.20)	(3.49)	(4.28)	(3.51)
Disproportionality	-0.4	0.18	-0.72	-0.84	0.67	0.34
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.63)	(0.82)	(0.46)	(0.23)
Percent elderly	1.26	0.43	1.7	1.13	2.87	3.26+
	(1.63)	(1.59)	(1.97)	(1.62)	(1.84)	(1.71)
Trade openness	-4.28	-5.05	-6.21	-9.01	26.00***	23.86***
	(7.64)	(6.72)	(8.78)	(7.93)	(6.47)	(4.97)
N	713	437	525	280	188	157
R squared	0.11	0.39	0.19	0.48	0.63	0.76
Panel-corrected SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Robust SE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
AR1 process modeled	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Period FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

*** $p<0.001$; ** $p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$, +$p<0.1$; entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and panel-corrected and robust standard errors in parentheses, obtained from random-effects models correcting for autocorrelation using Prais-Winsten estimation; constant not shown; fixed-effects for historical periods (Cold War, 1992-2001, Post-9/11) included; DV is Immigration Regime Openness (IRO; see Appendix F) scaled with empirical minima and maxima 1-100; key IV are z-scores of Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI; see Appendix A).

"The main strengths of the thesis are, in my view: the novel research questions which has major implications for current normative theories and political debates on immigration; the meticulous engagement with a wide-ranging literature on related topics; the compilation and coding of longitudinal data measuring immigration and citizenship policies; the sophisticated statistical analyses used to explore relations between the two kinds of policies and the impact of polarization and the strength of the far right; a broad familiarity with empirical contexts based not only on existing literature but also initial fieldwork in Austria, Belgium and New Zealand, which will provide important material for a later monograph. Sam's style of writing is clear and vivid. Overall, I think this is an excellent thesis and the three papers on which it is based will firmly establish their author as an important voice in the academic field of immigration and citizenship policy."

Rainer Bauböck, Chair in Social and Political Theory, European University Institute, supervisor

"The dissertation displays the candidate's knowledge and mastery of the literature in a truly impressive wide-ranging body of scholarship on the subject. Fully in the spirit of the interdisciplinary nature of the field of study, the dissertation brings in and critically employs the relevant concepts, theories, and approaches from various academic sub-disciplines, including political theory, comparative politics, political economy, and migration and citizenship studies. The candidate's critical assessment of the literature, as well as the original alternatives he presents, both in terms of the concepts, theories and research methods used in the many cited studies, display his capacity for independent scholarship beyond any doubt."

Maarten Vink, Chair in Citizenship Studies, European University Institute, co-supervisor

"I can confidently say that I have not seen a more proficient demonstration of statistical methods as applied to citizenship and immigration than demonstrated in this document. Mr. Schmid is careful, thoughtful, and thorough. Mr. Schmid meticulously works through existing citizenship and immigration policy indices, which helped me better understand his novel contributions. As a result, I foresee his novel citizenship index – CITRIX – to be a useful tool for researchers moving forward. And, related to this index creation, I found his exhaustive use and considerations of principal component analyses (e.g., altering number of dimensions, both in the text and the appendix) to demonstrate admirable circumspection. Last on this point, he uses this text as an opportunity to illustrate not only a proficiency but an artistry to data visualization."

Sara Wallace Goodman, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, external examiner

"In a nutshell, I believe this is a truly impressive doctoral dissertation. I thoroughly appreciated its theoretical richness, empirical rigor, originality, ambition to advance and contribute to ongoing debates in professional political science, and dialogue between empirical and normative debates. In my experience after graduating at the European University Institute myself, close to 10 years at the University of Oxford, and more than 2 years at the University of Glasgow, it is not rare to see one of these features in a good dissertation. However, it is rare to find all of those features at once in an outstanding thesis."

Sergi Pardos-Prado, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Glasgow, external examiner

"The Examining Board unanimously recommended an immediate unconditional acceptance and decided to award the doctorate of the EUI in Political and Social Sciences. This decision was uncontroversial given the high quality of the thesis submitted (both in its original and revised form after the examination reports), and Samuel Schmid's impressive, convincing, and meticulous performance during the defense. In fact, the candidate showed an unusual level of preparation for the defense, providing extra materials and slides targeted to some of the questions that came up during the viva."

Final report on the defense, December 8th, 2021, Florence, Italy